Steven Diggin

One kind of temporally extended agency involves planning your action in advance. This paper argues that there is also a different kind of temporally extended agency, characterised by planning that is partly retrospective in nature. Incorporative agency constitutively involves an agent planning to continue acting in such a way as to integrate some of their earlier activity into a to-be-completed extended action. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of incorporative agency, explicate the distinctive mechanism through which it is possible, and outline several kinds of conditions under which it can be rational to exercise. Finally, I argue that attending to the possibility of incorporative agency enables us to answer two sceptical challenges, concerning intentional skilled action that is initiated by automatic motor responses and intentional mental activity under content-involving descriptions.

Ethical Criticism is the practice of pointing towards a flaw in the ethical content or character of an artwork as a reason why this artwork is aesthetically faulty in some respect. This paper develops novel account of the mechanism by which this critical practice works. In contrast to the standard approach, this does not involve positing an interaction between the intrinsic ethical value and aesthetic value of an artwork. The argument runs as follows. Narrative artworks are sometimes criticizable on the grounds that they make inaccurate presuppositions about the actual facts. There are ethical facts, at least in a minimal sense. Therefore, artworks are sometimes criticizable on the grounds that they make mistaken presuppositions about the ethical facts. I argue that this Factual Criticism approach gives a satisfactory diagnosis of the examples that initially motivate the philosophical debate about ethics and aesthetics.

Most human action is improvised rather than planned in advance. But how do we improvise? I develop an account of what it means for improvisation to involve ‘making things up as you go along’: improvising involves planning what to do after you have already started doing it. I explore the philosophical consequences of this account of improvisation: what psychological profile improvisors must have; how the improvisational plans that are adopted during action can causally guide the action that one is already in the course of performing; what this means for how we should deliberate about and decide upon various options in the course of an improvisational performance. The main payoff is a discussion that improv(is)es on existentialist themes, in order to argue that humans can gain meaningful unity in their lives by means of improvising the performance of a self-constituting project over the whole course of their existence.

This paper argues that ethical propositions can legitimately be used as evidence for and against empirical conclusions. Specifically, I argue that this thesis is entailed by several uncontroversial assumptions about ethical metaphysics and epistemology. I also outline several examples of ethical-to-empirical inferences where it is extremely plausible that one can rationally rely upon their ethical evidence in order to gain a justified belief in an empirical conclusion. The main upshot is that ethical propositions can, under perfectly standard conditions, play both direct and indirect evidential roles in (social) scientific inquiry.

Plausible probabilistic accounts of evidential support entail that every true proposition is evidence for itself. This paper defends this surprising principle against a series of recent objections from Jessica Brown. Specifically, the paper argues that: (i) explanationist accounts of evidential support convergently entail that every true proposition is self-evident, and (ii) it is often felicitous to cite a true proposition as evidence for itself, just not under that description. The paper also develops an objection involving the apparent impossibility of believing P on the evidential basis of P itself, but gives a reason not to be too worried about this objection. Establishing that every true proposition is self-evident saves probabilistic accounts of evidential support from absurdity, paves the way for a non-sceptical infallibilist theory of knowledge and has distinctive practical consequences.