•  352
    Freewill and omniscience: a reply to Garrett
    Analysis 73 (3): 488-488. 2013.
    Brian Garrett (Analysis (2012), 293–5) comments on McCall's paper (Analysis (2011), 501–6). McCall had claimed that since the truth of true empirical propositions supervenes on, and depends upon, empirical fact, what God knows and does not know also depends upon being, i.e. upon facts. Consequently God's foreknowing what I freely decide to do depends upon what I freely do. Garrett objects that the dependence of truth on being seems to play no essential role in McCall's argument. McCall replies t…Read more
  •  218
    An insoluble problem
    Analysis 70 (4): 647-648. 2010.
  •  15
    An Essay on Free Will (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4): 663-680. 1985.
  •  58
    Storrs McCall presents an original philosophical theory of the nature of the universe based on a striking new model of its space-time structure. He shows how his model illuminates a broad range of subjects, including causation, probability, quantum mechanics, identity, and free will, and argues that the fact that the model throws light on such a large number of problems constitutes strong evidence that the universe is as the model portrays it.
  •  342
    The determinists have run out of luck—for a good reason
    with E. J. Lowe
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.
    In his paper ‘‘Bad luck once again’’ Neil Levy attacks our proof of the consistency of libertarianism by reiterating a time-worn compatibilist complaint.1 This is, that what is not determined must be due to chance. If A has a choice of X or Y, neither X nor Y being causally determined, then if A chooses X it can only be by chance, never for a reason. The only ‘‘reason’’ that could explain the choice of X over Y would have to be a causally sufficient reason, which would rule out A’s having a genuin…Read more
  •  231
    Connexive implication
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (3): 415-433. 1966.
  •  274
    Indeterminist free will
    with E. J. Lowe
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3). 2005.
    The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological…Read more
  •  195
    Model of the Universe
    Oxford University Press UK. 1996.
    Storrs McCall presents an original philosophical theory of the nature of the universe based on a striking new model of its space- time structure. He shows how his model illuminates a broad range of subjects, including causation, probability, quantum mechanics, identity, and free will, and argues that the fact that the model throws light on such a large number of problems constitutes strong evidence that the universe is as the model portrays it.
  •  76
    In their contribution to the first part of this special issue Craig Bourn and Emily Caddick Bourne claim to have solved a puzzle I put forward in my ‘An Insoluble Problem’. Here I argue that their attempt fails.
  • Polish Logic 1920-1939
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160 495-495. 1970.
  •  17
    Pure Three-Valued Łukasiewiczian Implication
    with R. K. Meyer
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1): 133-134. 1968.
  •  6
    The Determinists Have Run Out of Luck---For a Good Reason
    with E. Lowe
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.
  •  160
    Decision
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2). 1987.
    We all make decisions, sometimes dozens in the course of a day. This paper is about what is involved in this activity. It's my contention that the ability to deliberate, to weigh different courses of action, and then to decide on one of them, is a distinctively human activity, or at least an activity which sets man and the higher animals apart from other creatures. It is as much decisio as ratio that constitutes the distinguishing mark of human beings. Homo may not always be rationalis, but he i…Read more
  •  173
    Time flow does not require a second time dimension
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  67
    Abstract Individuals
    Dialogue 5 (2): 217-231. 1966.
    The title of this paper may seem to involve a contradiction: my purpose is to show that it does not.Individuals fall into two categories; those which depend for their existence upon the existence of other individuals, and those which do not. In the second category are found such things as shoes, ships, cabbages, kings, and discrete bits of sealing wax. These may be calledindividual substances, and the way in which the existence of a cabbage depends upon water and earth, or in which Descartes say…Read more
  •  21
    Review: Richard Sharvy, Eugene Freeman, Wilfrid Sellars, Things (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (1): 100-101. 1975.
  •  74
    Freedom defined as the power to decide
    American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (4): 329-38. 1984.
  •  116
    Time, tense, and reference
    Philosophia 32 (1-4): 423-433. 2005.
  •  130
    Axiomatic quantum theory
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5): 465-477. 2001.
    The basis of a rigorous formal axiomatization of quantum mechanics is constructed, built upon Dirac's bra-ket notation. The system is three-sorted, with separate variables for scalars, vectors and operators. First-order quantification over all three types of variable is permitted. Economy in the axioms is effected by, e.g., assigning a single logical function * to transform (i) a scalar into its complex conjugate, (ii) a ket vector into a bra and a bra into a ket, (iii) an operator into its adjo…Read more
  •  46
    An Aristotelian Dilemma
    with Jaakko Hintikka and Nicholas Rescher
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (2): 418-419. 1972.