Steven Geisz

There are many ways of being a good teacher. Here, I defend a way of teaching Indian and Asian philosophy that consists mainly in reading out loud to and with students—reading slowly, with lots of repetition. Such teaching is analogous to how a Taiji (i.e., “T’ai Chi”) form gets taught in group Taiji classes. This method guides students to adopt the perspectives of the text’s author[s] and imaginatively to inhabit the text’s philosophical space. It differs from lecturing, but it is also unlike “student-centered,” “inquiry-based,” and “active” learning. Indeed, it is “text-centered” or “professor-centered” learning since it invites students to submit to texts and the ways the teacher models engagement with them. This method arguably de-emphasizes “getting students to be able to do philosophy on their own” and instead emphasizes “getting students to have a meaningful experience with philosophy” and “getting students to appreciate the value of philosophy.”

Numerous theories of intentionality have been proposed which seek to account for the aboutness of signs, symbols, and representations. Typically such theories attempt to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality, and such theories are often offered for supposed mental representations which are thought to have natural, underived intentionality. While theories of intentionality have problems, it is thought that some such theory must work, at least in principle. ;I offer an alternative adverbial view of signs, symbols, and representations which, if successful, allows us to avoid the problems which theories of intentionality aim to solve. According to an adverbial view of signs, talk or thought about signs, symbols, or representations does not refer to token physical objects which are signs or---in what amounts to the same thing---which have semantic or intentional properties. Rather, talk/thought about signs should be understood adverbially, such that some physical object or other is required to communicate signly, but no physical object is, itself, a sign-object. ;The argument proceeds in three stages. In Part 1, the ontology of signs and utterances is considered. It is argued that the common distinction between natural and conventional intentionality is flawed, since the very individuation of signs can be seen as dependent upon an utterance-act which produces it. It is further argued that the very distinction between sign-objects and utterance-acts is problematic; only in extreme cases is there a neat distinction to be made. ;In Part 2, an adverbial view of signs is explicitly introduced and developed. Potential objections are responded to in the course of specifying how an adverbial view understands syntax and the individuation of signs. ;In Part 3, it is argued that, if we adopt an adverbial view and understand it in light of the considerations of Part 1, the standard problems of intentionality can be seen as an artifact of a contingent, non-adverbial view of signs, symbols, and representations. By adopting an adverbial view and refusing to reify or objectify signs, we can avoid the purported problems of intentionality in an intellectually satisfying way.

In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential objections are identified and considered. To respond to these objections, relationships between physical form and linguistic/representational form are examined. In the process, two ways of idealizing away from the heterogeneous details of actual language use are introduced: idealization toward homogeneity and idealization toward complete heterogeneity. I argue that an adverbial view of linguistic representation both allows for and requires that we idealize toward complete heterogeneity and that doing so has important implications for (1) our understanding of the relationship between physical form and representational form and (2) property attribution in general. These implications provide further indirect support for the alternative metaphysics of representation developed here.

Liberal democracy aims to treat all adult citizens as politically equal, at least in ideal cases: Once a citizen is over the age of majority, she is deemed a full-fledged member of the community and in theory has equal standing with all other adult citizens when it comes to making policy and participating in the political realm in general. I consider three questions: (1) Is there any plausible alternative to a standard "all adult citizens have equal political standing" model of democracy that could be drawn from a specifically Confucian valuing of elder members of the community? (2) Insofar as there is a plausible alternative, what might it reveal about differences between how liberalism and Confucianism think of human selves as located in time? (3) What sort of difference would it make if the Confucian valuing of age were implemented via informal social norms, on the one hand, or via explicit institutional mechanisms and procedures, on the other?

: This essay introduces a way of reading the Mengzi (Mencius) that complicates how we understand what Mengzi is recorded as saying. A pragmatic-strategic reading of the Mengzi is developed here, according to which Mengzi attends to and operates under important pragmatic constraints on speech. Based on a close reading of key passages, it is argued that truth-telling and descriptive accuracy are less important to Mengzi than guiding people along the Confucian path. This reading has implications for our understanding of Mengzi’s philosophical positions and his methods of argumentation, as well as for our understanding of philosophical activity in general.

The Nèiyè 內業 talks of “a heart-mind within a heart-mind” that is somehow connected to or prior to language. In the context of the overall advice on looking “inward” or “internally” as part of the meditation and mysticism practice that the Nèiyè introduces, this talk of a heart-mind within a heart-mind arguably invites comparisons with a Cartesian “inner theater” conception of mentality. In this paper, I examine the “inner” talk of the Nèiyè in order to tease out its identifiable commitments in philosophical psychology. I consider the ways in which the “inner” talk of the text might be read as marking out one or more of three different inner/outer distinctions, and I argue that we can consistently read the Nèiyè without seeing it as marking any inner/outer distinction that is related to what is often referred to in English as “inner experience.”

abstract A common bit of public political wisdom advises that in certain three‐way elections, one should cast a strategic vote for one of the top two candidates rather than a conscience‐driven vote for a third candidate, since doing otherwise amounts to ‘throwing one's vote away’. In this paper, I examine the possible justifications for this pragmatic advice to vote strategically. I argue that the most direct argument behind such advice fails to motivate strategic voting in large‐scale elections, since there is no significant chance that one's own vote will alter the outcome of the election, even in plausible close‐call cases. In short, the lack of probable pragmatic effect undermines the pragmatic motivation for altering one's baseline voting behavior. However, an indirect argument succeeds in motivating strategic voting in some scenarios. Such an indirect argument relies on the possibility of one acquiring an obligation to engage in public strategic campaigning for one of the top two candidates. In many cases in which one strategically campaigns, one will, indirectly, acquire an obligation to vote strategically in accord with one's prior public campaign activities. Thus, the common bit of political wisdom about strategic voting can be justified, though only indirectly

What challenges arise when attempting to incorporate body practice and meditation into undergraduate philosophy courses? In recent years, a number of philosophers have begun teaching such practices in academic classrooms, and at my university I have experimented specifically with teaching qigong, taijiquan (i.e., t’ai chi), hatha yoga, and meditation techniques in a variety of courses on East Asian and Indian philosophy. Teaching body practices and meditations poses potential problems about exclusion and advocacy in the classroom: exclusion, in the sense that the practices might improperly marginalize certain students from full participation, and advocacy, in the sense that including these practices in a class might amount to problematic advocacy of a particular substantive set of religious values. This paper explores ways I have addressed these problems through a variety of pragmatic, situation-specific approaches and by encouraging students to have a sense of ownership about the practices and the learning environment itself.