•  6
    I discuss several normative – in particular, moral – objections to theism. These objections arise for theism independently of the doctrines associated with particular sectarian religious traditions, and independently of particular metaethical positions such as divine‐command theory. The objections stem mainly from theistic attempts to solve the problem of evil, that is, to explain why a perfect God permits, or why a perfect God might permit, the suffering that our world contains.
  •  32
    This book offers new arguments for determinism. It draws novel and surprising consequences from determinism for our attitudes toward such things as death, regret, grief, and the meaning of life. The book argues that rationalism is the right attitude to take toward reality. It then shows that rationalism implies determinism and that determinism has surprising and far-reaching consequences. The author contends that the existence of all of humanity almost certainly depends on the precise time and m…Read more
  •  41
    There must have been a first generation
    Think 18 (53): 7-13. 2019.
    I argue, from premises accepted by every educated person, that there must have been a first human generation, contrary to what Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have prominently claimed.Export citation.
  •  50
    Substantial Change: Continuous, Consistent, Objective
    Journal of Philosophy 114 (10): 551-562. 2017.
    Since antiquity, philosophers have struggled to describe the instant of change in continuous time in a way that is both consistent with classical logic and also objective rather than arbitrary. A particularly important version of this problem arises, I argue, for substantial change, that is, any case in which a metaphysical substance comes into or goes out of existence. I then offer and defend an analysis of the instant of substantial change in continuous time that is consistent with classical l…Read more
  • This essay in epistemology focuses on issues associated with belief in God, understood as belief in the existence of the God of orthodox monotheism and in the truth of related theistic claims. What type of belief is belief in God, and under what general conditions is such belief epistemically justified? I consider various answers to these questions, I offer some answers of my own, and I suggest some consequences of the latter for several important issues in the epistemology of religion. ;I defen…Read more
  •  128
    Anselmian Atheism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 225-239. 2007.
    On the basis of Chapter 15 of Anselm's Proslogion, I develop an argument that confronts theology with a trilemma: atheism, utter mysticism, or radical anti‐Anselmianism. The argument establishes a disjunction of claims that Anselmians in particular, but not only they, will find disturbing: (a) God does not exist, (b) no human being can have even the slightest conception of God, or (c) the Anselmian requirement of maximal greatness in God is wrong. My own view, for which I argue briefly, is that …Read more
  •  12
    The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 34 (2): 293-299. 2008.
  •  586
    Questioning the Question
    In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?, Routledge. pp. 252-271. 2013.
    Why is there something rather than nothing? Apparently many people regard that question as a challenge to naturalism because they think it’s too fundamental or too sweeping for natural science to answer, even in principle. I argue, on the contrary, that the question has a simple and adequate naturalistic answer: ‘Because there are penguins.’ I then diagnose various confusions underlying the suspicion that the question can’t have such an answer and, more generally, that the question, or else some…Read more
  •  122
    Newcomb's Hidden Regress
    with Garnett Wilson
    Theory and Decision 54 (2): 151-162. 2003.
    Newcomb's problem supposedly involves your choosing one or else two boxes in circumstances in which a predictor has made a prediction of how many boxes you will choose. We argue that the circumstances which allegedly define Newcomb's problem generate a previously unnoticed regress which shows that Newcomb's problem is insoluble because it is ill-formed. Those who favor, as we do, a ``no-box'' reply to Newcomb's problem typically claim either that the problem's solution is underdetermined or else…Read more
  •  231
    Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism
    Religious Studies 42 (2): 177-191. 2006.
    According to the much-discussed argument from divine hiddenness, God's existence is disconfirmed by the fact that not everyone believes in God. The argument has provoked an impressive range of theistic replies, but none has overcome the challenge posed by the unevendistribution of theistic belief around the world, a phenomenon for which naturalistic explanations seem more promising. The confound any explanation of why non-belief is always blameworthy or of why God allows blameless non-belief. Th…Read more
  •  168
    The knower paradox and epistemic closure
    Synthese 114 (2): 337-354. 1998.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, however, no one wo…Read more
  •  99
    A semantic attack on divine-command metaethics
    Sophia 43 (2): 15-28. 2004.
    According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply. The sort of criticism I offer is familiar, but I develop it in what I believe is a novel way.
  •  818
    How Not to Argue from Science to Skepticism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1): 21-35. 2014.
    For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fashionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepticism about human knowledge. I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and scientifically informed common sense.
  •  154
    Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands
    Sophia 46 (3): 237-243. 2007.
    According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
  •  1
    On God and Our Ultimate Purpose
    Free Inquiry 31 35-37. 2011.
    William Lane Craig often defends theism by arguing that human life is meaningful only if it has ultimate significance, and it has ultimate significance only if God exists to give human life ultimate purpose. Developing an idea from Thomas Nagel, I rebut Craig's argument. I contend that the concept of ultimate purpose is incoherent, and hence ultimate significance is impossible even if God exists. Ultimate significance is a fantasy that shouldn't draw anyone to theism.
  •  2
    Kai Nielsen, Naturalism and Religion Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 22 (5): 347-349. 2002.
  • C. Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account (review)
    Philosophy in Review 20 98-99. 2000.
  •  89
    Anti-autonomism defended: A reply to hill
    Philosophia 36 (4): 567-574. 2008.
    In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.
  •  19
    The Ethics of Statistical Discrimination
    Social Theory and Practice 17 (1): 23-45. 1991.
  •  87
    Our errant epistemic aim
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 869-876. 1995.
    Often the first issue addressed by a theory of justified belief is the aim, goal, purpose, or objective of epistemic justification. What, in short, is the point of epistemic justification? Or, to put it a bit differently, why value justification: why is it worth having or pursuing? Prominent epistemologists, including both externalists and internalists, have proposed the following answer: the ultimate aim of epistemic justification is to maximize true belief and minimize false belief. This answe…Read more
  •  50
    Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason
    Philosophical Review 104 (1): 153. 1995.
  •  61
    Two Views of Religious Certitude
    Religious Studies 28 (1). 1992.
    At least since Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent , Anglo-American philosophers have been concerned with the role of certitude, or subjective epistemic certainty, in theistic belief. Newman is himself famous for holding that certitude is an essential feature of any sort of genuine belief, including in particular religious belief. As one recent commentator, Michael Banner, notes, for Newman
  •  31
    Belief Policies (review)
    Philosophical Review 106 (3): 448. 1997.
    Unfortunately, the book's weaknesses outweigh its strengths. Chief among the weaknesses is its spotty attention to relevant and important literature, both historical and contemporary. Even though Helm writes at length about assent, and even though he discusses Augustine, he completely ignores John Henry Newman, whose Grammar of Assent deserves at least a mention. Helm devotes more than a chapter to the relation between belief and the will and another chapter to fideism, yet he never mentions Lou…Read more
  •  2969
    The moral skepticism objection to skeptical theism
    In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 444--457. 2013.
    Skeptical theism combines theism with skepticism about the ability of human beings to know God's reasons for permitting suffering. In recent years, it has become perhaps the most prominent theistic response from philosophers to the evidential argument from evil. Some critics of skeptical theism charge that it implies positions that theists and many atheists alike would reject, such as skepticism about our knowledge of the external world and about our knowledge of our moral obligations. I discuss…Read more
  •  212
    Skeptical theism and moral obligation
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2). 2009.
    Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism i…Read more
  •  904
    Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2). 2009.
    I present a "moral argument" for the nonexistence of God. Theism, I argue, can’t accommodate an ordinary and fundamental moral obligation acknowledged by many people, including many theists. My argument turns on a principle that a number of philosophers already accept as a constraint on God’s treatment of human beings. I defend the principle against objections from those inclined to reject it
  • Kai Nielsen, Naturalism and Religion (review)
    Philosophy in Review 22 347-349. 2002.