Steph Marston

Spinoza argues that all entities are animated. Nonetheless, his philosophy provides a systematic grounding for our everyday distinction between living and non-living things. While all bodies in motion bring about transitive effects, living things share a further capacity for bringing about transformative effects, making real changes in themselves and in other entities. Further, this capacity in living things derives from their acting in virtue of their inadequate ideas. Inadequate ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy are thus intrinsic to living things’ being the kinds of things they are, underpinning both the everyday distinction between living and non-living things and the observable varying repertoires of effect among living things themselves.

Deleuze (1990) reads Part I of the Ethics as articulating an expressionist philosophy, in which to express (exprimere) is the ontological criterion for existence throughout Spinoza’s metaphysical system. However, he argues that inadequate ideas and passions are non‑expressing, such that finite modes express substance only in their adequate ideas. I argue, contra Deleuze, that Spinoza’s account of the workings of the human mind presses us to understand inadequate ideas as genuine expressions of substance which nonetheless are specific to the individuals which form them. On the same textual grounds I propose that the mind’s expression of substance in inadequate ideas, and thus in virtue of its encounters with other modes, is a source of both creativity and potential instability. I put this insight to work in a reading of Spinoza’s political philosophy, arguing that expression generates a dynamic in which social formations enact and reinforce their own forms of expression, while also being subject to the reimaginations and expression of those who live within them.

ABSTRACT According to Genevieve Lloyd, conatus is manifested in body as a fixed ratio of motion and rest and in mind as increasing adequate understanding. The commentary provides textual analysis to resolve the apparent paradox that bodily stability corresponds to intellectual growth. The activity of adequate ideas and passivity of inadequate ideas are identified as analogues of motion and rest in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind and these are put to work in exploring what is required for increasing one’s adequate understanding: that one can acquire adequate ideas only by extending one’s receptivity to being affected and by forming inadequate ideas. Thus a mind’s ratio between adequate and inadequate ideas is maintained even as it gains and exercises greater power. This appreciation of Spinoza’s epistemology supports Lloyd’s characterisation of his philosophy as “thinking from within the totality of being”.