Susan Gardner

In this paper we argue that, if it is true that maximum self-development is better both for individuals and society, and if it is true that that self-development is being seriously curtailed by pervasive environmental tech forces, then clearly educational systems, since they are guardians of “developing” young humans, have a moral imperative to push back against forces that diminish the self. On the other hand, if it is not true that “more self is always better,” that perhaps “goodness of fit” between self and society is optimum, then education systems are justified in continuing to pay scant attention to the forces of self-development (or lack thereof). In line with Sherry Turkle’s (2011) argument that tech forces are diminishing the sort of reflective reasoning necessary for self-development, we will argue that since communicative interchange is necessary for self-development, and an ever-developing self is necessary for ever deeper and more meaningful dialogue (hence forming a dialectic), the fact that social media and other forms of tech connection stunts deep and meaningful interchange has serious implications. Specifically, we will argue that, in contemporary high-tech society (what we are calling Society 2.0), the dialectic between self and communication is going the “wrong” way; that genuine dialogue is becoming ever more rare, which in turn is resulting in “diminished-I’s,” which in turn is resulting in ever more complacency in the face of utterly superficial communicative interchange. We will begin with an overview of what we mean by a “diminished-I,” and then follow by noting how social media, the reading vacuum, roboticism, crowd communication, and decreasing social capital are resulting in diminished-I’s. Since this is resulting in an “I-diminished” society, we will reflect on the question of whether those dialogical educational initiatives that promote self-development are, in fact, making dodos, i.e., making youngsters unfit for the environment in which they find themselves. Ultimately, we will argue that, if educators choose to fight back against the I-diminishing forces of Society 2.0, they need to take selves seriously and actively engage youngsters in dialogue with those with opposing viewpoints. Ultimately, youngsters in Society 2.0 will need all the assistance educators can muster to fight the addictive, literally mind-numbing forces of being “happily” “alone together,” and instead chose the riskier often unhappy-making option of diving into the truth-seeking process with varying coalitions of the willing.

A fairly precise vision of a healthy physical self can serve as motivation for undertaking the means to that end. The same cannot be said with regard to “healthy moral selves”. By definition, democracy is about living with others and, as we argue, a healthy moral self is one that lives well with others. However, precisely what “living with others” entails is ambiguous, particularly in a capitalist economy that presumes that the greatest happiness results from antagonistic competitiveness. In an attempt to demystify how self-focused individuals may nonetheless thrive in “the space between”, we will examine, with the help of Kant and Foucault, the Enlightenment Project that promoted maximal reasonableness (or what we are referring to as “healthy moral selves”) and then, with the help of Steven Pinker and Alisdair MacIntyre, explore the factors that have led to its seeming relatively recent failure. We will argue, following Iris Murdoch and others, that the best hope for its revitalization, and with it, democracy, lies, on one hand, with the debunking of counterfeit moral selves who use a “moral stance” to deliver what Frankfurt refers to as “bullshit”, and, on the other, with the reinvigoration of our understanding that healthy moral selves require a steady diet of engaging in “objective practical reasoning” with those who think differently, thereby potentially starving our fat relentless egos that are so often the source of divisiveness and, in so doing, become happy by becoming worthy of being happy. In animating the value of this goal, the hope is that the means, i.e., education for the reinvigoration of practical reason (the forgotten twin of theoretical reason) and genuine deliberative dialogue across difference will become sufficiently attractive that it will energize democratic practice and dialogue to such an extent that democracy, as a form of government, may yet flourish despite the atomizing forces of capitalism.

“Natural tribalism,” though it has resulted in humans killing and enslaving “non-bonded others” since forever, has nonetheless resulted in sufficient in-group cooperation that the human species has flourished to 8 billion today. Given this population squeeze, humans are now forced to live with “non-bonded” others as a fact of daily life, but this has had the effect forcing many of our natural “othering” tendencies (i.e., the tendency to see non-bonded others as essentially different and, hence, essentially bad) to go underground into attitudinal stances rather than be expressed as overt violence. Does this matter? And if it does, can anything be done about it? These are the questions that will be examined here.

There are a wide variety of potential applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in Defence settings, ranging from the use of autonomous drones to logistical support. However, limited research exists exploring how the public view these, especially in view of the value of public attitudes for influencing policy-making. An accurate understanding of the public’s perceptions is essential for crafting informed policy, developing responsible governance, and building responsive assurance relating to the development and use of AI in military settings. This study is the first to explore public perceptions of and attitudes towards AI in Defence. A series of four focus groups were conducted with 20 members of the UK public, aged between 18 and 70, to explore their perceptions and attitudes towards AI use in general contexts and, more specifically, applications of AI in Defence settings. Thematic analysis revealed four themes and eleven sub-themes, spanning the role of humans in the system, the ethics of AI use in Defence, trust in AI versus trust in the organisation, and gathering information about AI in Defence. Participants demonstrated a variety of misconceptions about the applications of AI in Defence, with many assuming that a variety of different technologies involving AI are already being used. This highlighted a confluence between information from reputable sources combined with narratives from the mass media and conspiracy theories. The study demonstrates gaps in knowledge and misunderstandings that need to be addressed, and offers practical insights for keeping the public reliably, accurately, and adequately informed about the capabilities, limitations, benefits, and risks of AI in Defence.

When Mathew Lipman first introduced Philosophy for Children (P4C) to the world, his goal was not to sneak a little academic philosophy into the typical school curriculum, as one might expect from the titles of his first books: Philosophy in the Classroom (Lipman et al., 1980) and Philosophy Goes to School (Lipman, 1988). His goal, rather, was to create a paradigm shift in the field of education itself: namely, to transform the typical hierarchical model into one in which the teacher/facilitator solicits responses from students and hence, in that sense, meets them where they “are at.” This non-hierarchical model, however, has stumbled in taking root, which is, perhaps, not surprising given that the hierarchical model, whether in school, in sport or in the home, appears to be so much easier and so much more efficient. If those of us who support a non-hierarchical model in all these arenas are serious about furthering this approach, it would appear that the onus lies with us to articulate precisely in what ways a hierarchical model falls short. In so doing, we will not only provide ourselves with a precise framework by which to make the case for the importance of adopting a non-hierarchical approach, we will also provide ourselves with a metric whereby we can measure whether our own non-hierarchal practice is true to its justification; and that the approach is not simply non-hierarchal for sake of being non-hierarchical, nor quasi-authoritarianism for the sake of more wide-spread acceptance. It is the articulation of the flaws of a hierarchical model that non-hierarchal model can (and should) correct that will be the focus of the analysis here.

Current philosophical literature is saturated with the debate on biomedical enhancement, where bio-liberals and conservatives alike make compelling arguments for and against the enterprise. However, this literature is yet to consider the impact such enhancement would have on the individual’s actual lived experience. This article seeks to remedy that by situating the bioethics debate within the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, specifically theorising how biomedical enhancement of the physical kind would impact Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-subject. The central issue arises when the reciprocal relationship between the physical body and phenomenal world (termed “body/world dynamic”) is shown to be off-balance because of the rapid rate at which human beings continue to “enhance” their environment. In this, we see that the development of the world has outweighed that of the body to the extent that we, as body-subjects, have become maladapted to the place we call home. This article will suggest that we can attempt to resolve this by restoring the balance of the body/world dynamic with “restrictive” enhancement, thereby providing an ethical justification for the pursuit of the enterprise.

There is an unacknowledged disagreement on what kind of dialogue best supports democracy. Many view democracy as analogous to a law court and so view “democratic dialogue” as a contest between competing advocates who have acquired the kind of “steel trap” critical thinking skills that are ideal for winning in the external marketplace of ideas. Others assume that the propensity to seriously reflect on opposing viewpoints within the minds of individuals is ideal for democratic maintenance. It will be argued here that our love affair with “critical thinking” that tends to support an external battle of ideas harms democracy. It will be argued that the complexity of our common humanity, the complexity of our form of governance, the complexity of the approaches needed to face wicked problems, and the complexity of the internal engine of personal development requires that we learn to readily engage in open truth-seeking dialogue with those who hold opposing viewpoints and in so doing, enhance the dimensionality through which we view the world. With regard to the educational implications, this suggests that, since engaging in dialogue across difference is the essence of the pedagogical framework that anchors Philosophy for Children, Philosophy for Children ought to be embraced as an essential component of any educational enterprise that views cultivating democratic citizenship as part of its mandate.

Though central to metaphysics, and exciting for entertainment, the fact that selves are invisible, has received insufficient attention in the field of P4C, and virtually none in the field of education in general. This may not be surprising as the enthusiasm to enrich “minds” both with essential information as well as with critical, creative, and cooperative inquiry skills, may blind educators to the fact that their initiatives (even those that are dialogical) may not touch how children view themselves, nor how they ought to function in the world as they find it. It will be argued here that, if ethical development, or democratic citizenship, or authenticity, or any other “self-education” initiative is on the educative menu, strategies (detailed here) must be undertaken to ensure that all parties are truly present, in body, mind and self. It will be further argued that since educating selves can be done at the same time as educating minds (e.g., nurturing reasoning skills), and since a Community of Philosophical Inquiry (unlike other educational strategies), in its dialogical structure, has the unique potential to solicit and hence educate selves, and since such “self-education” is an education for “making a life,” rather than the more common educative concern of educating for “making a living,” facilitators who do not activate the unique power of a CPI to enhance personhood are remiss in their responsibility to their charges.

That the world is awash with resentment poses a genuine question for educators. Here, we will suggest that resentment can be better harnessed for good if we stop focusing on people and tribes and, instead, focus on systems: those invisible norms that often produce locked-in structures of social interaction. A “systems lens” is vast, so fixes will have to be an iterative process of reflection, and revision toward a more just system. Nonetheless, resentment toward the status quo may be an important element in keeping that otherwise tedious process going, with the caveat that resentment is only productive when it is combined with reason, and that, therefore, educators, rather than privileging participant reactive attitudes, ought, instead, to promote participant reactive reasoning, as the latter can be a genuine force for both personal and interpersonal growth, while the former might very well do the reverse.

There are kinds of dialogue that support social justice and others that do the reverse. The kinds of dialogue that support social justice require that anger be bracketed and that hiding in safe spaces be eschewed. All illegitimate ad hominem/ad feminem attacks are ruled out from the get-go. No dialogical contribution can be down-graded on account of the communicator’s gender, race, or religion. As well, this communicative approach unapologetically privileges reason in full view of theories and strategies that might seek to undermine reasoning as just another illegitimate form of power. On the more positive side, it is argued in this paper that social justice dialogue will be enhanced by a kind of “communicative upgrading,” which amplifies “person perception,” foregrounds the impersonal forces within our common social spaces rather than the “baddies” within, and orients the dialogical trajectory toward the future rather than the past. Finally, it is argued in this paper that educators have a pressing responsibility to guide their students through social justice dialogue so that their speech contributes to the amelioration of injustice, rather than rendering the terrain more treacherous.

What precisely do we mean by respect? How should we adjudicate between conflicting demands of respect? What obstacles stand in the way of respect? The papers contained in this international anthology were presented at the North American Association of the Community of Inquiry conference in Vancouver, Canada, in June 2012, and were the outcome of in-depth and interdisciplinary discussions around the various aspects of respect. The book is an exacting and exciting analysis of the notion of respect - an analysis that has the potential to have lasting and extensive practical consequences.

Abstract: Humans, because they are self-conscious, have the capacity to take control over their own behaviour in a way that non-self-conscious entities, such as the local cow, do not. However, if we do not clearly understand how humans can do this, we will never be able to fully activate that potential. In what is to follow, the change in the value dynamic will be traced from the initial position in which humans respond - like any animate being - to the values in their environment, to the emergence of learned responses as a function of purposeful reinforcement, to the emergence of ‘self-control’ in which selfconscious language-users borrow values from significant others, and finally to the emergence of genuine autonomy, when selfconscious agents are able to free their practical judgements from external influence by thinking through value issues impartially. Since thinking through an issue impartially is the sine qua non mark of philosophical thinking, it would appear that learning how to think philosophically is of particular importance to agents who wish to maximise their potential for autonomy.

When Mathew Lipman first introduced Philosophy for Children to the world, his goal was not to sneak a little academic philosophy into the typical school curriculum, as one might expect from the titles of his first books: Philosophy in the Classroom and Philosophy Goes to School. His goal, rather, was to create a paradigm shift in the field of education itself: namely, to transform the typical hierarchical model into one in which the teacher/facilitator solicits responses from students and hence, in that sense, meets them where they “are at.” This non-hierarchical model, however, has stumbled in taking root, which is, perhaps, not surprising given that the hierarchical model, whether in school, in sport or in the home, appears to be so much easier and so much more efficient. If those of us who support a non-hierarchical model in all these arenas are serious about furthering this approach, it would appear that the onus lies with us to articulate precisely in what ways a hierarchical model falls short. In so doing, we will not only provide ourselves with a precise framework by which to make the case for the importance of adopting a non-hierarchical approach, we will also provide ourselves with a metric whereby we can measure whether our own non-hierarchal practice is true to its justification; and that the approach is not simply non-hierarchal for sake of being non-hierarchical, nor quasi-authoritarianism for the sake of more wide-spread acceptance. It is the articulation of the flaws of a hierarchical model that non-hierarchal model can correct that will be the focus of the analysis here.

There are kinds of dialogue that support social justice and others that do the reverse. The kinds of dialogue that supports social justice requires that anger be bracketed and that hiding in safe spaces be eschewed. All illegitimate ad hominem/ad feminem attacks are ruled out from the get-go. No dialogical contribution can be down-graded on account of the communicator’s gender, race, or religion. As well, this social justice communicative approach unapologetically privileges reason in full view of theories and strategies that might seek to undermine reasoning as just another illegitimate form of power. On the more positive side, we will argue that social justice dialogue will enhanced by a kind of “communicative upgrading” that amplifies “person perception,” foregrounds the impersonal forces within our common social spaces rather than the “baddies” within, and orients the dialogical trajectory toward the future rather than the past. Finally, we will argue that educators have a pressing responsibility to guide their students through social justice dialogue so that their contributions contribute to the amelioration of injustice, rather than rendering the terrain more treacherous.

It is difficult to be a philosopher in this postmodern era. This is so because philosophers, who heretofore have been the archetype of persons eager to engage in reasoned discourse, regardless of their differences, suddenly seem unable to talk to each other, primarily due to claim by postmoderns that non-postmoderns are naïve in their blindness to the fact that truth the claims cannot be true in any objective sense, and that claims to objectivity have been used maliciously throughout the ages to wield oppression. After exploring some of the seductive arguments of the post-modern position, and suggesting a re-working of the non-post-modern position, this paper will conclude that philosophical educators carry a heavy responsibility for limiting the real-life damage that has been produced by this philosophical truth-storm by siding firmly with its less contentious opposite by becoming guardians of the possibility that claims can be false.