Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2016
Montréal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
  •  6
    Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. 2017.
    This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for…Read more
  •  24
    Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-20. forthcoming.
    ABSTRACTThe literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Norm...
  •  25
    Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (7): 878-895. 2017.
    People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to…Read more
  •  133
    In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3): 529-542. 2017.
    Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness fo…Read more