Steve Clarke

I feel privileged to receive so many thoughtful commentaries. Four commentaries focus on my proposal for a register system to manage conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare. Reasons of space meant I was unable to develop this proposal to any great extent in my article.1 Hirschberg et al 2 explore practical and ethical issues involved in implementing a register system. I am pleased to have provoked further discussion of the proposal, and I thank them for their efforts. Boretti3 offers three practical suggestions to help minimise the influence of factors that could discourage participation in a register system. These strike me as helpful and commonsensical. I endorse all three. Meng4 worries that the implementation of a register system could undermine the cohesion of multidisciplinary teams of healthcare professionals when only some members are willing to offer particular procedures, weakening joint decision-making processes. Such problems are liable to arise however CO is managed. Under the conventional compromise, there may be healthcare professionals in teams with COs who opt to refer, while other members do not, and this division can undermine cohesion. Also, if CO is prohibited, then tensions may arise between team members who are happy to offer a procedure and …

Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future require us to try to think clearly about what it is to have moral status and about when and why we should attribute moral status to beings and entities. What should we say about the moral status of human non-human chimeras, human brain organoids, artificial intelligence, cyborgs, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into a computer, or onto the internet? In this introductory chapter we survey some key assumptions ordinarily made about moral status that may require rethinking. These include the assumptions that all humans who are not severely cognitively impaired have equal moral status, that possession of the sophisticated cognitive capacities typical of human adults is necessary for full moral status, that only humans can have full moral status, and that there can be no beings with higher moral status than ordinary adult humans. We also need to consider how we should treat beings and entities when we find ourselves uncertain about their moral status.

This chapter examines what, if anything, governments in Western liberal democratic societies should do to reduce rates of acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories. It begins by addressing three concerns. One is that it is unclear what counts as a conspiracy theory. A second is that it might be supposed that the acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories is not harmful. And if the acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories is not harmful then it is unclear why governments should be trying to reduce their rates of acceptance. A third concern is that it is unclear that we should be encouraging governments to undertake the project of reducing the popularity of unwarranted conspiracy theories, given that sometimes governments themselves have been known to mislead us about conspiracy theories. The chapter then looks at short-term and long-term strategies to reduce the popularity of unwarranted conspiracy theories. Long-term strategies include promoting critical reasoning skills through schooling and other forms of public education; promoting knowledge of the media and how it works; and making government operations more transparent and accountable.

We humans can enhance some of our mental and physical abilities above the normal upper limits for our species with the use of particular drug therapies and medical procedures. We will be able to enhance many more of our abilities and be able to do so in more ways in the not-too-distant future. Some commentators have welcomed the prospect of human enhancement technologies becoming widely used, while others have viewed it with alarm and have made clear that they find human enhancement morally objectionable. Unfortunately the debate over the ethics of human enhancement appears to have reached an impasse, with proponents and opponents of human enhancement drawing on different intellectual traditions, relying on different methodologies and ‘talking past one another’. In order to move this debate forward, we need either to find new ways of understanding the current debate or to develop new ways of thinking about the ethics of human enhancement. In this volume leading philosophers and bioethicists invite us to adopt new ways to think about the ongoing debate, either by drawing on work in psychology that helps to explain common reactions to the prospect of human enhancement or by finding points of comparison between the current debate about the ethics of human enhancement and other academic debates, such as the debate about justice for people with disabilities. Other contributors offer original lines of argument about the ethics of human enhancement and seek to take that debate in new directions.

Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the ‘full’ moral status usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, usually ascribed to machines and other artefacts. These assumptions were always subject to challenge; but they now come under renewed pressure because there are beings we are now able to create, and beings we may soon be able to create, which blur traditional distinctions between humans, non-human animals, and non-biological beings. Examples are human non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet, and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings. While commonsensical views of moral status have always been questioned, the latest technological developments recast many of the questions and raise additional objections. There are a number of ways we could respond, such as revising our ordinary suppositions about the prerequisites for full moral status. We might also reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. The present volume provides a forum for philosophical reflection about the usual presuppositions and intuitions about moral status, especially in light of the aforementioned recent and emerging technological advances.

The use of deceptive techniques is common in social science research. It is argued that the use of such techniques is incompatible with the standard of informed consent, which is widely employed in the ethical evaluation of research involving human subjects. A number of proposals to justify the use of deceptions in social science research are examined, in the face of its apparent incompatibility with the standard of informed consent, and found to be inadequate. An alternative method of justification is outlined, which enables some deceived participants in social science research to rationally and autonomously choose to participate in that research. The alternative method of justification appeals to the idea of indirect consent, which is introduced. It is argued that research subjects who receive reliable testimony regarding research procedures can sometimes be placed in a position to rationally and autonomously consent indirectly to participation in experiments and studies, even if these involve significant deceptions.

The prospect of enhancing ourselves through the use of new biotechnologies is for the most part, hypothetical. Nevertheless, the question of whether we should undertake such enhancement is worthy of discussion as it may become possible in the future. In this article, we consider one form of argument that conservative opponents of biotechnological means of enhancement (bioconservatives) deploy in opposition to the use of enhancement technologies—the backfiring objection. This is the objection that the use of such technologies is liable to go wrong and lead to outcomes that are inferior to the outcomes intended. We will argue that the objection is not nearly as significant as bioconservatives suppose it to be. Bioconservatives sometimes supplement the backfiring objection by arguing that change will be irreversible, that the new (or the unconventional) is especially liable to backfire and that humans possess severe and permanent limitations which cannot be overcome. We consider these ways of supplementing the backfiring objection and argue that each of them, when properly understood, is of limited value to the bioconservative. We also consider how traditional approaches to moral education can be supplemented by bioenhancement.

This paper is about the workplace surveillance of a particular class of employees: professionals. Professionals have professional obligations. We identify four different ways in which employers' use of workplace surveillance can make it difficult for professionals to fulfil professional obligations. We argue that when employers proceed in these ways they violate the principle of unhindered professionalism, which states that employers ought not to significantly hinder the ability of their professional employees to fulfil professional obligations. We finish up by identifying several constraints on morally permissible uses of workplace surveillance of professionals that follow from the principle of unhindered professionalism.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. Contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out, however, and are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History And Philosophy of Science viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The majority of the papers in this collection had their origin in the 2001 Australasian Association for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science annual conference, held at the University of Melbourne, where streams of papers on the themes of scientific realism and commonsense were organised.

It is widely supposed that it is important to ensure that patients undergoing medical procedures hope that their treatments will be successful. But why is hope so important, if indeed it is? After examining the answers currently on offer in the literature, we identify a hitherto unrecognized reason for supposing that it is important that patients possess hope for a successful treatment, which draws on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky’s hugely influential descriptive theory about decision-making in situations of risk and uncertainty. We also consider some concerns about patient consent and the potential manipulation of patients that are raised by our account.

It is often said that it is important for patients to possess hope that their treatment will be successful. We agree, but a widely appealed to type of hope—hope based on conviction (religious or otherwise), renders this assertion problematic. If conviction‐based hope influences patient decisions to undergo medical procedures, then questions are raised about the scope of patient autonomy. Libertarians permit patients to make decisions to undergo medical procedures on the basis of any considerations, including conviction‐based hopes, on grounds of respect for freedom of choice. Rational interventionists want to restrict choices made on the basis of conviction‐based hope on the grounds that choices based on hope incorporate irrationality of a sort incompatible with autonomous decision‐making. In this article, we navigate a middle path between these extremes, arguing that patient decision‐making based on conviction‐based hope ought to be acceptable and permitted in health care when it conforms to norms of practical rationality. These norms allow patients some room to make decisions to consent to undergo medical procedures informed by conviction‐based hope.

It is widely supposed that it is important to ensure that patients undergoing medical procedures hope that their treatments will be successful. But why is hope so important, if indeed it is? After examining the answers currently on offer in the literature, we identify a hitherto unrecognized reason for supposing that it is important that patients possess hope for a successful treatment, which draws on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky’s hugely influential descriptive theory about decision-making in situations of risk and uncertainty. We also consider some concerns about patient consent and the potential manipulation of patients that are raised by our account.

ABSTRACT‘Generalists’ hold that conspiracy theories, as a class, have epistemic defects. Well confirmed theories that invoke conspiracies, such as the theory that the Nixon administration conspired to orchestrate the break in at the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate complex, on 17 June 1972, – the ‘Watergate theory’ – raise a problem for generalists as it’s hard to understand how such theories can have epistemic defects. The Watergate theory is often not considered a mere conspiracy theory, because it enjoys ‘official theory’ status and in folk usage that means it is not a conspiracy theory. However, most people concede that the Watergate theory was a conspiracy theory before obtaining official status. So, appealing to folk usage does not make the problem go away. Recently however, several generalist scholars including, Cassam, Mandik, Thalman and Butter, have argued that theories invoking conspiracies that enjoy official status were never conspiracy theories. I’ll consider their reasoning and show where they go wrong. I’ll work with the examples of the Watergate theory and the ‘false flag’ theory of the Mountain Meadows massacre of 1857, which has it that this massacre of over 100 people was led by white Utahn Mormons disguised as Native Americans.

Ordinary cognition is subject to the influence of a variety of systematic distortions or biases. This chapter looks at the use of some collective cognition techniques to correct for individual cognitive bias. It introduces the possibility of group‐level corrections to cognitive bias and raises the problem of biases that emerge at the group level. The chapter discusses how to ameliorate some of the cognitive biases that affect individuals by utilizing group processes and choice architecture. Some examples of the use of the internet to create corrections to cognitive biases are also discussed. Then the possibility of institutions engineering solutions to individual cognitive biases is considered.

The causal relationship between religion and violence is examined. It is argued that it is currently unclear whether or not religion is a significant cause of violence. Three types of argument relating religion to violence are then considered. It is sometimes argued that a lack of religion makes people less moral than they would be otherwise, and, therefore more inclined to violence. It is sometimes argued that religion makes people tolerant, and it is sometimes argued that religion makes people intolerant. If people become more intolerant, they can reasonably be expected to become more violent and if people become more tolerant then they can reasonably be expected to become less violent. It is sometimes also argued that religion offers forms of justifications for violence that are unavailable to atheists and that this may lead the religious to cause more violence than is caused by atheists.

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo‐Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness ‘from the armchair’. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve.

Michael Robinson takes issue with an ‘argument from voluntariness’ made by several opponents of current practices for managing conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare, including Cantor, Stahl and Emanuel, and Schuklenk, whom he characterises as ‘non-accommodationists’. Here I argue that while Robinson is right to oppose the argument from voluntariness, he misunderstands current arrangements for managing CO in healthcare, and he misses the force of the non-accommodationist case against those arrangements. I also argue that despite what he says, Robinson is as much a proponent of reform of the management of CO in healthcare as are his non-accommodationist opponents. Additionally, I raise a concern about Robinson’s preferred approach to managing CO in healthcare.

The authors of a much discussed recent book A Lot of People are Saying: The New Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy, Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum argue that ‘a new conspiracism’ has emerged recently. Their examples include Donald Trump’s allegations that elections have been rigged, ‘Birther’ accusations about Barack Obama, ‘QAnon’ and ‘Pizzagate’. They characterize these as ‘conspiracism without the theory’. They argue that the new conspiracism is validated by repetition, disregards experts, and is satisfied with the conclusion that allegations are ‘true enough’. Here I argue that there is no new conspiracism. Muirhead and Rosenblum have misconstrued their chief examples of new conspiracism and mischaracterized classic conspiracism. The non-existence of a new conspiracism matters. If those studying contemporary conspiracism suppose that many of the objects of their study are theory-free then they are liable to fail to examine the theories that actually are driving contemporary conspiracism. Also, if they suppose that they are confronting an entirely new phenomenon then they are in danger of failing to learn lessons from the rich history of conspiracy theorizing.

Huck Finn’s struggles with his conscience, as depicted in Mark Twain’s famous novelThe Adventures of Huckleberry Finn(AHF) (1884), have been much discussed by philosophers; and various philosophical lessons have been extracted from Twain’s depiction of those struggles. Two of these philosophers stand out, in terms of influence: Jonathan Bennett and Nomy Arpaly. Here I argue that the lessons that Bennett and Arpaly draw are not supported by a careful reading of AHF. This becomes particularly apparent when we consider the final part of the book, commonly referred to, by literary scholars, as ‘the evasion’. During the evasion Huck behaves in ways that are extremely difficult to reconcile with the interpretations of AHF offered by Bennett and Arpaly. I extract a different philosophical lesson from AHF than either Bennett or Arpaly, which makes sense of the presence of the evasion in AHF. This lesson concerns the importance of conscious moral deliberation for moral guidance and for overcoming wrongful moral assumptions. I rely on an interpretation of AHF that is influential in literary scholarship. On it the evasion is understood as an allegory about US race relations during the 20-year period from the end of the US Civil War to the publication of AHF.

Jon Haidt, a leading figure in contemporary moral psychology, advocates a participation-centric view of religion, according to which participation in religious communal activity is significantly more important than belief in explaining religious behaviour and commitment. He describes the participation-centric view as ‘Straight out of Durkheim’. I argue that this is a misreading of Durkheim, who held that religious behaviour and commitment are the joint products of belief and participation, with neither belief nor participation being considered more important than the other. I further argue that recent evidence from the cognitive science of religion provides support for Durkheim’s balanced account of religion and counts strongly against Haidt’s participation-centric view of religion. I suggest that Haidt’s adherence to the participation-centric view of religion is better explained by his desire to accept an account of religion that is consistent with his social intuitionist moral psychology than by his desire to accept an account of religion that accords with available scientific evidence about religion.

Inspired by Smith, Ben-Moshe suggests that we should only accommodate conscientious objections (COs) in medicine based on moral beliefs that are true, or which closely approximate to the truth. He suggests that we can identify moral truths by consulting our consciences when our consciences adopt the standpoint of an impartial spectator. He also suggests some (surprisingly modest) changes to our current practices in regard to the management of CO in medicine that would be needed were his proposal to be adopted. Here, I argue that both Smith and Ben-Moshe underestimate the difficulties involved in adopting the standpoint of an impartial spectator. In particular, both authors fail to recognise the extent to which cognitive bias and ideological commitments prevent many of us from identifying the standpoint of an impartial spectator and also prevent us from realising that we are failing to be impartial. I also consider some different changes to current practices that would be needed if we were to take on Ben-Moshe’s approach to CO in medicine while also recognising the difficulties involved in adopting the standpoint of an impartial spectator.

Gilbert Harman argues that the warrant for the lay attribution of character traits is completely undermined by the “fundamental attribution error” (FAE). He takes it to have been established by social psychologists, that the FAE pervades ordinary instances of lay person perception. However, examination of recent work in psychology reveals that there are good reasons to doubt that the effects observed in experimental settings, which ground the case for the FAE, pervade ordinary instances of person perception. Furthermore, it is possible to make sense of these experimental results without invoking the FAE. Harman's argument against lay character trait attribution is unsubstantiated.