This article examines Herder’s theory of subjectivity in relation to his theory of individuality. It argues that Herder drew on vitalist principles to develop a unique theory of sensation that sets him radically apart from his empiricist predecessors. Central to this is Herder’s conviction that human sensation is not a mechanical process but an active one, serving to orient each person to the world in a predominantly unconscious and never exactly identical way. The consequence is that the proces…
Read moreThis article examines Herder’s theory of subjectivity in relation to his theory of individuality. It argues that Herder drew on vitalist principles to develop a unique theory of sensation that sets him radically apart from his empiricist predecessors. Central to this is Herder’s conviction that human sensation is not a mechanical process but an active one, serving to orient each person to the world in a predominantly unconscious and never exactly identical way. The consequence is that the process of world-orientation—including worldview and the opinions people develop—is not understood primarily as a product of self-reflective reason, but rather as an unconscious, bodily-sensory process. Finally, the article argues that for Herder, it is not philosophy that helps us understand and expand our own limited perspective, but literature.
