Stephen David Edwards

The HeartMath Institute originated in 1991 through Doc Childre’s vision of promoting heart intelligence and health. The HeartMath system is an interdisciplinary undertaking, which bridges natural, human, social, spiritual, and ecological sciences, with the goal of promoting personal, social, and global coherence. The general goal of this paper is to introduce HeartMath as a coherent scientific approach to dialogue theological information, as well as a specific meditation method to explore theological phenomena. The particular aim is to contribute a theoretical and practically orientated pilot study with heuristic phenomenological reflection on personal experience of HeartMath theory, practice, meditation, related action, and reports in the form of scientific articles. This study is directly relevant to the DIALOGO conference theme of dialogue between science and theology. Methodology concerns the theoretical and practical value of HeartMath meditation methods as described with examples from HeartMath Global Coherence (GC) and Inner Balance (IB) apps. There are five GC reflective meditations on the theme of science and theology, complemented by five IB purely contemplative meditations. The reflective and discursive focus of the paper is on the monitoring of meditation sessions related to science and theology. The specific focus is on HeartMath techniques, electronic devices, and the planetary health potential of the Global Coherence Initiative.

This study is about the physical and spiritual aspects of running. In addition to the human physical activity of running, there is a special reference to God-consciousness. Although the paper reflects an African, Christian, psychological bias, from an interfaith perspective, it concerns a simple, natural, human activity, within a broader energetic field of consciousness, which is usually and simply referred to as Love. The deliberate choice of the broad generic terms, God, or Godhead, is intended to include such terms as Allah, Brahman, Tao, Spirit, Divine, etc. While the terms “self” and “soul” may be used in different ways by various wisdom, spiritual and religious traditions, here they essentially refer to the interior, social and spiritual dimensions of human relationships. The study adopts a phenomenological, psychological, and biographical methodology with special reference to the spirituality of running as experienced by participants and reported by the heroic figures of Allyson Felix, Eliud Kipchoge, and Teilhard de Chardin, respectively. Its humble intention is to inspire all concerning the benefits of physical activity in general and running in particular, for physical, mental, social, and spiritual health promotion.

The accelerating destructive effects of pollution threaten the existence of all inhabitants of planet earth. Health promotion interventions inevitably include a dynamic harmony of various interacting planetary components and contexts, bio-psycho-social as well as spiritual, cultural and ecological. This study was based on a broad research question as to what would best heal polluted planet earth. As with most countries, South Africa is slowly recovering from the effects of COVID-19. It seemed timeous to investigate a local sample of knowledgeable and experienced persons with regard to their views on pollution prevention and health promotion. Sixteen local KwaZulu-Natal persons responded to an online google questionnaire. There were 5 men and 11 women, with a mean age of 55 and age range from 25 to 73 years. Data analysis using NVivo12 software indicated that participants’ responses generally coalesced into a coherent health promotion theme including subthemes of awareness, education, regulation, and action to prevent human destructiveness, promote healing and the holistic integrity of nature. Unique local findings as well as those similar to other studies are discussed. Further research could include formal scales with larger local and international samples in interconnected, ecological and health promotion initiatives.

The great wisdom traditions typically emphasize various forms of love, especially cosmic, agape type love. The African value of Ubuntu implies essential humanity, developed through the ongoing evolutionary event of humanization, socialization, enculturation, and communal spirituality. In addition to cosmic love and everyday caring practices, Ubuntu includes human essentials such as compassion, empathy, and respect. This contribution adopts a narrative approach. The authors tell a story of their involvement in the HeartMath system, with special reference to HeartMath related research before and after the establishment of the African Global Coherence Magnetometer at Bonamanzi Game Reserve. Their studies indicate the effectiveness of the Global Coherence Application (app). This electronic app, developed along scientific biofeedback principles, can be downloaded free of charge. It is highly recommended for persons interested in amplifying the effect of their meditation, contemplation and prayer.

Mystical, panentheistic lines from Wordsworth’s poem, Tintern Abbey, constitute inductive case study material to introduce HeartMath science’s Global Consciousness Project (GCP). This case study provides a temporal dimension along which to view the cosmic significance of Wordsworth’s “felt sense”, Teilhard de Chardin’s “noosphere” and the GCP. A heuristic phenomenological method is employed. This method facilitates discussion of previous South African research with traditional healers that led to collaboration with the HeartMath Institute, based in California, and establishment of an African Global Coherence Initiative Magnetometer. This latter magnetometer is one of six GCI planetary magnetometers, with the other five currently operating in in California, Saudi Arabia, Lithuania, Canada and New Zealand. The present study introduces GCP2, an update, expanded version of the Global Consciousness Project, which complments GCI. Previously operating from the Institute of Noetic Sciences (IONS), GCP2 is now harmoniously housed by the HeartMath Institute, where its data complements both GCI and Tree Rhythm projects in amplifying interconnectedness science and global healing practices. Contemporary, endemic, planetary contexts of chaos, pollution, mindless destructiveness and war, provide urgent argument for GCP2.

Sports Medicine as an apparent sub-class of medicine has developed apace over the past 30 years. Its recent trajectory has been evidenced by the emergence of specialist international research journals, standard texts, annual conferences, academic appointments and postgraduate courses. Although this field of enquiry and practice lays claim to the title ‘sports medicine’ this paper queries the legitimacy of that claim. Depending upon how ‘sports medicine’ and ‘medicine’ are defined, a plausible-sounding case can be made to show that sports medicine is not in fact a branch of medicine. Rather, it is sometimes closer to practices such as non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery. The argument of the paper is as follows. It begins with a brief statement concerning methodology. We then identify and subscribe to a plausible defining goal of medicine taken from a recognised authority in the field. Then two representative, authoritative, definitions of sports medicine are discussed. It is then shown that acceptance of these definitions of sports medicine generates a problem in that if they are accepted, no necessary commitment to the defining goal of medicine is present within sports medicine. It seems to follow that sports medicine is not medicine. In the final part of the paper a critical response to that conclusion is presented and rebutted. The response is one which rejects the identification of the defining goal of medicine upon which our argument rests

This paper enquires into the nature and the extent of the obligations of nurses. It is argued that nurses appear to be obliged to undertake supererogatory acts if they take clause one of the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) Code of Professional Conduct seriously (as, indeed, they are required to do). In the first part of the paper, the nature of nursing obligations is outlined, and then the groups and individuals to whom nurses have obligations are identified. Following a brief discussion of the moral foundation of the nurse's obligations to her/his employer, a common conflict of obligations is identified. Then a distinction is drawn between ordinary and extraordinary moral standards. Appreciation of this is necessary for an understanding of the criterion of what constitutes a supererogatory act. By the definition of supererogatory acts proposed below, it is suggested that actions such as whistleblowing satisfy that definition

The ethics of care still appeals to many in spite of penetrating criticisms of it which have been presented over the past 15 years or so. This paper tries to offer an explanation for this, and then to critically engage with three versions of an ethics of care. The explanation consists firstly in the close affinities between nursing and care. The three versions identified below are by Gilligan (1982 ), a second by Tronto (1993 ), and a third by Gastmans (2006 ), see also Little (1998 ). Each version is described and then subjected to criticism. It is concluded that where the ethics of care is presented in a distinctive way, it is at its least plausible; where it is stated in more plausible forms, it is not sufficiently distinct from nor superior to at least one other common approach to nursing ethics, namely the much-maligned 'four principles' approach. What is added by this paper to what is already known: as the article tries to explain, in spite of its being subjected to sustained criticism the ethics of care retains its appeal to many scholars. The paper tries to explain why, partly by distinguishing three different versions of an ethics of care. It is also shown that all three versions are beset with problems the least serious of which is distinctiveness from other approaches to moral problems in health care.

This paper recounts the events surrounding the case of Ashley X, a severely disabled young girl whose parents opted for oestrogen therapy, a hysterectomy and breast removal – the so-called ‘Ashley treatment’ – in order to reduce her projected adult weight and improve her quality of life. Following a description of the events leading up to the procedure itself, and the worldwide debate which ensued, the main arguments in favour and against the procedures are presented. The paper also critically engages with a recent defence of the treatments presented by one of those closely involved with the case – Dr D Diekema. Finally, the recommendations of a report which criticizes procedures at the hospital in which the treatments took place are described, and it is argued that the main recommendation regarding the constitution of the Hospital Ethics Committee (HEC) is ill-thought through and is unlikely to have made any difference to the decision taken by the HEC to approve the Ashley treatments

This paper is prompted by the charge that the prevailing Western paradigm of medical knowledge is essentially Cartesian. Hence, illness, disease, disability, etc. are said to be conceived of in Cartesian terms. The paper attempts to make use of the critique of Cartesianism in medicine developed by certain commentators, notably Leder (1992), in order to expose Cartesian commitments in conceptions of disability. The paper also attempts to sketch an alternative conception of disability — one partly inspired by the work of Merleau-Ponty. In particular, three key Cartesian claims are identified and subjected to criticism. These are as follows: (a) The claim that the body is an object, (b) what is termed here ‘the modularity thesis’, and (c) the claim that the body cannot be constitutive of the self (i.e. since the soul/mind/brain is). In opposition to these claims, it is argued that the body is properly viewed as a subject; that there are neither purely mental, nor purely physical disabilities; and that selves are constituted, at least in part, by their bodies.

This “current controversies” contribution describes the recent case of a severely disabled six year old girl who has been subjected to a range of medical interventions at the request of her parents and with the permission of a hospital clinical ethics committee. The interventions prescribed have become known as “the Ashley treatment” and involve the performance of invasive medical procedures (eg, hysterectomy) and oestrogen treatment. A central aim of the treatment is to restrict the growth of the child and thus make it easier for her parents to care for her at home. The paper below discusses the main objections to the treatment. It concludes that the most serious concern raised by the case is that it may set a worrying precedent if the moral principle employed in justification of the treatment is applied again to endorse it in similar circumstances. Finally, it raises the possibility that that same moral principle may even be invoked to justify more radical interventions than those that were actually performed in the Ashley treatment

This paper is prompted by the charge that the prevailing Western paradigm of medical knowledge is essentially Cartesian. Hence, illness, disease, disability, etc. are said to be conceived of in Cartesian terms. The paper attempts to make use of the critique of Cartesianism in medicine developed by certain commentators, notably Leder (1992), in order to expose Cartesian commitments in conceptions of disability. The paper also attempts to sketch an alternative conception of disability — one partly inspired by the work of Merleau-Ponty. In particular, three key Cartesian claims are identified and subjected to criticism. These are as follows: (a) The claim that the body is an object, (b) what is termed here ‘the modularity thesis’, and (c) the claim that the body cannot be constitutive of the self (i.e. since the soul/mind/brain is). In opposition to these claims, it is argued that the body is properly viewed as a subject; that there are neither purely mental, nor purely physical disabilities; and that selves are constituted, at least in part, by their bodies

This article discusses the question of whether, as is often claimed, nursing is properly described as an art. Following critical remarks on the claims of Carper, Chinn and Watson, and Johnson, the account of art provided by RG Collingwood is described, with particular reference to his influential distinction between art and craft. The question of whether nursing is best described as an art or a craft is then discussed. The conclusion is advanced that nursing cannot properly be described as an art, given acceptance of Collingwood’s influential definition of art. Moreover, it is shown that, due to difficulties inherent in specifying the ‘ends’ of nursing, nursing is only problematically described as a craft

Current UK guidelines regarding clinical research on children permit research that is non-therapeutic from the perspective of that particular child. The guidelines permit research interventions that cause temporary pain, bruises or scars. It is argued here that such research conflicts with the Declaration of Helsinki according to which the interests of the research subject outweigh all other interests. Given this, in the context of clinical research, who is best placed to protect the child from this kind of exploitation? Is it the medical researcher, the child’s parents or the nurse advocate? This article describes the problem, possible responses to it, and closes with a consideration of, and rejection of, a defence of current guidelines that claims moral parity between clinical research and clinical education

This paper is an attempt to provide a critical evaluation of the theory of disability put forward by Lennart Nordenfelt. The paper is in five sections. The first sets out the main elements of Nordenfelt's theory. The second section elaborates the theory further, identifies a tension in the theory, and three kinds of problems for it. The tension derives from Nordenfelt's attempt to respect two important but conflicting constraints on a theory of health. The problems derive from characterisation of the goals of persons; the difficulty which Nordenfelt has in respecting the plausible view that there is a distinction between illness and disability; and the presence in the theory of other strongly counter-intuitive implications. In section three a defence of Nordenfelt is attempted from within the resources available within his own theory. This defence seeks to exploit his distinctions between a person who is ill and one who is generally disabled and that between first- and second-order disabilities. However, it is concluded that there are insufficient resources within Nordenfelt's theory to fend off the criticisms developed in section two. The fourth section of the paper attempts a defence of Nordenfelt. It is claimed that introduction of the concept of capacity helps to explain differences between problem cases in the theory. Finally, it is shown that at least two important constraints on any theory of disability emerge from the preceding discussion.

For more than 15 years Professor Per Nortvedt has been arguing the case for moral realism in nursing and the health‐care context more generally. His arguments focus on the clinical contexts of nursing and medicine and are supplemented by a series of persuasive examples. Following a description of moral realism, and the kinds of considerations that support it, criticisms of it are developed that seem persuasive. It is argued that our moral responses are explained by our beliefs as opposed to moral realities. In particular, two key arguments presented by Nortvedt are challenged: the so‐called argument from convergence and the argument from clinical sensitivity. Both of these key planks in the case for moral realism are rejected, and an alternative ‘social conditioning’ account briefly sketched, which, it is claimed, has the same explanatory power as Nortvedt's thesis but does not rest on an appeal to independently existing moral properties.

Is it true that an ethics of care offers something distinct from other approaches to ethical problems in nursing, especially principlism? In this article an attempt is made to clarify an ethics of care and then to argue that there need be no substantial difference between principlism and an ethics of care when the latter is considered in the context of nursing. The article begins by considering the question of how one could in fact differentiate moral theories. As is explained, this cannot be done merely in light of the moral judgements they defend, nor their ontological commitments (e.g. their view of the nature of persons). Following these methodological beginnings, care-based ethics is described and critically discussed. It is shown that ontological commitments embraced within care ethics do not themselves show that care ethics is distinct from other approaches. The idea of ‘psychological care’ is also discussed, which stems from the work of Margaret Little. Her claim that the ‘gestalts’ of justice and care cannot be combined is rejected in favour of an approach that does just that and which has been developed by Joan Tronto. It is then claimed that the moral commitments of principlism are certainly not incompatible with those of an ethics of care in the nursing context. A challenge to the idea that principlism and ethics of care might be compatible is anticipated in the work of Eva Feder Kittay. This challenge is responded to and it is concluded that care considered as a moral orientation and the moral values embedded in principlism are best combined in the nursing context. Care provides a moral orientation over which the obligations referred to in principlism can be laid

This paper discusses the distinction between disability and handicap as it is proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in their publication International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (WHO, 1993 (first published, 1980)). Following criticism of this an attempt to salvage the distinction by Nordenfelt (1993, 1983) is discussed. It is argued that neither the WHO nor Nordenfelt are successful in their attempts to preserve the distinction between disability and handicap in a theoretically wellmotivated manner. Contrary to the WHO, it is argued that what they term ‘disabilities’ and ‘handicaps’ both have external causes. And contrary to Nordenfelt's position it is shown that “basic actions” do not provide a firm theoretical foundation for the concept of disability. Moreover, the criticisms of these two sets of views reveal that attempts to describe the phenomenon of disablement which focus on the individual suffer from a serious methodological shortcoming

Tom Shakepeare is an eminent, and somewhat controversial, contributor to disability studies. As he outlines, part of the explanation for his controversial status within that field stems from his engagement with disciplines outside it, including genetics and bioethics. For many in the field of disability studies, no genuine engagement should be sought with scholars in genetics or bioethics because—so the party line goes—these areas of study are inherently opposed to disability rights and otherwise pose genuine threats to the status of disabled people. The present volume is unlikely to do much to reduce his controversial status.The book is divided into three parts. The first presents a detailed criticism of the social model with some, more positive, proposals concerning how disability is best conceived. The second part—perhaps the one that will be of most interest to JME readers—concerns bioethical issues in disability. The final part focuses on themes such as care, charity, intimacy and the role of the non-disabled in “the world of disability”.The main reason why this book is unlikely to reduce Shakespeare’s controversial status is that its central theme is a sustained attack on the so-called and widely held “social model” of disability. According to this model, the causes of disability lie in the social environment, not within the individual. So, change the social environment in appropriate ways, and disability disappears. Shakespeare illustrates the various ways in which this model is analytically flawed and has had a negative effect upon disability studies, research and the lives of disabled people. …

A number of commentators claim their disability to be a part of their identity. This claim can be labelled ‘the identity claim’. It is the claim that disabling characteristics of persons can be identity-constituting. According to a central constraint on traditional discussions of personal identity over time, only essential properties can count as identity-constituting properties. By this constraint, contingent properties of persons (those they might not have instanced) cannot be identity-constituting. Viewed through the lens of traditional approaches to the problem of personal identity over time, disablement is most likely to be regarded as a contingent property of a person and not an essential one. Hence, on traditional approaches, the identity claim must be false. An alternative account of identity is sketched here. It is one which exploits the idea of narrative identity, and points to five basic features of personal existence. When accounts of identity are structured in relation to these five features, it is argued, disablement can be shown to be identity-constituting, and hence the identity claim can be accepted

It was reported in 2006 that a regime of ‘supervised self harm’ had been implemented at St George’s Hospital, Stafford. This involves patients with a history of self-harming behaviour being offered both emotional and practical support to enable them to do so. This support can extend to the provision of knives or razors to enable them to self-harm while they are being supervised by a nurse. This article discusses, and evaluates from an ethical perspective, three competing responses to self-harming behaviours: to prevent it; to allow it; and to make provision for supervised self-harm. It is argued that of these three options the prevention strategy is the least plausible. A tentative conclusion is offered in support of supervised self-harm

In the UK and elsewhere suicide presents a major cause of death. In 2008 in the UK the topic of suicide rarely left the news. Controversy surrounding Daniel James and Debbie Purdy ensured that the problem of assisted suicide received frequent media discussion. This was fuelled also by reports of a higher than usual number of suicides by young people in South Wales. Attention attracted by cases such as that of Daniel James and Debbie Purdy can lead to a neglect of the problem of how to respond to the vast majority of suicides, in which there is no obvious accompanying health problem. This paper seeks to redress that balance to some degree. Its focus is primarily on the provision of assisted suicide when the person seeking such assistance has no accompanying health problem. It is argued that a network of suicide centres (SCs) should be established, the purpose which in certain circumstances, will extend to assisting suicide in cases where a competent person has a definite, sustained intention to end their own life. Arguments in support of this proposal are provided, focusing on respect for autonomy, relief of suffering and respect for the ‘life-plan’ of a person. Considerations relating to reduction of harms to third parties are also recruited. Eight responses to the proposal are considered. But none is found compelling, nor are they found jointly compelling

COVID-19 offers new opportunities for confrontation and transcendence of the givens of life, including illness, suffering and death. These givens also bring humanity’s greatest gifts, such as joy and compassion. This article reports on two recent African psychology studies on COVID-19. The first study on local rural Zulu persons’ COVID-19 coping experiences provides a contemporary context for the second study on universalising and indigenising the meaning and practice of love after COVID-19. Five main points are made. First, African psychology is original psychology. Second, it refers to psychology in, of, for, and from Africa, on, by and for Africans. Third, it has much to offer psychology in other continents. Fourth, the Greek philosophy of love has considerable African origins. Fifth, the concept of Ubuntu both relates to and extends the notion of agape or unconditional love, through its emphasis on human relationships, which require extra compassionate care during and after COVID-19.

Tom Shakespeare’s important new book includes, among other topics, a persuasive critique of the social model of disability. A key component in his case against that model consists in an argument against the impairment/disability distinction as this is understood within the social model. The present paper focuses on the case Shakespeare makes against that distinction. Three arguments mounted by Shakespeare are summarised and responded to. It is argued that the responses adequately rebut Shakespeare’s case on this specific issue. Moreover, as the engagement with Shakespeare’s argument illustrates, his claim to employ a critical realist perspective appears to be in considerable tension with the case he offers against the impairment/disability distinction

In this article we examine ethical aspects of the involvement of children in clinical research, specifically those who are incapable of giving informed consent to participate. The topic is, of course, not a new one in medical ethics but there are some tensions in current guidelines that, in our view, need to be made explicit and which need to be responded to by the relevant official bodies. In particular, we focus on tensions between the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki, and the guidance offered by the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health , and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. We conclude with a call for these organisations to make their guidance explicit in relation to the World Medical Association Declaration