Stephen Kershnar

This chapter defends the following thesis: forfeiture theory best explains just war. Specifically, it explains when a war is just and when it is morally permissible to kill people and break things. This theory has strong implications for who is liable to be killed. In particular, except in the case where killing is necessary to avoid a catastrophe, only those who forfeit their rights are liable to be killed in wartime. Hence, at the heart of the theory is an account of when people forfeit their rights in general and in the particular context of wartime. This theory also has implications for which, if any, of the commonly cited restrictions on wartime killing (imminence, necessity, proportionality, and discrimination) are relevant.

This chapter argues that autonomous weapons pose no moral special problem. By posing no special problem, it is meant that producing and using autonomous weapons is wrong under the same conditions that the use of non-autonomous weapons or no weapons is wrong. That is, the use does not raise a distinct moral issue. Producing or using autonomous weapons does not necessarily infringe on someone’s moral right. Hence, producing or using autonomous weapons is not necessarily wrong. The central argument here is that autonomous-weapon use does not necessarily infringe attackers’ rights. This is because unjust attackers forfeit their rights. If unjust attackers forfeit their rights, then autonomous weapons do not necessarily infringe on the attackers’ rights. The secondary argument is that the use of such weapons does not infringe on defenders’ or third-parties’ rights.

In this paper, I argue that the descendants of slaves were not harmed by slavery since they owe their existence to slavery. I then recognize that they may have a claim to compensation based on their having inherited their ancestors’ (i.e., the slaves’) claim to compensation. I argue that the inheritance-based claim is defeated by a number of concerns, particularly doubt surrounding the existence and amount of this inheritance-based claim, concerns about offsets (sums that must be subtracted from compensation), and problems concerning the identity of any contemporary public or private entity that owes compensation.

Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice-where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead-cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed.

In this paper, we argue that an MMA competition is a discretionary zone. Two premises support the argument. First, different rules regarding MMA competition are rights-respecting. Second, if different rules regarding MMA competition are rights-respecting, then an MMA competition is a discretionary zone. We then considered the following objections: some MMA competition rules infringe rights, some non-consequentialist wrong-makers are not right-based, and sometimes consequences trump rights. The objections fail. We then applied our theory to the issue of whether MMA competitions should exclude transgender women. We find the people who own such competitions have moral discretion regarding whether to exclude them.

The compensatory‐justice justification of affirmative action requires a comparison of the actual world in which the injured person lives with a relevantly similar possible world in which this person lives but where the unjust injuring act never occurred, in order to identify the degree of harm brought about by the unjust injurious act. The problem is that some unjust injuring acts, particularly acts of slavery, led to intercourse and the later creation of the ancestors of many members of minority groups. Hence, there is no possible world in which these individuals exist and in which the injustice, e.g., slavery, did not occur. As a result, the counterfactual test does not allow us to measure or even understand the existence of a compensatable injury to these persons. I provide an inheritance‐based account of compensation that escapes this.

In the secondMoral responsibilityfoundationalism part of the book, I begin by arguing that individuals are not morally responsible. If an individual is morally responsible, then there is a responsibility-foundation that makes him morally responsible, but there is no such foundation. A responsibility-foundation is a basic responsibility-making fact that does not depend on a person being responsible for something else. This rests on the notion that if there were a responsibility-foundation, it would be either an ungrounded choice or an ungrounded character stateCharacter state and that neither is true. The chapter then considers three types of objections. First, moral responsibility does not require a responsibility-foundation. Second, a character state can serve as the foundationMoral responsibilityfoundation. Third, we know people are responsible even if we don’t know what the foundation is. These objections fail. The appendices complement the part of the book that focuses on responsibility. In the first appendix, I set out a theory of what responsibility is. The purpose of this appendix is that it clarifies what I am denying when I argue that people are not morally responsible. In the second appendix, I argue that GodGod is also not morally responsible. This appendix aims to show that the absence of a responsibility is a conceptual truth and not one that depends on the finite or flawed nature of human beings.

Non-consequentialist theories fail because they depend on moral rights and people do not have moral rights. If people have rights, then they are justified by interests or autonomyAutonomy, but they are not so justified. For example, interest-promotion is neither necessary nor sufficient for a right. The same is true for autonomy-promotion. The absence of rights explains why consent does not matter, why people do not forfeit their rights, and why forfeiture is not governed by a principle of proportionality. The explanation is that rights are prior to consent and forfeiture so if the former do not exist, neither do the latter. Because forfeiture is prior to proportionality, there also is no proportionality. A theory of morality that cannot handle voluntary change in moral relations (consent and promise) or conflict is a failed theory. This is one of, if not the main task, of morality. Because of the failure of rightsMoralityright, non-consequentialismNon-consequentialism fails.

This chapter argues that if individuals are not morally responsible, then there is no morality. By no morality, I mean that there are no rightMoralityright or wrong actions, no goodMoralitygood or bad states of affairs, and no other things with moral properties or, at perhaps less sweepingly, we do not know whether there are such things. Here I focus on right and wrong actions. My main argument in this chapter is that if people are not morally responsible, then there is no morality as it relates to matters that are up to us or, at least, we don’t know whether there is morality on such matters. When it comes to the right, either consequentialism or non-consequentialismNon-consequentialism is true. Consider consequentialism. If we don’t know whether determinismMoral responsibilitydeterminism is true, then we don’t know whether there are acts that produce more good than any other act available to the agent and hence we don’t know whether there are obligatory or wrong acts. Consider non-consequentialism. If non-consequentialism is true, then people have rights and rights protect autonomyAutonomy. The notion that non-consequentialism depends on rights rests on a consideration of the most plausible non-consequentialist theories. The notion that rights protect autonomy depends on a theory of what best fits and justifies rights. Autonomy is inextricably linked to moral responsibility and, as argued above, people do not have it.

Morality is a fundamental part of our worldview. We view people as acting rightly or wrongly, making the world better or worse, and being virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying the ways we treat others, the people we befriend, our identities, and so on. Moral responsibility is also central to the notion that people can, and often are, praise- or blameworthy. We have a family of attitudes that presuppose moral responsibility. On the positive side we feel gratitude, pride, reciprocal love, and forgiveness. On the negative side, we feel resentment, indignation, anger, and shame. We also seem to have a distinct sort of love toward those who freely and reciprocally love us. Our daily view of the world is almost, if not completely, unimaginable without responsibility. In this book, I argue against (non-consequentialist) morality and morally responsibility.

In the first part of the book, I argue that there are reasons to think that non-consequentialismNon-consequentialism fails. It fails because the heart of non-consequentialism is an attempt to show how people may treat others in the case of cooperation and conflict. Cooperation occurs via consent because it is through consent and its cousin, promise, that people voluntarily accept permissions and incur duties. In particular, it is the way in which people voluntarily change their perimeter of rights, specifically to their body and property. Consent is, roughly, the means by which one waives a right and thus changes his perimeter of rights with regard to another. Consent lies at the heart of many topics in law, medicine, politics, and ethics. A common idea is that consent in itself matters toward the right and the good. This chapter rejects this idea. More specifically, it defends two theses. First, the maximization theory of consentConsentmaximization theory is true. The maximization theory asserts, roughly, consent functions to maximize what justifies rights (for example, autonomyAutonomy or interests). Second, because the maximization theory is true, consent does not matter in and of itself. Specifically, consent by itself does not matter for the right or the good. If consent does not matter in and of itself, then non-consequentialism is in real trouble for consent is at the heart of how non-consequentialism handles moral transformation in the context of cooperation. Consequentialism asserts that an act is permissible because, and only because, it brings about, whether directly or indirectly, as much good as any other act available to the agent. The direct-versus-indirect condition is designed to allow for rule-consequentialismConsequentialismrule-consequentialism. It is compatible with agent-relative or agent-neutral accounts of the good. For example, egoism as a moral theory might be seen as consequentialism about prudential good. On this account, consequentialism does not address things that are not acts (for example, motives), although it does address acts that bring these other things about. Non-consequentialismNon-consequentialism asserts that there are permissible acts and that consequentialism is false.

In this chapter, I assume that, contrary to the above argument, individuals are morally responsible and then explore how narrowMoral responsibilitynarrow responsibility would be. Here I argue for internalismMoral responsibilityinternalism in moral responsibility. My argument is that connectionMoral responsibilityconnectionand controlMoral responsibilitycontrol are what make people morally responsible. Because connection and control consist of, and only of, reasoning (and mental states) that a person is phenomenally aware of, what makes someone responsible is such reasoning. Because such reasoning is an internal feature of a person, internalism in responsibility is true. Internalism in this context leads to a very narrow scopeRightnarrow scope for responsibility. It is so narrow, for example, the people are at most blameworthy for akrasiaAkrasia. I then explore the implications of this argument with regard to principal-agent responsibility, negligence, attempted versus completed crimes, and akrasia. If the above analysis is correct, then our everyday judgments of moral responsibility are unreliable.

In the fourth chapter, I argue that there is no satisfactory theory of proportionality in the context of punishment. By proportionality in punishmentPunishment, I mean that there is a systematic positive relation between the seriousness of a person’s wrongdoing and the maximum severity of punishment she may be given. Proportionality is a feature of most non-consequentialist theories of punishment, including forfeiture theory, retributivismJusticeretributivism, distributive-justice theory, and punishment as societal defense. Because this restriction is a central part of non-consequentialist theories of permissible threats and force, such theories are likely mistaken.

This book argues that consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they face metaphysical and intuitional problems. The two theories exhaust the theories of the right, so there is no rightness. This result matters because it requires us to give up widely held beliefs regarding knowledge, moral responsibility, and reasons for action. The author's argument is unique because it focuses on applied-ethical arguments rather than metaethical issues. Specifically, it avoids metaethical discussions of whether morality explains our thoughts and actions, how we know about morality, and whether the denial of morality is self-defeating. The author specifically argues against consequentialism and non-consequentialism in the following ways: (1) Metaphysical Problems: Consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they need a theory of counterfactuals and backtracking that they cannot have. (2) Rights Problems: Non-consequentialism is false because non-consequentialism depends on rights, and people do not have rights. They do not have rights because of problems regarding moral responsibility, right-grounding, and self-ownership. (3) Circularity: Non-consequentialism is false because the basic building blocks of non-consequentialism-desert, rights, and virtue-are circular. Morality Collapses will be of interest to researchers and graduate students working in normative ethics, metaethics, moral responsibility, and political philosophy.

Cultural appropriation occurs when an individual from one culture uses another culture's ideas. Often the ideas relate to artifacts, clothes, food, and symbols. Frequently, critics of cultural appropriation claim that it is a type of theft. The critics also claim that it disrespects minorities and also is similar to or involves colonialism. In this paper, we argue that it is neither wrong nor bad to culturally appropriate. It is not wrong because no one owns cultural symbols, not all cultural appropriation involves insult or ridicule, and it is unclear what makes something an instance of cultural appropriation. It is often not bad because a free market in cultural goods frequently maximizes the good.

Matt Lutz and Spencer Case’s book – Is Morality Real? A Debate (New York: Routledge, 2024) – has three parts. First, Lutz and Case set out what moral realism is. Roughly, moral realism says that there is mind-independent morality. Moral anti-realism says that moral realism is false. Along the way, they set out and evaluate different types of moral realism and moral anti-realism. Second, Case and Lutz argue for their positions. Third, Case and Lutz debate their arguments in four short and highly-readable debate chapters. One of Case’s arguments fails because he cannot say whether an epistemic reason is a type of moral reason. And one of Lutz’s arguments fails because he identifies a reason in terms of desire and this makes a reason float free of the well-being of the person to whom the reason applies or to something that matters in itself. Still, the book is superb.

In the past decade, three philosophers in particular have recently explored the relation between desert and intrinsic value. Fred Feldman argues that consequentialism need not give much weight – or indeed any weight at all – to the happiness of persons who undeservedly experience pleasure. He defends the claim that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is determined by the “fit” between the amount of well-being that a person receives and the amount of well-being that the person deserves. Shelly Kagan uses a similar claim to motivate the view that equality is not intrinsically valuable. Thomas Hurka argues that desert is a third-order value, which is a function of the relation between the second-order value of having a virtuous or vicious character and the first-order value of experiencing pleasure or pain. In this paper, we sketch a theory of desert as fittingness and defend a general account of the relation between desert, well-being, and intrinsic value. We then discuss various applications of our “geometry of desert,” including a solution to the problem of the Repugnant Conclusion. In so doing, we explain, revise, and extend many of these authors’ central ideas.

Michael Huemer and Daniel Layman’s book is brilliant. It is enjoyable, highly readable, and tightly argued. Their arguments address both theory and practice. I cannot say enough good things about it. Despite its brilliance, Huemer’s and Layman’s arguments fail. Layman’s argument fails because he fails to show that a democratic government is accountable, a government respects the side-constraint feature of rights, or there is a content-independent duty to obey a government’s commands. Huemer’s argument fails because it lacks a plausible foundation. It fits best with a classic libertarian theory, but such a theory lacks foundation. It fits poorly with a consequentialist theory because of the way in which Huemer frames the issue of political authority and because Huemer does not argue that anarcho-capitalism is better than government rule.

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Consider our emotions regarding other people or ourselves. We often feel anger, gratitude, pride, and shame toward them or ourselves. Consider religious beliefs. Jews and Christians believe that God cares whether a person does right by others and freely loves him. Consider moral values. We value dignity, freedom, and rights. The above emotions, beliefs, and values assume that people are responsible. In particular, they assume that a person is responsible for what she thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that the above worldview is false. No one is responsible. I provide four arguments for this conclusion. (1) Foundation. No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something else. (2) Epistemic Condition. No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthiness. (3) Internalism. If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the opposite. (4) Amount. No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy). The above arguments cohere with each other, explain the responsibility-skepticism literature, and have disturbing implications.

The notion that immigrants have a right to immigrate to the U.S. appears to conflict with the government’s or citizens’ property rights. Michael Huemer has given one of the most interesting and provocative arguments on immigration in years. It turns the dominant view on its head. Unfortunately, the argument fails. U.S. citizens own land, individually, collectively, and via their government. For immigrants to gain a right to enter on it, Huemer must think that the landowners have lost their rights to their land, the landowners’ rights are overridden, or the landowners’ rights are undermined. He does not show that any of these are true. A separate issue and one not discussed here is whether it is a wise policy to reduce or end immigration to the United States.

Space warfare is warfare that takes place in outer space. It involves ground-to-space, space-to-ground, and space-to-space violence between nations or peoples. The violence can involve kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, or electronic destruction. International law, specifically, the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I, currently bans weapons of mass destruction from being put into space, although one wonders if one country were to violate the ban whether others would follow suit. In this paper, I argue that that if there is a non-consequentialist morality of space war, then one country can unjustly attack a second country’s space vehicles. This in turn depends on property rights. But there is no adequate theory of property rights with regard to space war. Hence, there is no non-consequentialist morality of a space war.

James Stacey Taylor’s book – Markets with Limits: How the Commodification of Academia Derails Debate (New York: Routledge, 2022) – is excellent. He explores the errors that have derailed the discussion of the limits of markets, attempts to rerail the discussion through a clarifying taxonomy, and explains why the derailment occurred. He also argues that academic research should be governed by academic rather than market norms. The first part of his project succeeds. It is less clear whether the second and third parts succeed.

The most valuable player (MVP) of an athletic league is the single best individual player in the league. The MVP award is the institutional recognition of this person, and it is the highest annual award that a player can receive. Despite its widespread consideration and importance, we argue that the concept of the MVP is a fundamentally vague concept. In the context of professional sports, however, such a vague category is valuable in that it promotes the active discussion of different types of excellence found within a specific sport and the weight to be assigned these types, thus leading to a gain for the discussants.

In punishment, proportionality is the systematic mathematical relationship between the significance of the wrongdoing and the amount of punishment that may be imposed on the wrongdoer. In this chapter, Kershnar argues that there is no adequate equation for proportionality. The lack of an adequate equation rests on intuitions and the absence of a shared metric. If there is no equation for proportionality, then there is no proportionality. This is because if there is no equation for proportionality, then there is no general justification for proportionality. Purported justifications of punishment that lack proportionality—specifically, consequentialism and consent theory—are implausible. The lack of proportionality, then, is a threat to the notion that some punishment is justified and, more generally, non-consequentialism.