•  1664
    Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims
    In David R. Morrow (ed.), Moral Reasoning, Oxford University Press. 2017.
  •  1380
    The Core of Care Ethics
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2015.
    Chapter 1 Introduction This chapter briefly explains what care ethics is, what care ethics is not, and how much work there still is to be done in establishing care ethics’ scope. The chapter elaborates on care ethics’ relationship to political philosophy, ethics, feminism, and the history of philosophy. The upshot of these discussions is the suggestion that we need a unified, precise statement of care ethics’ normative core. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of the chapters to come: Ch…Read more
  •  652
    Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2): 231-248. 2013.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perf…Read more
  •  536
    Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1): 38-58. 2016.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into w…Read more
  •  469
    The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again
    In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups, Oxford University Press. pp. 150-172. 2016.
    Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from individu…Read more
  •  226
    Filling Collective Duty Gaps
    Journal of Philosophy 114 (11): 573-591. 2017.
    A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive j…Read more
  •  208
    Distributing States' Duties
    Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (3): 344-366. 2015.
    In order for states to fulfil (many of) their moral obligations, costs must be passed to individuals. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
  •  185
    The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265): 701-722. 2016.
    A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for t…Read more
  •  152
    Are 'Coalitions of the Willing' Moral Agents?
    Ethics and International Affairs 28 (1). 2014.
    In this reply to an article of Toni Erskine's, I argue that coalitions of the willing are moral agents. They can therefore bear responsibility in their own right.
  •  90
    Duties to Make Friends
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5): 907-921. 2013.
    Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new …Read more
  •  42
    Duties of Group Agents and Group Members
    Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (1): 38-57. 2017.
  •  30
    Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what “the state” is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in particular a moral agent capable of taking moral respon…Read more
  •  22
    Collective Responsibility Gaps
    Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4): 943-954. 2019.
    Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsi…Read more
  •  15
    Distributing States' Duties
    Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (3): 344-366. 2016.
  •  6
    When does ‘Can’ imply ‘Ought’?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3): 354-375. 2018.
    ABSTRACTThe Assistance Principle is common currency to a wide range of moral theories. Roughly, this principle states: if you can fulfil important interests, at not too high a cost, then you have a moral duty to do so. I argue that, in determining whether the ‘not too high a cost’ clause of this principle is met, we must consider three distinct costs: ‘agent-relative costs’, ‘recipient-relative costs’ and ‘ideal-relative costs’.