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4Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa's EpistemologyIn John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: The Structure of Knowledge Safety.
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44The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of ResearchPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3): 523-528. 1986.
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33Metaepistemology and SkepticismPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 913-918. 1998.
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382Justification, truth, and coherenceSynthese 55 (2): 191-207. 1983.A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher lev…Read more
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471Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a ReplyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4): 400-415. 2013.No abstract
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1144Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic LogicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
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19Lehrer on Coherence and Self-TrustSelf-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and AutonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043. 1999.
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21Pragmatic encroachment and having reasonsIn Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Routledge. 2019.
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724Rationality and TruthIn Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In…Read more
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88Fumerton on Metaepistemology and SkepticismMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 913. 1998.
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53Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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907A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight ViewIn David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117. 2013.
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5Skepticism, relevance, and relativityIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 17--37. 1991.
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102Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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1Contextualism defended some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 67-71. 2013.
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2Ascriber ContextualismIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 417. 2008.
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326Why Basic Knowledge is Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 417-430. 2007.The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we …Read more
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199Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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144Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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552Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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38Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043-1048. 1999.
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