Stephanie Elsen

Alex Gregory argues that disabilities are best understood as particular kinds of inabilities. They should be determined relative to what are the statistically most common bodily features and ability levels in a reference class. The inability theory ties in with two aspects of how we commonly use the term ‘disability’ in everyday life and therefore appears attractively simple and intuitive. These are the ideas that disability is about a limitation of abilities and that it is a deviation from the typical or normal. In this article, I acknowledge that the inability theory is a good starting point for thinking about disability, but I then present two objections that should motivate us to continue our search for an adequate disability account. First, I show that the inability theory still faces a number of over- and underinclusiveness objections. These objections point us to features of the inability theory that make it significantly more difficult to arrive at clear, justified, and—in terms of our classification practice—convincing judgements about specific cases. Second, and more fundamentally, I show that key features of the theory are motivated solely by the consideration that a theory with these features is in line with our intuitive disability classifications. I argue that this kind of consideration should not play such a central role in shaping and justifying a theory of disability, even by Gregory’s own standards.