University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  7
    From Morality to Virtue
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
  •  14
    An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the “sense of obligation” is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the “we” whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual “we.”
  •  12
    Harm to Others
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 691-694. 1987.
  • Morality, Authority, and Law
    Oxford University Press UK. 2013.
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the Second-Person Standpoint --an argument which advances an analysis of central moral concepts as irreducibly second personal in the sense of entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Section I concerns morality: for example, its distinctiveness among normative concepts, th…Read more
  • How should ethics relate to philosophy?
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  3
    III-Moral Obligation: Form and Substance
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 31-46. 2010.
  •  64
    “Second-personal morality” and morality
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (5): 804-816. 2018.
  •  72
    Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzier, Sebastian Rödl und Peter Schaber
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 173-179. 2009.
  •  1
    Joseph Butler: Five Sermons (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 1983.
    _CONTENTS:__ Introduction Selected Bibliography Five Sermons:_ The Preface_ Sermon I - Upon Human Nature Sermon II - Upon Human Nature Sermon III - Upon Human Nature Sermon IV - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor Sermon V - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor A dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue_
  •  10
    Impartial Reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 507-515. 1989.
  •  1
    Impartial Reason
    Ethics 96 (3): 604-619. 1983.
  •  2
    Rational Agent, Rational Act
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 33-57. 1986.
  •  5
    Human Morality’s Authority
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 941-948. 1995.
    A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
  •  26
    Introduction
    Law and Philosophy 14 (1): 1-3. 1995.
  • Reason, Self-Regard, and Morality
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1972.
  •  1
    Ethics and Morality
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 552-566. 2017.
  •  168
    Internalism and agency
    Philosophical Perspectives 6 155-174. 1992.
    have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.' Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethical writing is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear.2 Sometimes writers have in mind the view that sincere assent to a moral (or, more generally, an ethical) jud…Read more
  •  269
    Precis: The second-person standpoint (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 216-228. 2010.
  •  115
    Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters
    Philosophical Review 123 (1): 79-105. 2014.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view o…Read more
  •  477
    Toward fin de siècle ethics: Some trends
    with Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton
    Philosophical Review 101 (1): 115-189. 1992.
  •  2
    Stephen Darwall expands upon his argument for a second-personal framework for morality, in which morality entails mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He explores the role of the framework in relation to cultural ideas of respect and honor; the development of "modern" moral philosophy; and interpersonal relations
  •  48
    Under Moore's Spell
    Utilitas 10 (3): 286. 1998.
    As David Wiggins points out, although Ross is best known for opposing Moore's consequentialism, Ross comes very close to capitulation to Moore when he accepts, as required by beneficence, a prima facie duty to maximize the good. I argue that what lies behind this is Ross's acceptance of Moore's doctrine of agent-neutral intrinsic value, a notion that is not required by, but is indeed is in tension with, beneficence as doing good to or for others
  •  3
    Ought, Reasons, and Morality by W. D. Falk (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (4): 208-214. 1989.
  •  14
    Book reviews and critical studies (review)
    with Virginia Black and L. Baronovitch
    Philosophia 9 (3-4): 339-373. 1981.
  •  691
    Moral Psychology as Accountability
    In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 40-83. 2014.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we arg…Read more
  •  289
    Moral obligation: Form and substance
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 31-46. 2010.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation no…Read more