Stephanie Sheintul

Nudging is a morally contentious method of influence. One concern is that nudges threaten to undermine individual autonomy. With the rise of artificial intelligence systems, this worry has only magnified, with some arguing that we should be even more concerned about the threat that AI-driven nudges pose to our autonomy than the threat that traditional, “human-driven” nudges pose. Call this the comparative threat claim (CTC). Calboli (Philosophy& Technology 38, 2025) argues that to evaluate the plausibility of the CTC, we should distinguish between two dimensions of autonomy that AI-driven nudges threaten to undermine: self-agency and autocracy. I have two aims in this discussion. The first is to build on Calboli’s conceptual framework by introducing a third dimension of autonomy that is relevant to concerns about autonomy and nudging: sovereignty. The second is to evaluate the plausibility of the CTC with respect to paternalistic nudges, in particular. I argue that, for this kind of nudge, the CTC is implausible when it comes to a nudgee’s autocracy and sovereignty. Overall, the discussion contributes to our understanding of how concerned we should be about the impact that AI-driven nudges have on our autonomy.

Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. I call this the false diminishment account of doxastic wronging. In this paper, I argue against this account on the grounds that it is morally overdemanding. Nevertheless, I agree with proponents that our beliefs are sometimes morally objectionable. I offer an account of disrespectful belief which holds that our beliefs are disrespectful when they falsely deflate, i.e., incorrectly underestimate, and thereby lead us to undervalue morally significant features of each other’s personhood. My view implies that we can form disrespectful beliefs about each other even if we do not wrong each other by forming them.

Some scholars working on the ethics of paternalism are interested in whether there is a systematic normative connection between hard paternalism and people’s moral rights. One affirmative view is that hard paternalism is pro tanto wrong inasmuch as it always involves a rights infringement. Daniel Groll defends this view on the grounds that hard paternalism always infringes a competent adult’s right to be the only one to act only for his own good. I call this right the right to self-beneficence. In this note, I argue that Groll misidentifies a right that competent adults have. Rather than the right to self-beneficence, I argue that if hard paternalism infringes any particular right, it is a right that a competent adult has against others “taking over” matters that fall within his sphere of legitimate agency or, by extension, the legitimate exercise of his agency. I call this right the right against legitimate agency interference.

This paper aims to answer the following question: what is the normative connection between paternalism and the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency? I consider the following two views. _The Robust View_ says that paternalism is _pro tanto_ wrong insofar as the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is always disrespectful. _The Less Robust View_ says that whenever the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is disrespectful, paternalism is _pro tanto_ wrong. I interpret the major motive-based theories of paternalism as endorsing the Robust view. While this view is susceptible to a devastating criticism, I argue that the Less Robust view is true. To make my case, I elucidate three ways in which the paternalist may come to hold a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency. I then argue that any paternalistic action which is predicated on or motivated by a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency is _pro tanto_ wrong. Consequently, I suggest that motive-based theorists endorse the Less Robust view instead.