•  129
    Seeing People and Knowing You: Perception, Shared Knowledge, and Acknowledgment
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4): 55--73. 2013.
    This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other things. I articulate this difference by pointing out that I can know another person by sharing knowledge with he…Read more
  •  32
    What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2): 358-375. 2017.
    In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti-psychologism’ and ‘non-psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti-psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non-psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, want…Read more
  •  25
    A Dilemma for Neo-Expressivism—And How to Resolve It
    Acta Analytica 31 (2): 191-205. 2016.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for neo-expressivist accounts of self-consciousness. Such accounts are united by the idea that we can elucidate self-consciousness by appreciating the thought that some self-ascriptions both function as expressions and are truth-evaluable statements. The dilemma, I argue, is that the neo-expressivists either have to accept a circular element into their accounts or else the accounts lose their appeal. I recommend embracing circularity and argue that this is a ca…Read more
  •  22
    Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5). 2017.
    In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of…Read more
  •  18
    Expression and Self-Consciousness
    Philosophical Topics 44 (1): 163-182. 2016.
    This article argues that nonverbal spontaneous expressions of mental states in human beings involve self-consciousness. We—language-using rational creatures—are capable of knowing our smiles, winces, and frustrated frowns in a self-conscious way. This distinguishes expressions from mere reflexes and mere physiological responses. Such a capacity is, further, essential to such forms of behavior. This is shown by the difficulty of constructing a coherent scenario where we—keeping our rational and c…Read more
  •  14
    Review of Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought by Alice Crary (review)
    Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (1): 131-138. 2016.
    Book review of Crary, Alice, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought, Harvard University Press 2016.