Stephen Kearns

This chapter explores the relationship between self-control and decision-making. In particular, it examines various problems with the idea that agents can (and do) exercise self-control over their decisions. Two facts about decisions give rise to these problems. First, decisions do not result from intentions to make those very decisions. Second, decisions are often made when agents are uncertain what to do, and thus when agents lack best judgments. On the common understanding of self-control as an ability to act in line with an intention or best judgment (in the face of counter-motivation), decisions are not, and perhaps cannot, be the subject of self-control. In light of this, the authors propose that this common conception of self-control needs revision. As well as commitment-based self-control, they argue that there is also non-commitment-based self-control—the type of self-control over an action that need not involve any prior evaluative or executive commitment.

The usual compatibility debates concerning moral responsibility, determinism and indeterminism tend to be all-or-nothing ("Determinism rules out responsibility!", "Undetermined actions are too lucky to be free!"). The suggestion in this paper is that the debate may benefit from being reconfigured around the question of whether determinism or indeterminism increase or decrease responsibility. The positions we shall explore in this paper are Mitigating Soft Compatibilism (the view that determinism mitigates responsibility), Enhancing Soft Compatibilism (the view that determinism enhances responsibility), Swings and Roundabouts Soft Compatibilism (the view that both determinism and indeterminism enhance and mitigate responsibility equally), and Different Strokes Soft Compatibilism (the view that determinism variously mitigates and enhances responsibility in different contexts). We shall also explore the related idea that our concept of responsibility has an impossible ideal-if both determinism and indeterminism detract from responsibility in different ways, then what is necessary for full responsibility may be impossible.

Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book, The Range of Reasons (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. A good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. We are sympathetic to some of his ideas and critical of others. It makes sense for us to focus on the first half of his book, where Whiting presents two accounts of normative reasons (the first superseded by, although possibly also compatible with, the second). We welcome this opportunity to clarify our own current views on the nature of normative reasons by contrasting them with Whiting’s views.

Self-control is a fundamental part of what it is to be a human being. It poses important philosophical and psychological questions about the nature of belief, motivation, judgment, and decision making. More immediately, failures of self-control can have high costs, resulting in ill-health, loss of relationships, and even violence and death, whereas strong self-control is also often associated with having a virtuous character. What exactly is self-control? If we lose control can we still be free? Can we be held responsible for loss of self-control? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of self-control, the authors examine and assess the following topics and questions: • The importance of self-control • What is self-control? • Self-control and the law of desire • Mechanisms of self-control • How is it possible to lose self-control? • Blameworthiness and (the loss of) self-control • Externalist self-control • Pathologies of self-control. Combining philosophical analysis with surveys of the latest psychological research, and including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary of key terms, Self-Control is essential reading for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, moral psychology, free will, and ethics. It will also be of interest to those in related fields such as psychology and cognitive science.

Certain aspects of our situations often influence us in significant and negative ways, without our knowledge (call this claim “situationism”). One possible explanation of their influence is that they affect our abilities. In this paper, we address two main questions. Do these situational factors rid us of our abilities to act on our sufficient reasons? Do situational factors make it more difficult for us to exercise our abilities to act for sufficient reasons? We argue for the answer ‘sometimes’ to both these questions. We then explore the consequences of this view for moral responsibility.

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of moral luck

1. IntroductionSuch is the depth and breadth of Peter van Inwagen’s philosophical output, one must pick and choose which topics to cover when editing a book exploring the philosophical themes touched upon in his work. In Being, Freedom and Method,1 John Keller has brought together several excellent philosophers to explore four such themes – being, freedom, method, and God (the last of which doesn’t make it into the title of the book, perhaps because doing so would violate the rule that the title of a work of analytic philosophy must list exactly three things). Keller does a fine job of covering many of the topics that have interested van Inwagen over the years, but he cannot cover them all (I am most sad to see no substantive treatment of van Inwagen’s work on composition and mereology). Van Inwagen, in his afterword, also finds it necessary to pick and choose which papers he responds to – he addresses only seven of the sixteen papers in the book. I too must pick and choose. In what follows, I shall briefly describe the contents of the book, then make more substantive comments on some of the papers (those about which I think I have something interesting to say).

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Shoemaker’s new book, Responsibility from the Margins, is an excellent and insightful explication of Shoemaker’s tripartite theory of moral responsibility. After setting out the main elements of his account, Shoemaker uses underexplored marginal cases of responsible agency to illustrate, support and shape his main theses concerning responsibility. The book as a whole thus presents us with a thoroughly defended, subtle, and plausible theory of the extent and the nature of moral responsibility.Shoemaker takes as his starting point Peter Strawson’s claim that an agent’s responsibility for an action stems from the ‘quality of will’ expressed by that action. In particular, the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes towards an...

Alfred Mele’s zygote argument for incompatibilism is based on a case involving an agent in a deterministic world whose entire life is planned by someone else. Mele’s contention is that Ernie (the agent) is unfree and that normal determined agents are relevantly similar to him with regards to free will. In this paper, I examine four different ways of understanding this argument and then criticize each interpretation. I then extend my criticism to manipulation arguments in general. I conclude that the zygote argument is no threat to compatibilism.