Stewart Kelly

In this dissertation I examine various libertarian, or incompatibilist, notions of human freedom. The free will - determinism debate involves a number of important issues, a few of which I seek to carefully explore. ;The first chapter divides into two parts. The first part briefly reviews some historical attempts to offer a satisfactory definition of freedom. I suggest that the definitions suggested by Hobbes, Locke, Moore, and others are rather problematic. The remainder of the chapter is an attempt to systematically introduce and present Roderick Chisholm's libertarian analysis of a free human action. Chisholm's view is presented as a possible solution to the metaphysical problem of human freedom: How can a human action be both caused and free. ;The second chapter seeks to ascertain how successful Chisholm's proposed solution is. I delineate a number of common criticisms of his view, arguing that while most pose no serious threat to his view, a few pose very serious problems. Chisholm's claim that the free agent functions as an unmoved mover was shown to involve him in very serious difficulties, and in conjunction with some lesser problems, justified us in concluding that Chisholm's agency theory was not a feasible solution to the metaphysical problem of human freedom. ;Chapter 3 takes a brief look at another version of agency theory, one suggested by Richard Taylor. I argue that this attempted solution is no more viable than Chisholm's, and probably less so. ;Finally, the last chapter analyzes an attempt by Peter van Inwagen to formally demonstrate the incompatibility of free will and determinism. I argue that this attempt is not successful, and that, in light of the previous chapters, the libertarian seems unable to either logically demonstrate incompatibilism or to offer a viable analysis of human freedom. I conclude by suggesting that the compatibilist may be more successful than his libertarian counterpart in meeting the challenge posed by the metaphysical problem of human freedom

Introspection is often cited as providing rational warrant for either a libertarian or a compatibilist view of human free will. C. A. Campbell argues for the former position, while Adolf Grünbaum argues for the latter. Others, such as Peter van Inwagen, attempt to show that introspection fails to provide adequate warrent for the belief that humans have free will. The paper seeks to demonstrate how all three views are mistaken, and to show just what introspective evidence rationally justifies. The epistemic status of introspective truth claims is also discussed, as is the possibility of parallels between introspection related issues and the mind body problem.