Stephen Mumford

The category of ‘women’s sport’ is not the feminist win some would have you believe. Instead, the segregation of women in sport is just one more way in which women are told to expect less from society. Women had to fight to be included in sport in the first place, and are now only included under far less favourable terms than those enjoyed by men. There are better and more accurate ways to ensure safety and fairness than segregation by gender. And this matters deeply: open play would encourage a more equitable distribution of resources, increase women’s participation in sport and challenge outdated, sexist myths about women and their bodies.

Laws and exceptions seem to be in conflict. A law is supposed to be universal, applying at all times and places, whereas an exception must be a contravention of such universality. The solution proposed here is that while laws are in a sense universal in scope, their content concerns what is disposed to happen only—what tends to be—rather than what is necessitated. What we take to be exceptions will typically be cases where those dispositions are, for whatever reason, unmanifested. The exceptions are not, therefore, to the laws themselves but instead point to the relatively commonplace and unproblematic notion that dispositional processes can fail to manifest. Given that the law has only a dispositional import, however, it is not violated, and thus remains a law applying to everything within its scope, even if there are exception cases.

Since the advent of modern philosophy, causation has been treated as a relation between two separate events. Any worldly dynamism is then provided by the succession of essentially static events. Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in powers, but this has been hampered by an acceptance of many of the presuppositions of modern philosophy, most conspicuously those of Hume. Simply placing powers on top of the static Humean framework will not do. Causal dispositionalism offers a more dynamic notion, where an instance of causation involves a unified process rather than a relation between distinct events. This theory has a number of advantages. It can account for change as well as stability, long- and short-lived processes, genuine complexity and real emergence, non-linear interaction of causes, extreme context-sensitivity, and contrary powers. This is a more plausible framework for understanding causation in biology, ontologically and epistemically.

Although there are many contemporary Humean approaches to efficient causation, there is also an alternative, which can be thought of as broadly Aristotelian in origin. The key ideas that characterize the neo-Aristotelian view are: potentialities and natures; there being a source of change within things (the powers); some form of “conditional” necessity; processes, continuous change rather than discontinuity; mutual manifestations; simultaneity and contiguity of cause and effect; and powers that have to be held back rather than stimulated. Empiricist accounts suggest that powers stand in need of stimulus conditions. But this already suggests that without them, they are passive. The Aristotelian idea, in contrast, is that powers tend to manifest when in propitious circumstances. They are released, indeed they will always be active unless they are held back. The neo-Aristotelian metaphysics favors continuity, with natural causal processes having their various stages essentially.

When and how do powers manifest themselves? There are two models. The orthodox view has powers standing in need of stimuli, which once received issue in responses. This model portrays powers as passive. The stimuli are powerful, but the powers are disempowered, turning the order of explanation on its head. The second model is more promising: C. B. Martin’s notion of mutual manifestation partnering. Powers exercise when they meet their reciprocal partners and produce something jointly that they could not have produced alone. In his chapter on causation, Martin offers an analogy to explain mutual manifestation: it is like two triangular cards coming together to form a square. The triangles do not cause the square; they become the square. We argue that although mutual manifestation is the right model, Martin’s analogy of the two triangles is misleading. If we look at natural processes in which powers exercise and manifest themselves, we see that three revisions are needed to the analogy. First, the triangles need not become the square immediately. It can take time for a process to unfold. Second, powers compose often in a non-linear fashion. This would mean that the area of the square need not be the sum of the areas of the two triangles. Third, component powers needn’t be found in their resultant powers. This would be like the two triangles sometimes forming a circle rather than a square. Martin’s analogy depicted mereological composition rather than the natural processes issuing from powers and, contrary to his claim, causation is indeed the notion we should be thinking of.

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated 2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers 3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

In this paper I aim to make sense of our pre‐theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are outlined.

I outline of an account of social entities. I show that they can have powers that are not the powers of their parts, nor their mere aggregation. This means that they cannot be reduced to their constituents. I use the example of public health to illustrate how the powers of social entities can work: how racismRaceracism, for instance, can have effects on individual human bodies. This justifies the study of social phenomena in addition to the study of individual people and middle-sized concrete entities, and in addition to the study of fundamental physics. Certain problems, including health, economy, and even language, are only explained in terms of social entities. We have good theoretical grounds, therefore, for rejecting methodological individualism.

David (D. M.) Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. It is primarily through his owrk that Australian philosophy, and Australian metaphysics in particular, enjoys such a high reputation in the rest of the world. In this book Stephen Mumford offers an introduction to the full range of Armstrong's thought. Mumford begins with a discussion of Armstong's naturalism, his most general commitment, and his realism about universals. He then examines his theories of laws, modality and dispositions, which make up the basics of Armstrong's core theory. With this in place, Mumford explores his ideas on perception, mind and belief before returning to metaphysics in the last two chapters, looking at truth and the new view of instantiation. The book is a dispassionate, fair and unbiased account of Armstrong's thought. Although Armstong's is a body of work that Mumford regards highly and of real significance, he nevertheless highlights areas of weakness and issues about which there is room for further debate.

Analytic philosophers have in recent decades rediscovered powers as the basis for an all-encompassing metaphysics and philosophy of nature. What recommends the powers view is its explanatory utility, including a putative explanation of potentiality. Powers can be understood as the elementsElement in the world that provide the grounding for potentiality in actuality. They can be productive of their manifestations but typically do so only in certain circumstances. This will explain why there can be some potentialities that are not actualised and also why there are some constraints on what can be. The powers account also makes potentialities a possible subject of scientific investigation as powers are to a degree empirically accessible. It is important, however, that we provide a plausible account of how powers are able to bring things about: how they able to make some of the potentialities actualities. A mutual manifestation model is preferred to the stimulus-response model of productionProduction. It was C. B. Martin who introduced the mutualMutualmanifestationManifestation model but it is argued that his account needs to be amended so that it resembles less mereological compositionComposition and more causationCausation.

Stephen Mumford puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role is in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties--from the solubility of sugar to the belief that zebras have stripes. Mumford discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. His clear, straightforward, realist account reveals them to be less mysterious than they seem, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws.

There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a power. It seems that, according to the dispositionalist theory of freedom, such an agent would still count as acting freely. There is a strong non-consent intuition that a is not free in such a case because they did not consent to having the power P—the desire in question. Filling out this intuition is not straightforward. But it can be done in terms of the exercise of P being regulated by higher-order powers of self-reflection. Such regulation is what allows an agent to either take ownership of a power or to reject it

Most theories of causation assume that it must involve some kind of necessity, or that the cause must be entirely sufficient for the effect. Others have already suggested that it should be possible to get a theory of causation from a theory of powers or dispositions. Such a project is far from complete but even here we find that the key point in a dispositional theory of causation has been lacking. This paper attempts to establish some of the most important principles of such a theory and in so doing turn the existing discussion in a new direction.

[EN]Most theories of causation assume that it must involve some kind of necessity, or that the cause must be entirely sufficient for the effect. Others have already suggested that it should be possible to get a theory of causation from a theory of powers or dispositions. Such a project is far from complete but even here we find that the key point in a dispositional theory of causation has been lacking. This paper attempts to establish some of the most important principles of such a theory and in so doing turn the existing discussion in a new direction. [ES]La mayoría de las teorías de causación asumen que debe envolverse algún tipo de necesidad, o que la causa debe ser enteramente suficiente para el efecto. Otros ya han sugerido que debería de ser posible obtener una teoría de causación a partir de una teoría de poderes o disposiciones. Un proyecto tal está muy lejos de estar completo, pero incluso aquí encontramos que ha faltado el punto clave en una teoría dispositiva de causación. Este escrito intenta establecer algunos de los principios más importantes de una teoría tal, y al hacerlo inclina la discusión existente en una nueva dirección.

Omissions are sometimes linked to responsibility. A harm can counterfactually depend on an omission to prevent it. If someone had the ability to prevent a harm but didn’t, this could suffice to ground their responsibility for the harm. Michael S. Moore’s claim is illustrated by the tragic case of Peter Parker, shortly after he became Spider-Man. Sick of being pushed around as a weakling kid, Peter became drunk on the power he acquired from the freak bite of a radioactive spider. When a police officer called to Spider-Man to stop an escaping burglar, which he could have done easily, he failed to act. He was through taking orders. The omission was followed by a crime. That very same burglar later robbed Peter’s own house and when challenged he shot dead Peter’s Uncle Ben. Later, Spider-Man tracked down the killer and, when seeing his face close up, the possibility of prevention dawned on him. He could have stopped this crook and had he done so Uncle Ben would still be alive. Stan Lee’s tale of power finished with a Shakespearean twist. Young Peter realised the truth of the WGPCGR-thesis: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility. We too will endorse the WGPCGR-thesis. There is a close connection between our notions of moral and legal responsibility and the powers we have as causal agents. This will be particularly important when it comes to the case of omissions: where we had the power to act but failed to do so. We hope to show the connections between the notions of power, cause, act, omission and responsibility but also some of the nuances. We will do so with particular reference to Moore’s account in Causation and Responsibility.

This paper argues that the technical notion of conditional probability, as given by the ratio analysis, is unsuitable for dealing with our pretheoretical and intuitive understanding of both conditionality and probability. This is an ontological account of conditionals that include an irreducible dispositional connection between the antecedent and consequent conditions and where the conditional has to be treated as an indivisible whole rather than compositional. The relevant type of conditionality is found in some well-defined group of conditional statements. As an alternative, therefore, we briefly offer grounds for what we would call an ontological reading: for both conditionality and conditional probability in general. It is not offered as a fully developed theory of conditionality but can be used, we claim, to explain why calculations according to the RATIO scheme does not coincide with our intuitive notion of conditional probability. What it shows us is that for an understanding of the whole range of conditionals we will need what John Heil (2003), in response to Quine (1953), calls an ontological point of view.

There has been much discussion of powers or real dispositions in the past decade, but there remains an issue that has been inadequately treated. This concerns the precise modal value that comes with dispositionality. We contend in this paper that dispositionality involves a non-alethic, sui generis, irreducible modality. Dispositions only tend towards their manifestations; they do not necessitate them. Tendency is, of course, a dispositional term itself, so this last statement offers little by way of illumination. But given our thesis on the irreducible nature of dispositionality, we maintain that it cannot be explicated correctly in non-dispositional terms. Nevertheless, we all have experience of dispositionality at work, through the exercise or our own powers and the action of other powers upon us. The notion of dispositionality that we acquire is one that involves a modality stronger than pure contingency but weaker than necessity. The recognition of this distinct modal value for dispositionality is one of the biggest oversights in the growing literature in the area. Yet it is there for all to see in even the most mundane example.

The results of sport would not interest us if either they were necessitated or they were a matter of pure chance. And if either case were true, the playing of sport would seem to make no sense either. This poses a dilemma. But there is something between these two options, namely the dispositional modality. Sporting prowess can be understood as a disposition towards victory and sporting liabilities a disposition towards defeat. The sporting contest then pits these net prowesses against each other. The stronger will tend to beat the weaker but no more than tend. This makes sense of the sporting contest in which the weaker knows they still can win. The stronger team can lose though they do not tend to do so. The dilemma is thus escaped

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powersTherefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false