•  40
    Ramsey's record: Wittgenstein on infinity and generalization
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1116-1133. 2020.
    There is, in the Ramsey Archive at the Hillman Library of the University of Pittsburgh, a note, written in 1929, in Ramsey's hand and mostly in German, consisting of twenty paragraphs the contents...
  •  47
    Ramsey, ‘Universals’ and atomic propositions
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1): 134-154. 2019.
    ABSTRACTIn ‘Universals’, Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ramsey intends this to be a revision of the 1925 claim. Puzzlingly, however, Ramsey does not mention analysis in 1925. My task in this article is to provide a justification for that change of mind. My …Read more
  •  55
    Sense and the identity conception of truth
    European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3): 1041-1056. 2018.
    The identity conception of truth holds that a thinkable is true just in case it is a fact. As such, it sets itself against correspondence theories of truth, while respecting the substantive role played by truth in respect of enquiry. In this article, I motivate and develop that view, and, in so doing, promote a particular conception of sense. This allows me to defend the view from two substantial criticisms. First, that the identity conception of truth is incoherent in respect of its treatment o…Read more
  •  42
    Frank Ramsey and the Realistic Spirit
    Palgrave Macmillan. 2014.
    This book attempts to explicate and expand upon Frank Ramsey's notion of the realistic spirit. In so doing, it provides a systematic reading of his work, and demonstrates the extent of Ramsey's genius as evinced by both his responses to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , and the impact he had on Wittgenstein's later philosophical insights.
  •  51
    Whistling in 1929: Ramsey and Wittgenstein on the Infinite
    European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3): 651-669. 2014.
    Cora Diamond has recently criticised as mere legend the interpretation of a quip of Ramsey's, contained in the epigraph below, which takes him to be objecting to or rejecting Wittgenstein's Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. Whilst I agree with Diamond's discussion of the legend, I argue that her interpretation of the quip has little evidential support, and runs foul of a criticism sometimes made against intuitionism. Rather than seeing Ramsey as making a claim about the nature o…Read more