Steffi Schadow

While Kant’s conception of science in relation to the natural sciences as well as to psychology and anthropology and even to logic has been the subject of much discussion, the question of the extent to which Kant regards ethics as a science has received only marginal attention. This is unfortunate since Kant leaves no doubt that the idea of moral philosophy as a science is central to an adequate understanding of morality and moral obligation, and is therefore one of the key elements in his practical philosophy. The aim of this paper is to explore Kant’s idea of moral philosophy as a science. Why does Kant think that the scientific method is crucial for a successful theory of ethics? To answer this question, it will be necessary to clarify what Kant might have meant by the idea of a scientific moral philosophy. Accordingly, the plan for the paper is as follows: First, I will briefly discuss Kant’s concept of science in general. I will then refer to Kant’s description of the idea and aim of moral philosophy in the Preface to the Groundwork. As will be shown, what moral philosophy has in common with other sciences, according to Kant, is that it is understood as metaphysics and thereby deals in the first line with the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori. Third, I will argue that Kant understands moral philosophy as a rational science in which objective moral rules are both the product and the object of practical rationality. Finally, it is shown that this position, which I call Kant’s methodological constitutivism, is powerful in at least two ways: First, it fulfils an ideal of science that is still valid today with its claim to objectivity. And second, it gives us an idea of what it might be like to defend an account of moral objectivity within a Kantian framework.

In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the Categorical Imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses her pro-attitudes, i.e., interests, preferences, and life-plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations on Kant’s concept of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims is debated.

The concept of practical identity is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy, both in Kantian-inspired models such as that of Christine Korsgaard, and non-Kantian models such as that of Bernard Williams. However, it is not clear to what extent the references to Kant have a substantive basis, since it is not entirely apparent what exactly one should refer to in Kant when speaking of a ‘practical identity’. This, in turn, makes it difficult to discern what precisely a ‚Kantian‘ concept of practical identity could look like, and whether criticism of it is justified. Here, I will argue that Kant’s texts provide us with several useful aspects of the concept of practical identity, which in turn help us to understand the model of universal moral justification that he advocates.

This article examines the philosophical concept of happiness and its connection to the concept of time. The concept of happiness is one of the oldest concepts in philosophy. Accordingly, the article begins by examining the historical context of ‘happiness’. It then goes on to explore the ‘form of happiness’, identifying subjective and objective concepts of happiness and also taking into account the psychological interpretation of the concept. Finally, the article considers the temporal dimension of ‘happiness’.

The view that morality consists of laws has a rich, particularly religious, tradition. In current debates on ethics, however, it is anything but philosophical commonsense. Not least due to the return to the advantages of virtue ethics, principle-oriented ethics such as the moral law approach have lost popularity. Despite this, the advantages of law-based ethics can also be defended; one paradigm here is still Immanuel Kant’s attempt to ground the objectivity of morality on the concept of a moral law. Accordingly, the aim of this text is to explore the systematic potential of ethics based on the concept of law. For this purpose, I will examine the historical roots of a connection between the concept of morality and that of law and then focus on Kant’s approach to morality. Finally, I will outline the advantages of his conception of morality as autonomy over alternative models of justification of morality.

Someone is morally motivated precisely when his moral judgment or a moral fact arouses in him the intention to perform an action corresponding to the judgment or fact; we also speak of someone being moved to perform an action because of a moral attitude. For example, Sarah believes that it is moral to donate a portion of her income to solidarity causes, and this belief moves her to donate a certain amount of money to a charity each month. The philosophical question of moral motivation illuminates two fundamental aspects here: First, it aims at analyzing the nature of moral judgments: Do they motivate by themselves or only by reference to a non-cognitive state? Is Sarah's belief that donation is morally required already a motive, or must Sarah additionally desire to donate in order for her judgment to motivate her? Second, the question of moral motivation aims to analyze the relationship between moral judgments and motives: Is it necessary or contingent? Does Sarah's judgment that donating is morally required (possibly in combination with a desire to donate or be moral) necessarily mean that she is morally motivated, or can the motivation be absent?

How can what we view as morally correct be the motive force for our actions? This work investigates this question with a view to Kant's action theory and moral philosophy, based on a close textual reading. In addition to a historical and systematic framework, it provides a comprehensive textual analysis of Kant's arguments, which also takes into account aspects of the history of his works. The result is a rich picture of Kant's theory of moral motivation, which is not only rooted in Kant's concept of moral justification, but also supports it. Respect for the law is thus to be understood as a way in which human beings make the practical norm their own. According to the interpretation proposed here, moral reasons turn out to be unconditional, universally valid rules whose practical significance as subjective principles of action and motive can only be understood through Kant's theory of moral-rational sensibility. Kant's approach is thus not only of interest within his own work, but also makes an inspiring contribution to a contemporary theory of practical normativity.

Owen Ware is already well-known among Kant scholars since he published several insightful contributions on Kant’s practical philosophy. Ware has now collected five of his essays on Kant’s practical philosophy in a book. Kant’s Justification of Ethics, OUP 2021, largely refers back to some of his previously published papers. The guiding idea of the book, and a crucial feature of Ware’s approach, is the claim that Kant’s ethics and metaphysics form a unit and that the central questions of Kant’s moral philosophy have to be analyzed against this methodological background. With this assertion he opposes what he believes has been an observable research trend for a long time.

In her much debated article Modern Moral Philosophy Elizabeth Anscombe is known to argue that we are best advised to abandon the concept of moral obligation from moral discourse. This paper offers a step by step analysis of her argument against the concept of moral obligation by considering all of her relevant writings in moral philosophy and action theory. In doing so, it discusses her critical account of morality which turns out to be based on a non-homogeneous theory of practical normativity that has fundamental roots in Modern Moral Philosophy. Finally, it appears that Anscombe’s arguments against central concepts of modern moral philosophy show inner inconsistencies and weaknesses that give also reason to criticize her general philosophical position.

The contribution focuses on Kant's distinction between right and ethics. According to Kant, ethical as well as juridical laws are laws of freedom. As such they can be recognized by rational beings as unconditionally binding. The decisive difference between right and ethics consists in the way that obligations are required in their respective realms of legislation. While ethical legislation cannot be external and ethics is also concerned with inner motivations, juridical duties do not command dispositions but specific actions. Thus, for Kant, an essential characteristic of ethical normativity is that the autonomous subject compels itself.