Steven J. Firth

Matti Häyry has argued that space exploration aimed at human settlement is both irrational and morally impermissible. Such projects, he claims, expose others—including future generations—to serious risks that were not autonomously chosen and which may be harsh, oppressive, and difficult or impossible to escape. Given the increasing institutional interest in extra‐planetary habitation, these concerns warrant serious engagement. This paper refutes Häyry's use of the precautionary principle as a decisive moral rule in this context because the principle is ill‐suited to long‐term, future‐directed activities in that it treats abstention as ethically neutral. The moral failure of human settlement in space, if there is one, lies not in space exploration qua activity—but in mission frameworks that exclude normative, social, and philosophical perspectives from their design and governance.

The picture theory of disability shows how the irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals can be ‘pictured’, and how a linguistic analysis of that picture can be used to represent the experience of disability. Technically constituting a species of ‘relational approach’ due to its consideration of the interplay between an individual and their environment, the theory differs from other relational accounts by focusing on the nature of the experience rather than the function of the relationship. The main deviation from other theories of disability is in the conceptual shift away from a ‘nounal’ interpretation of disability in which disability is that which is caused or embodied, to an ‘adverbial’ description in which disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals. This chapter overviews the picture theory of disability, positions it within a broader disability theory context, and critically analyses it.

Discussion surrounding first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) is hotly debated in the literature. This paper responds to claims made by Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis that the ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language indicates that communication with ETI would not be possible, and that the resultant uncertainty forces us into the Hobbesian Trap—the proclivity to adopt pre-emptive military strategies as a function of mutual distrust and fear of imminent attack. The ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language constitutes largely behaviourist thinking and hinges on ‘shared human context.’ However, shared universal contexts, together with the potential existence of post-biological ETI, suggest that communication at a level sufficient to interpret basic dispositions (what I call the level of ‘performative function’) may be possible. Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.

Bachelors Honours Thesis: Much philosophical thought has been given to the subject of personal identity. However, almost all of the discourse on personal identity seems to assume the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics without giving thought to whether or not such a paradigm accurately describes reality – and though David Lewis briefly addresses Personal Identity under the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, his conclusion is Struldbruggian immortality. This paper surveys the major philosophical contributions in personal identity, and attempts to both evaluate forensic agents and responsibility under the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics and critiques current work in this area.

Broadly speaking, exclusion for disabled people can be understood as a general lack of social and political integration within a society. Inequalities arising from the multi-dimensional causes of exclusion not only include poverty, but more fundamental aspects of societal membership such as social participation, financial autonomy, friendship, sexual citizenship, and accessibility. The articles of this thesis offer insight to the nature of the experience of exclusion for disabled people by considering specific examples of exclusion (such as the exclusion from sexual citizenship, discussed in Articles I and II), and a new theoretical approach to disability (advanced in Article III). Analysis of the nature of exclusion for disabled people reveals a unique set of multi-dimensional problems, and despite efforts from the disability rights community and an increased academic interest in disability studies, there has been a limited incorporation of holistic or transdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenon in works of praxis and in governmental policy. Seeking to highlight and ameliorate the experience of exclusion for disabled people, disability rights organisations advocate for greater societal integration and inclusion into the social fabric of society by offering revisionary theoretical interpretations of disability in an effort to steer social change — a devoir to which the works of this thesis contribute academically. Focussing on the interplay between the nature of exclusion, rights, and basic needs, this thesis investigates the limits of the welfare state’s obligations to afford disabled people a life of eu zen, argues for greater obligations in areas such as sexual citizenship, inclusion, and presents an alternate theory of disability. The Introduction situates the articles of this thesis within a wider theoretical context that highlights the importance of social context, and focusses on the nature of exclusion and inclusion for disabled people as a complex set of societal and political disadvantages which go beyond simple poverty and social disenfranchisement. The main claim of this thesis is that the experience of exclusion for disabled people constitutes a multi-faceted and interconnected set of disadvantages and barriers that constitute a greater and more substantive set of exclusions than those experienced by other excluded groups.

The Welfare-Funded Sex Doula Programme is a proposed sexual needs service that advances the sexual citizenship of disabled people by providing specially trained ‘sex doulas’ to meet the various, often complex, sexual needs of disabled people. Conceived as providing disabled individuals with practical sexual support services, the role of the sex doula includes advocacy, counselling, therapy, and practical relief from sexual tension. The programme constitutes a robust, comprehensive, and theoretically cohesive welfare service that seeks to provision access to sexual citizenship for disabled people. Grounded in Aristotelian concepts of flourishing, the programme identifies sexual citizenship as a fundamental basic need and seeks to ensure that disabled people have the opportunity to achieve the same level of sexuality as able-bodied people. Work advancing the programme includes both philosophical and theoretical arguments showing how the programme is justified under several moral frameworks, and claims made therein have resulted in velitation in the literature regarding the potential of such a programme to violate individuals’ negative rights.

This thesis argues that the nature of disability is, currently, fundamentally misunderstood. Current approaches to disability are nounal and seek to determine the locus of disability with the intention of better understanding the phenomenon of disability. In contrast, this thesis offers an adverbial perspective on disability and shows how disability is experienced as an increased and personally irremediable impediment to daily-living tasks or broader goals. This thesis holds that impediment is not a function of either biological individuality or the Social, but of a specific relation between the individual and their environment. The following delineates the Picture Theory of Disability — a mechanism for the evaluation of the experience of disability and a heuristic device for the proper interpretation of disability. The theory is born of Humean sentimentalism and elements of Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory of Language, and shows when, where, and how disability is experienced.


The leading models of disability struggle to fully encompass all aspects of “disability.” This difficulty arises, the author argues, because the models fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disability. Current theoretical approaches to disability can be understood as “nounal,” in that they understand disability as a thing that is caused or embodied. In contrast, this paper presents an adverbial perspective on disability, which shows that disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours. The picture theory of disability technically constitutes a species of relational approach because its analysis references the interplay between an individual and their environment; it differs from other relational accounts, however, by interpreting disability as a certain kind of negative experience—rather than a function of that relationship. This purely descriptive theory makes no normative claims about disability and operates as both a mechanism for the evaluation of the experience of disability and a heuristic device for the proper interpretation of disability. When disability is reframed in this way, the theory offers a particularist perspective which shows if, when, where, and how disability is experienced.

Discussion surrounding first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) is hotly debated in the literature. This paper responds to claims made by Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis that the ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language indicates that communication with ETI would not be possible, and that the resultant uncertainty forces us into the Hobbesian Trap—the proclivity to adopt pre-emptive military strategies as a function of mutual distrust and fear of imminent attack. The ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language constitutes largely behaviourist thinking and hinges on ‘shared human context.’ However, shared universal contexts, together with the potential existence of post-biological ETI, suggest that communication at a level sufficient to interpret basic dispositions (what I call the level of ‘performative function’) may be possible. Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.

Social Science relies heavily on the use of ethnography and other forms of qualitative study, research that may place the researcher as well as their subjects at significant ethical risk. In Canada, Research Ethics Boards are responsible for protecting research participants during these studies. But how much ethical oversight ought the Research Ethics Boards be entitled to? Are they repressing valuable qualitative studies or are the Social Science simply rebelling against new but appropriate control mechanisms not formerly applied to them? This paper evaluates how well the changes made in the TCPS 2 respond to the concerns of Social Scientists as presented in the literature.

The sexual citizenship of disabled persons is an ethically contentious issue with important and broad-reaching ramifications. Awareness of the issue has risen considerably due to the increasingly public responses from charitable organisations which have recently sought to respond to the needs of disabled persons—yet this important debate still struggles for traction in academia. In response, this paper continues the debate raised in this journal between Appel and Di Nucci, concurring with Appel’s proposals that sexual pleasure is a fundamental human right and that access to sexual citizenship for the severely disabled should be publicly funded. To that endeavour, this paper refutes Di Nucci’s criticism of Appel’s sex rights for the disabled and shows how Di Nucci’s alternative solution is iniquitous. To advance the debate, I argue that a welfare-funded ‘sex doula' programme would be uniquely positioned to respond to the sexual citizenship issues of disabled persons.

The Human Condition is neither a well-defined nor well-described concept—nevertheless, it is generally agreed that human sexuality is a fundamental and constituent part of it. For most able-bodied persons, accessing and expressing one's sexuality is a (relatively) trouble-free process. However, many disabled persons experience difficulty in accessing their sexuality, while others experience such significant barriers that they are often precluded from sexual citizenship altogether. Recognising the barriers to the sexual citizenship of disabled persons, the concept of a Welfare-Funded Sex Doula Program has been advanced — a program specifically aimed at meeting the various (and often complex) sexual needs of disabled people. Below we show how that program can be justified within at least two different moral frameworks, the capabilities approach and liberal utilitarianism, and consider and repudiate arguments against it.