The mind-brain problem is a persistent challenge in philosophy and science, having marked implications for psychiatry. In this paper, we claim that physicalism, a kind of theoretical monism, is usually taken by many psychiatrists as the only possible solution to the MBP, and argue that this may have negative consequences for the field. Not only does it restrict the psychiatric training, thereby preventing professionals from considering and reflecting upon different perspectives on the MBP, but i…
Read moreThe mind-brain problem is a persistent challenge in philosophy and science, having marked implications for psychiatry. In this paper, we claim that physicalism, a kind of theoretical monism, is usually taken by many psychiatrists as the only possible solution to the MBP, and argue that this may have negative consequences for the field. Not only does it restrict the psychiatric training, thereby preventing professionals from considering and reflecting upon different perspectives on the MBP, but it also leads clinical psychiatrists to ignore alternatives in their research agendas and clinical care. We suggest, therefore, that, as long as the MBP remains open and disputed by divergent views, theoretical monism should give place to theoretical pluralism in psychiatry.
