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SelvesIn Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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30Chapter One. IntroductionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-4. 2011.
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Intentionality, terminology and experienceIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
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5Intencionalidad real 3: por qué la intencionalidad entraña concienciaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 35-69. 2008.
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74Realistic materialismIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
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28PrefaceIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. 2011.
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264Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility (edited book)Lexington Books. 2013.Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.
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The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David HumeClarendon Press. 1992.It is widely supposed that Hume (1711-1776) invented and espoused the `regularity' theory of causation, holding that causal relations are nothing but a matter of one type of thing being regularly followed by another. It is also widely supposed that he was quite right about this, and that it was one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. Galen Strawson argues in this book that the regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and that Hume never adopted it in any case.
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321The phenomenology and ontology of the selfIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, John Benjamins. pp. 23--39. 2000.
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Dreams of final responsibilityIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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158Causation and Universals.The secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume.Causation: A Realist ApproachPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 494-498. 1991.
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30Chapter Ten. Personal IdentityIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 77-87. 2011.
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32Chapter Two. “Person”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 5-16. 2011.
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26Chapter Thirteen. “ But next... ”: Personal Identity without Substantial ContinuityIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 97-109. 2011.
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32Chapter Sixteen. A Fatal Error of Locke’s?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 125-130. 2011.
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26Chapter Six. “Consciousness... is inseparable from thinking”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 42-49. 2011.
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27Chapter Five. ConsciousnessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 30-41. 2011.
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27Chapter Eleven. Psychological ConnectednessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 88-92. 2011.
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23Chapter Eight. “Person”—Locke’s DefinitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 58-71. 2011.
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21ReferencesIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 253-258. 2011.
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18Chapter Twelve. TransitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 93-96. 2011.
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9Chapter Seventeen. Circularity?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 131-134. 2011.
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18Chapter Seven. “From the inside”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 50-57. 2011.
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22Chapter Twenty. ConclusionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 150-156. 2011.
