Stephen Smith

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

This article explores the use of empirical data when considering whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary euthanasia. In particular, it focuses on the evidence available to the Select Committee for the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill on whether or not covert euthanasia is taking place in the UK under the current prohibition of PAS and voluntary euthanasia. The article shows that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to make any claims about the extent of covert euthanasia within the UK, although there is sufficient evidence to conclude that instances of covert euthanasia do happen. The article also calls for more research to be conducted in order to determine the rate of covert euthanasia in order to inform debate about the legalization of end-of-life decisions such as PAS and voluntary euthanasia

Conscience and conscientious objections are important issues in medical law and ethics. However, discussions tend to focus on a particular type of conscience-based claim. These types of claims are based upon predictable, generalizable rules in which an individual practitioner objects to what is otherwise standard medical treatment. However, not all conscience based claims are of this type. There are other claims which are based not on an objection to a treatment in general but in individual cases. In other words, these cases may involve practices which the doctor does not usually object to but does so in this instance on these facts. This paper will explore these types of conscience-based claims in two ways. First, it will explore whether these types of individualised conscience-based claims are really conscience claims at all. Second, it will explore how these claims interact with the other sorts of judgements we expect doctors to make in these cases.

This article explores conceptions of moral status in the work of American thriller author Dean Koontz. It begins by examining some of the general theories of moral status used by philosophers to determine whether particular entities have moral status. This includes both uni-criterial theories and multi-criterial theories of moral status. After this examination, the article argues for exploring bioethics conceptions in popular fiction. Popular fiction is considered a rich source for analysis because it provides not only a good approximation of the beliefs of ordinary members of the moral community, but also explores important issues in a context where ordinary individuals are likely to encounter them. Following on from this, the article then explores theories of moral status in the context of Koontz’s novels. In particular, the article focuses on the novel Watchers and Koontz’s Frankenstein series. Through these works, Koontz indicates that entities have moral status for a variety of reasons and thus presumably, he is a proponent of multi-criterial theories of moral status. The article concludes with an examination of what this might mean for our understanding of moral status claims generally.

Those involved in end-of-life decision making must take into account both legal and ethical issues. This book starts with a critical reflection of ethical principles including ideas such as moral status, the value of life, acts and omissions, harm, autonomy, dignity and paternalism. It then explores the practical difficulties of regulating end-of-life decisions, focusing on patients, healthcare professionals, the wider community and issues surrounding 'slippery slope' arguments. By evaluating the available empirical evidence, the author identifies preferred ways to regulate decisions and minimise abuses at the end of life, and outlines an ethical theory which can provide practical guidance for those engaged in end-of-life decisions"--Provided by publisher.