SuddhaSatwa GuhaRoy

Social interactions rarely occur with persons in the abstract. Rather, we engage with parents, teachers, neighbours—that is, persons in various capacities, as occupants of social roles. If social interactions are role-mediated, then interpersonal trust must also be directed at persons in their roles. While Baier (1992) acknowledged that most trust is placed in individuals in their roles, she did not explore the mechanisms of role-mediated interpersonal trust. This paper takes up that task. I advance a role-mediated, motivational account of interpersonal trust: when X trusts Y to Φ, X trusts Y as an occupant of role R, expecting Y to fulfil trust expectations for the right reasons. Trustworthiness, consequently, requires Y meeting trust expectations as well as doing so with appropriate motives. The appropriate motives, as I argue, are also tied to the trustee's social role. This theory contrasts with Kelsall's (2025) recent account, which, while rightly emphasising the significance of roles in interpersonal trust, defends a motive-neutral approach. Although I share Kelsall's emphasis on the centrality of roles, I question his motive-neutral approach and propose a motivational alternative—one that also improves upon the mainstream motivational accounts.

We develop a comprehensive account of self-trust in its role-mediated, general and universal forms, highlight the connectionbetween self-trust and personal autonomy, and argue that we can have too much or too little self-trust. Both can undermine per-sonal autonomy. Our account explicates and supports three compelling theses about trust: that interpersonal trust is often trustin a person in a social role (Thesis One); that self-trust is a nonprototypical variant of interpersonal trust (Thesis Two); and thatself-trust is essential to autonomy (Thesis Three).

Bernard Williams’s famous phrase ‘one thought too many’ has been variously interpreted. But Susan Wolf (2012) thinks that even the most sympathetic interpretation misunderstands its full implications. She argues that Williams and herself are sceptical about morality’s ability to provide determinate answers and its claim to supreme precedence. That is what this phrase implies. However, according to Wolf, even the most sympathetic interpretation of Williams’s claim surreptitiously smuggles in such an unconditional commitment to morality. I argue that we can save a version of the standard sympathetic view which does not smuggle in any such commitment. By preserving this version of the standard sympathetic view, we can preserve space for moral ruminations, sans any unconditional commitment to morality.

This paper advances a Marxist critique of the politics of cancellation and raises concerns about the possible development of a cancel culture. Rather than delving into debates on freedom of speech, crucial though they are, this paper focuses on the pragmatics of the political tool – its goals, mechanisms, effects, and the underlying reasoning. From a Marxist perspective, it is essential to analyse cancellation and cancel culture holistically, considering their rationale, the mechanism, the objectives, and the impacts, along with their relationship to the material conditions of society. Such an analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of any historical development and argues that addressing political problems in the long term requires such a holistic approach, including the development of relevant productive forces. If cancellation evolves into a culture, it may give rise to a polity that reinforces market relations. Within the framework of historical materialism, this would be a case of the superstructure supporting the base, turning politics into a matter of private opinions, which is far from ideal. The paper concludes with some practical considerations.