-
11The determinists have run out of luck—for a good reasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.In his paper ‘‘Bad luck once again’’ Neil Levy attacks our proof of the consistency of libertarianism by reiterating a time-worn compatibilist complaint.1 This is, that what is not determined must be due to chance. If A has a choice of X or Y, neither X nor Y being causally determined, then if A chooses X it can only be by chance, never for a reason. The only ‘‘reason’’ that could explain the choice of X over Y would have to be a causally sufficient reason, which would rule out A’s having a genuin…Read more
-
4
-
11Indeterminist free willPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3). 2005.The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological…Read more
-
7Indeterminist Free WillPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 681-690. 2007.The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological…Read more
-
2Atwell R. Turquette. A method for constructing implication logics. Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, vol. 12 , pp. 267–278 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2): 308-309. 1968.
-
26P. T. Geach. Aristotle on conjunctive propositions. Ratio , vol. 5 no. 1 , pp. 33–45Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (4): 661-662. 1973.
-
44A. N. Prior. Recent advances in tense logic. Basic issues in the philosophy of time, edited by Eugene Freeman and Wilfrid Sellars, Open Court, LaSalle, Ill., 1971, pp. 1–15. , pp. 325–339.) (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (1): 99. 1975.
-
1Jean-Louis Gardies. La logique du temps. Collection SUP. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris1975, 160 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (3): 430-432. 1977.
-
8Model of the UniverseOxford University Press UK. 1996.Storrs McCall presents an original philosophical theory of the nature of the universe based on a striking new model of its space- time structure. He shows how his model illuminates a broad range of subjects, including causation, probability, quantum mechanics, identity, and free will, and argues that the fact that the model throws light on such a large number of problems constitutes strong evidence that the universe is as the model portrays it.
-
5Note on “The Art of Time Travel: An Insoluble Problem Solved”Manuscrito 40 (1): 279-280. 2017.ABSTRACT In their contribution to the first part of this special issue Craig Bourn and Emily Caddick Bourne claim to have solved a puzzle I put forward in my ‘An Insoluble Problem’. Here I argue that their attempt fails.
-
6The Determinists Have Run Out of Luck---For a Good ReasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.
-
11The Paradox of ForeknowledgeDialogue 6 (2): 229-230. 1967.What fourth dimension of a four-dimensional space-time continuum. I propose to develop some of the commonly held implications of this view, and to show that they involve a contradiction. Hence whatever time is, it cannot be the thing corresponding to this particular theory.
-
4The evolution of a single trapped ion exhibiting intermittent fluorescence and dark periods may be described either as a continuous process, using differential rate equations, or discretely, as a Markov process. The latter models the atom as making instantaneous transitions from one energy eigenstate to another, and is open to the objection that superpositions of energy states will form which are not covered by the Markov process. The superposition objection is replied to, and two new mathematic…Read more
-
4Time and the Physical ModalitiesThe Monist 53 (3): 426-446. 1969.Relative to any point in time, how many possible futures are there? For example, it may rain tomorrow, or again it may not. So it would appear that relative to today, there are at least two possible futures, one involving rain tomorrow and the other not. Of course only one of these two future states of affairs will take place, and in that sense there is only one actual future, though there may be many possible futures. The only hypothesis under which there is, for every instant in time, only one…Read more
-
14Can a Turing Machine Know That the Gödel Sentence is True?Journal of Philosophy 96 (10): 525-532. 1999.
-
13QM and STR: The combining of quantum mechanics and relativity theoryPhilosophy of Science 67 (3): 548. 2000.Combining quantum mechanics with special relativity requires (i) that a spacetime representation of quantum states be found; (ii) that such states, represented as extended along equal-time hyperplanes, be invariant when transformed from one frame to another; and (iii) that collapses of states be instantaneous in every frame. These requirements are met using branching spacetime, in which probabilities of outcomes are represented by the numerical proportions of branches on which the outcomes occur…Read more
-
5
Montréal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |