Stephanie Rumpza

In this paper, I argue against a common evaluation of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, namely, that it lacks a sufficient place for hermeneutics. This critique, which has been advanced since his early work, puts forward three major objections: (1) by holding givenness as absolute, Marion betrays the phenomenological breakthrough he claims to defend; (2) by recasting the role of the subject as the receptive adonné, he renders the self passive and undermines our freedom in the process of knowing; (3) by placing initiative on the given as arriving from outside our anticipations, Marion refuses any horizon of interpretation, whether history, tradition, culture, language, or practice, even though these things are structurally necessary to our understanding. Against this common view, I will argue that Marion has provided an adequate response to each of these critiques. In Part I, I will discuss the first two objections through Marion’s essay “The Hermeneutics of Givenness.” In Part II, I will extend this discussion to the extremes by considering the radical cases of saturated phenomena, building on Revelation Comes from Elsewhere. Finally, in Part III I will consider the broader hermeneutic horizons of language, culture, and history with a special attention to La métaphysique et après. By bringing to light Marion’s answers to these hermeneutic concerns, we will not only gain a better sense of how Marion sees his own project, but how the larger world of phenomenology situates itself in relation to hermeneutics, and where further lines of hermeneutic study might complement and challenge these insights.

"Why is it that so many Catholics continue to find Continental Philosophy attractive? This volume by leading philosophers and theologians explores the reception of continental philosophy, and its history within Catholic Institutions in the twentieth century. From its earliest days in North America, Catholic philosophers and theologians have been the strongest supporters of continental philosophy; in turn, this has contributed to the intellectual enrichment of Catholic universities, making an important mark on Catholic thought. By taking a stance towards the evolving relationship between Catholics and Continental Philosophy, many of the contributors to this volume serve as living demonstrations that this engagement is far from over. Exploring the mutual interests that made this alliance possible as well as their underlying tensions, contributors provide, for the first time, a sustained account of the historical, institutional, and intellectual relationship between Catholicism and Continental Philosophy."--

Jean-Luc Marion’s Erotic Phenomenon strictly denies reciprocity in love. This has led many readers to critique his account of love as a self-confirming idolatry which denies any place for the beloved. By a close reading of the text, I show that, in fact, Marion’s embrace of asymmetry is precisely what opens the ego to the new horizon of love’s gratuity, which is the very condition for the other to appear; denying reciprocity is a precondition for affirming love’s rich abundance. At the same time, I suggest, this asymmetrical focus also leaves a critical dimension of love underdeveloped: that love must involve a response to a particular other. Building on the implications of Marion’s own logic, I sketch in what a more complete account of this structure would look like, and illustrate it with a literary example from J. D. Salinger.

In this paper, I argue against a common evaluation of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, namely, that it lacks a sufficient place for hermeneutics. This critique, which has been advanced since his early work, puts forward three major objections: (1) by holding givenness as absolute, Marion betrays the phenomenological breakthrough he claims to defend; (2) by recasting the role of the subject as the receptive adonné, he renders the self passive and undermines our freedom in the process of knowing; (3) by placing initiative on the given as arriving from outside our anticipations, Marion refuses any horizon of interpretation, whether history, tradition, culture, language, or practice, even though these things are structurally necessary to our understanding. Against this common view, I will argue that Marion has provided an adequate response to each of these critiques. In Part I, I will discuss the first two objections through Marion’s essay “The Hermeneutics of Givenness.” In Part II, I will extend this discussion to the extremes by considering the radical cases of saturated phenomena, building on Revelation Comes from Elsewhere. Finally, in Part III I will consider the broader hermeneutic horizons of language, culture, and history with a special attention to La métaphysique et après. By bringing to light Marion’s answers to these hermeneutic concerns, we will not only gain a better sense of how Marion sees his own project, but how the larger world of phenomenology situates itself in relation to hermeneutics, and where further lines of hermeneutic study might complement and challenge these insights.

In this chapter, I situate many of the themes of the book by providing a background context to the so-called “theological turn” that outsiders do not always fully appreciate. Namely, in France, philosophy—phenomenology included—is inseparable from the serious study of the history of philosophy, which in turn has been informed by Heidegger. In addition to his phenomenological breakthroughs, Heidegger claimed that the accomplishment of metaphysics has not only blinded us to the most important questions, but deformed the very shape of our philosophical reasoning, effectively paralyzing our inquiry until a new way of “thinking” can be found. French philosophers have engaged very seriously with the historical dimensions of this argument. Many leaders of “theological turn” were deeply versed in the history of philosophy in general and this Heideggerian problematic in particular. Their originality was then not so much an arbitrary turn to theology, but a historically informed response to this Heideggerian problematic, using the question of God and religious-inspired thinking to escape the onto-theo-logically oriented metaphysics. While it is legitimate to continue to critically question what a discourse about God would mean for philosophy, a truly rigorous philosophy must set aside any prohibitions made on ideological grounds to examine on their own terms the gains that have been made through these efforts to think alongside religious thinkers and questions.

A strong front of resistance to the ever-narrowing rationality of our age, contemporary French philosophy shows us how the question of God can free up promising new pathways for our thinking. In an age where thinking is too often restricted to its scientific exercise, how better to liberate the full powers of our reason than to engage with the possibility of what exceeds them? What better way to measure our progress beyond modernist metaphysics and the contemporary nihilism it generated than to discuss the question of God? Written by specialists in French philosophy, the essays in this volume use the question of God to identify problematic metaphysical patterns still carved into our thought as well as to reconstruct new paths for philosophy that open beyond these limitations. Discussing the work of Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Héring, Levinas, Derrida, and others, contributions range across topics including the influence of Neo-Platonic philosophy on theology, the errors of modern rationalism, and phenomenology's interest in Christianity. Even when drawing on resources from the religious tradition, this French engagement with the question of God defies any simplistic attempt to relegate its efforts to theology; the authors of this volume clearly demonstrate its deeply-embedded relation to the history of thought and its relevance to questions central for the task of philosophy today. With a special attention the work of significant philosophers less known outside of France, this volume promises to deepen the Anglophone reception and understanding of contemporary French philosophy.

The Orthodox icon is often claimed as unique among images. Yet many proponents of this view, such as Leonid Ouspensky and Pavel Florensky, defend this singularity through a polemic against Western realism using a logic that culminates in a polemic against the world of experience. In this paper, I will use phenomenology to dismantle these two false dualities, against realist images and real experience, by uncovering the deeper concerns that motivate them. First, I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of painting to collapse the dichotomy of carnal and spiritual images. Then, I use Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenality of Revelation to reframe the dichotomy of worldly and spiritual experience. This broadened understanding of experience will serve as a starting point to refine our understanding of what is claimed by the icon, both in its function as an image and in the world it opens for those who approach it on its own terms.

How can something finite mediate an infinite God? Weaving patristics, theology, art history, aesthetics, and religious practice with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Hans-George Gadamer and Jean-Luc Marion, Stephanie Rumpza proposes a new answer to this paradox by offering a fresh and original approach to the Byzantine icon. She demonstrates the power and relevance of the phenomenological method to integrate hermeneutic aesthetics and divine transcendence, notably how the material and visual dimensions of the icon are illuminated by traditional practices of prayer. Rumpza's study targets a problem that is a major fault line in the continental philosophy of religion – the integrity of finite beings I relation to a God that transcends them. For philosophers, her book demonstrates the relevance of a cherished religious practice of Eastern Christianity. For art historians, she proposes a novel philosophical paradigm for understanding the icon as it is approached in practice.

Jean-Luc Marion is often interpreted as a thinker of the purely invisible and apophatic, in tension with the rich forms of mediation found in Christian practice. I will challenge these assumptions through a close reading of one of Marion's rare concrete examples, the “icon”— not his philosophical use of the term, but the holy image that initially inspired it. Marion defines the sacred image by its “transparency,” “self-effacement,” or “kenosis.” This seems to indicate that the icon must cancel itself out to make room for God, an iconoclastic attitude with troubling consequences for the believer who prays to the icon and for the rest of the finite world. By rigorously developing Marion's understanding of this word “kenosis,” I argue that, counter to initial impressions, this account of the sacred image is deeply faithful to the essential aspects of the Byzantine icon understood as a “window into heaven.”

In this interview, Jean Greisch discusses the 1979 Colloquium Heidegger et la Question de Dieu, his original contribution to the published volume, and its impact on his later work. Greisch first situates the conference within the reception history of Heidegger as well as the critical advancements of Levinas and Derrida that made such a questioning of God palatable within the French philosophical context. He argues that theological thinking delivers an important challenge to philosophical thinking, and reflects on what such a meeting point could mean. Finally he voices a double challenge to Heidegger, not only in his forgetting of the Hebraic tradition, but his complicity with Nazi antisemitism, while yet advising against a wholesale rejection of Heidegger’s insights.

In this interview, Jean-Luc Marion recalls the intellectual world of Paris in 1970s, reflecting on how his engagement with the ubiquitous “death of God” question led to the sketches of God without Being first presented at this 1979 Colloquium, and discusses the criticism it provoked not only from Heideggerians but also from Thomists. He discusses the reception history of phenomenology in France the reasons for the particular power it gained among thinkers of his generation. Finally, he recounts how his work has led from the 1979 Colloquium through the “Theological Turn” and up to his forthcoming D’ ailleurs, la révélation, which he briefly previews here. Marion closes with words on originality, criticism, and the particular challenges of the contemporary world that await philosophical thinking today.

In this concluding reflection, the editors of this special issue reflect on the significance that Heidegger has had for French philosophy, precisely because of the creative and critical engagement of many of the original thinkers demonstrated above. It is not insignificant that Christian thinkers were drawn to Heidegger, seeing promise in his expansion of philosophical questioning, above all an enrichment of the idea of truth. However it is equally important to recognize that Heidegger’s native Christian roots were stripped of their animating spirit, the question of God and the revelation of the Hebraic scriptures. It is thus notable that the criticisms from this conference originating from the side of faith frequently appeal to the Scriptures as they argue that there are truths which Heidegger himself simply does not seem to see.

Organized by Richard Kearney and Joseph S. O’Leary, the 1979 Colloquium Heidegger et la question de Dieu was of critical importance for the development of phenomenology of religion in France. This special issue introduces the event and its ensuing publication to the English-speaking world. The editors’ historical and thematic contextualizing essay is followed by contributions from six leading philosophers. Richard Kearney sets the stage by updating his original foreword, while Jean-Yves Lacoste presents the central moments in the history of Heidegger’s complicated relationship to Christian thinking. Paul Ricoeur’s “Introductory Note” delivers a well-known challenge to Heidegger in a piece whose brevity belies its impact. Finally, three participants of the 1979 Colloquium, Joseph S. O’Leary, Jean Greisch, and Jean-Luc Marion, reflect back on the significance of this event and its role in developing their own groundbreaking work. The special issue closes with a brief reflection on where we find ourselves in philosophy today.

Heidegger’s account of what it is to be a human being is compelling, but closed off to the idea of an Absolute. Yet Jean-Yves Lacoste argues it is possible even for Christianity to accept these atheistic structures of Dasein as native to the human condition. The initial closure of these structures to God cannot be erased, but one can marginalize them to make space for “liturgy,” or a relation to the Absolute. Lacoste offers asceticism as the most vivid illustration of this liturgical marginalization, as a subversion of the structure of care. However, this immediately produces a contradiction. This subversion of care is itself a project of care: to succeed in marginalizing care only confirms it all the deeply. To rescue Lacoste from this vicious circle, I will draw upon Evagrius Ponticus, a 4th century desert monk known for his keen analysis of ascetic experience. Evagrius’ writings show how the subversion of care in ascesis can be completed only by its subversion in prayer. The interplay of these two moments, as elaborated through Evagrius’ writings, thus support Lacoste’s argument and offer a compelling illustration of these ideas at work.

While it has become commonplace to use the term “icon” in philosophy of religion, it is an “icon” modeled after the resources of language. We find this for example in the recent Blackfriars article by Adam Glover, which despite its intention to treat the icon as an image, reduces it once again to a general form of reference which immediately feeds back into the linguistic. But might the icon have resources unique to its character as an image that can help us understand what is meant by the paradoxical task of making visible the invisible God? This article takes up this task in conversation with the work of Jean-Luc Marion.