Stephen M. Gardiner

ABSTRACT In this paper we identify and explore a dimension of intergenerational injustice that we call ‘intergenerational blinding’: roughly-speaking, the ethically objectionable imposition by one generation on another of various kinds of generational ignorance. Work in ecology has identified a phenomenon called ‘shifting baselines syndrome’. We argue that this phenomenon shows the potential for intergenerational blinding in the environmental realm. Yet, the emergence of intergenerational environmental blinding as a distinctive form of injustice has not received much attention from moral and political philosophers. Here, we make the case for taking this injustice seriously as a potential accelerator of our environmental crises, and as a distinctive form of intergenerational epistemic injustice.

The Tollgate Principles (‘TGPs’) aim to represent ‘the price that must be paid’ by anyone claiming to be ethically serious about pursuing solar geoengineering (Gardiner and Fragnière, Ethic Policy Environ 221(2):143–174, 2018). The TGPs are influential but, like other governance principles, have also provoked criticism. This paper clarifies the Tollgate approach by responding to objections and dissolving some perceived tensions. It argues that, while not the final word, the TGPs are an important step in the evolution of geoengineering governance and should continue to be taken seriously at all levels. It concludes that rather than “beware the Toll Keepers” (Briggle, Ethic Policy Environ 21(2):187–189, 2018) we should instead “beware the Toll Dodgers”: those who would brush aside the TGPs and other ethics-centered approaches. As well as defending the Tollgate approach specifically, the discussion provides broader lessons for governing geoengineering and other controversial technological interventions.

Axel Gosseries argues for a radical intergenerational egalitarianism. His views imply that we should typically adopt a “pro-present” stance, prioritizing the here-and-now over the future. Theoretically, when compared to the pro-future stance of commonsense morality, Gosseries’s positions seem to shift the norms of intergenerational ethics significantly in favor of the current generation. Practically speaking, much rests on his assumption that the current generation will be the least well-off generation by comparison to its successors. I argue that there is a strong initial presumption against Gosseries’s views. Yet I also concede that the radical argument is relatively easy to make. Its roots are deeply embedded in the core values of contemporary ethical theory, namely justice and well-being. I show this by identifying “master arguments” for pro-present intergenerational transfers based on each value, and conclude that the task of resisting the radical, pro-present position will be difficult. In an effort to make progress, I sketch some logical space for three promising strategies: (i) appealing to embeddedness; (ii) defending pro-future norms; and (iii) opposing “jealous virtues”. Some key ideas include: a permissive interpretation of a Rawlsian difference principle; two touchstones for intergenerational ethics; and a reminder of limits that constrain core values. I close by briefly addressing Gosseries’s assumption that our generation is or contains the least well-off, and his resistance to historical climate justice. There I emphasize: the prominence of intergenerational threats; the implications of taking past generations to be the true intergenerational worse off; and the suspicion that we might fall into “lemon egalitarianism”.

The philosopher John Rawls once said that "the question of justice between generations... subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests." This Handbook aims to illuminate those tests, indicate the progress made in resolving them, and take some steps of its own. It focuses on the increasing relevance of not only intergenerational justice, but intergenerational ethics more generally, to key challenges of the 21st century. It features philosophers and political theorists of international standing, providing cutting-edge perspectives. Part A considers intergenerational from the point of view of leading contemporary theories and diverse cultural traditions. Topics include consequentialism, deontology, the ethics of care, contractualism, communitarianism, indigenous perspectives on ancestry, capabilities, republicanism, Buen Vivir, nonanthropocentrism, Confucianism, Maori philosophy, and African intergenerational ethics. Part B reflects on key concepts that structure discussion of intergenerational issues, such as sustainability, natural heritage, well-being, basic needs, meaning, and the threat of intergenerational tyranny. Part C addresses central issues that arise in intergenerational ethics, ranging from key philosophical problems to how to understand political ideals to questions about the limits of appropriate concern. Chapters focus on areas such as: just intergenerational saving, discounting in economics, duties to the past, the nonidentity problem, the repugnant conclusion, discursive justice, shaping intergenerational institutions, and whether to make threatening human extinction an international crime. Part D samples topics that have special importance in intergenerational affairs, such as pensions, inheritance, reparations, intergenerational debt, nuclear weapons, human population size, species conservation, and genetic enhancement of humans.

Climate change has been called “the biggest global health threat of the 21st century.” This chapter outlines some central ethical dimensions of the challenge. It begins by reviewing a few of the major health impacts expected from climate change. It then summarizes some key issues surrounding the ethical importance of health, and of injustices connected to global health inequalities. Finally, the chapter explores a recent concept – planetary health – that aims to environmentalize public health in order to confront climate change more successfully. The basic conclusion is that issues of ethics and justice are central to the public health challenge moving forward. One aspect of this challenge is the need for a more philosophically robust account of the ethics of public health in general, perhaps pursued through a deeper exploration and development of the concept of planetary health.

ABSTRACT:Many of humanity's most serious problems are global, intergenerational, and ecological, yet current institutions are poorly placed to confront such problems. In part, this institutional challenge reflects difficulties with our basic concepts and theories. Bioethics is a central area where such questions arise. Although some have argued for an environmentalized bioethics since its inception, biomedicine has thus far failed to embrace the challenge, and some accuse most bioethicists of being "asleep at the wheel" (Schenck and Churchill 2021). This paper discusses the basic ethical challenge, offers the "perfect moral storm" analysis, and explores one promising new concept for bioethics, planetary health, in light of that analysis. Drawing on the foundational report of the Rockefeller Foundation–Lancet Commission (Whitmee et al. 2015) and using climate change as the example, the author argues that planetary health has significant strengths but also some weaknesses, and that identifying both is helpful in charting a path forward for environmentalized bioethics.

Written both for general readers and college students, Dialogues on Climate Justice provides an engaging philosophical introduction to climate justice, and should be of interest to anyone wanting to think seriously about the climate crisis. The story follows the life and conversations of Hope, a fictional protagonist whose life is shaped by a terrifyingly real problem: climate change. From the election of Donald Trump in 2016 until the 2060s, the book documents Hope’s discussions with a diverse cast of characters. As she ages, her conversations move from establishing the nature of the problem, to engaging with climate skepticism, to exploring her own climate responsibilities, through managing contentious international negotiations, to considering big technological fixes, and finally, as an older woman, to reflecting with her granddaughter on what one generation owes another. Following a philosophical tradition established by Plato more than two thousand years ago, these dialogues are not only philosophically substantive and carefully argued, but also distinctly human. The differing perspectives on display mirror those involved in real-world climate dialogues going on today.

We are in the early stages of a new “intergenerational turn” in political philosophy. This turn is largely motivated by the threat of global climate change, which makes vivid a serious governance gap surrounding concern for future generations. Unfortunately, there is a lack of fit between most proposed remedies and the nature of the underlying problem. Most notably, many seem to believe that only piecemeal, issue-specific, and predominantly national institutions are needed to fill the intergenerational governance gap. By contrast, I argue that we should adopt a genuinely global approach that treats intergenerational questions as foundational, and advocates for new permanent institutions with ongoing responsibilities to act on intergenerational threats. In this essay, I summarize my diagnosis of the underlying problem—that we face a basic standing threat that I call the “tyranny of the contemporary”—and sketch my proposal for a global constitutional convention aiming at institutions with standing authority and a broad remit. I then develop some of these ideas further through responses to fellow advocates for reform who nevertheless consider my proposals to go too far. In particular, I reject a counterproposal made by Anja Karnein, who argues that reforms should address only threats whose negative impacts would cross a high threshold. I argue that this would leave future generations vulnerable to what I call “squandering generations”. Among other things, these intergenerational squanderers violate appropriate relationships between past, present, and future generations. Yet, in my view, a central task of defensible intergenerational institutions is to protect the future against such abuse.