Stephanie Sheintul

Some scholars working on the ethics of paternalism are interested in whether there is a systematic normative connection between hard paternalism and people’s moral rights. One affirmative view is that hard paternalism is pro tanto wrong inasmuch as it always involves a rights infringement. Daniel Groll defends this view on the grounds that hard paternalism always infringes a competent adult’s right to be the only one to act only for his own good. I call this right the right to self-beneficence. In this note, I argue that Groll misidentifies a right that competent adults have. Rather than the right to self-beneficence, I argue that if hard paternalism infringes any particular right, it is a right that a competent adult has against others “taking over” matters that fall within his sphere of legitimate agency or, by extension, the legitimate exercise of his agency. I call this right the right against legitimate agency interference.

This paper aims to answer the following question: what is the normative connection between paternalism and the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency? I consider the following two views. The Robust View says that paternalism is pro tanto wrong insofar as the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is always disrespectful. The Less Robust View says that whenever the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is disrespectful, paternalism is pro tanto wrong. I interpret the major motive-based theories of paternalism as endorsing the Robust view. While this view is susceptible to a devastating criticism, I argue that the Less Robust view is true. To make my case, I elucidate three ways in which the paternalist may come to hold a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency. I then argue that any paternalistic action which is predicated on or motivated by a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency is pro tanto wrong. Consequently, I suggest that motive-based theorists endorse the Less Robust view instead.