Susan P. Murphy

This chapter examines the following question – to what extent do contemporary ethical approaches to the duty of assistance offer ways to resolve the tensions faced by those engaged in the current practice of assistance? Two broad categories of responses that cut across traditional consequentialist and deontological boundaries are evident – instructive accounts that seek to specify precisely what the duty of assistance entails, and more specifically, what the content of this obligation is for affluent citizens towards those in need beyond their borders; and distributive accounts that resist the temptation to specify the content of the duty, focusing instead on opportunities offered by the imperfect structure of this duty, the possibilities of agency, and the processes and tools required for giving expression to this duty in different contexts that interrupt the usual order and practice. This chapter focuses on the first group of accounts through a comparative analysis of the work of John Rawls and Peter Singer. It argues that the instructive focus proposed in both approaches are at risk of over-specifying and simultaneously and under-estimating the requirements and reach of the duty of assistance. Ultimately, it argues that such instructive accounts do not provide pathways to resolve the tensions faced by those engaged in the current practice of global assistance.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a more comprehensive exposition of the approach that has emerged throughout this book as the most appropriate and practical guide for agents (donors and recipients, individual and collectives) in the practice of assistance within the contemporary circumstances of assistance, and to consider the objections that might be posed to this account. The following begins with an elaboration of what is here referred to as an interconnected ethical approach drawing upon an application of a Senian account of the imperfect duty to aid as a basic duty of justice. An elaboration of this approach points to the unavoidable interconnections between agents and our shared interdependencies; and also to the interconnections that link duties, action, and responsibility for outcomes as a source of further moral action. Rather than examining aid as a separate and stand-alone duty that has a clear cut-off point, this approach points to a moral landscape where responsible action entails inclusive engagement that may lead to further accumulative moral requirements. This normative argument carries a range of ethical implications for how acts of assistance should be practiced. It also sparks a number of potential objections, including the charge that this account misconstrues and over-burdens the idea of the duty to aid; and that the agential latitude entailed in the approach is problematic given the power asymmetries of the contexts of need. The following outlines the interconnected ethical approach that has emerged and the range of potential objections that this might prompt before turning to the implications for policy and practice in the final chapter.

This chapter returns to the central question – to what extent do contemporary ethical approaches to the duty of assistance offer ways to resolve the tensions faced by those engaged in the current practice of assistance? Through an examination of the approaches offered by Onora O’Neill and Amartya Sen, it argues that both deontological and consequentialist frameworks can provide ways to resolve the tensions faced by those engaged in the practice of assistance. Both accounts are potentially disruptive in that they prompt questioning, critical reflection, and enable dynamic approaches to aid that stretch considerably beyond simple and determinate prescriptive actions. They clarify the basis of the duty of assistance as an imperfect duty that is wide in reach, and is open and unspecified in its requirements. Both approaches construct robust accounts of active situated agents engaging in a process of practical reasoning that supports agents to figure out how to specify the requirements of this duty in particular, concrete circumstances. Both accounts also point to additional considerations for those supporting such practices, and in particular, how agents might navigate issues related to harm and the matter of responsibility for the outcomes of action.

This monograph opens with an examination of the aid industry and the claims of leading practitioners that the industry is experiencing a crisis of confidence due to an absence of clear moral guidelines. The book then undertakes a critical review of the leading philosophical accounts of the duty to aid, including the narrow, instructive accounts in the writings of John Rawls and Peter Singer, and broad, disruptive accounts in the writings of Onora O’Neill and Amartya Sen. Through an elaboration of the elements of interconnection, responsible action, inclusive engagement, and accumulative duties, the comparative approach developed in the book has the potential to overcome the philosophical tensions between the accounts and provide guidance to aid practitioners, donors and recipients in the complex contemporary circumstances of assistance. Informed by real world examples, this book grapples with complex and multi-dimensional questions concerning practices and the ethics of aid. The author judiciously guides us through the debate between deontological and consequentialist moral theories to arrive at a sophisticated consequentialist account that does justice to the complexity of the problems and facilitates our deliberation in discharging our duty to aid, without yielding, as it should not, a determinate answer for each specific situation. Researchers, students, and practitioners of international aid will all find this book rewarding. Win-chiat Lee, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University Susan Murphy’s book offers us a sophisticated exploration of the philosophical basis for aid. It is grounded in a full understanding of the complexities and pitfalls of the aid industry, but its particular strength lies, mainly through an extensive discussion of Singer, Rawls, O’Neill and Sen, in a comparison of consequentialist and duty-based approaches, eventually endorsing a broad non-idealised, situated consequentialist account in what she calls an interconnected ethical approach to the practice of assistance. For anyone wanting to think carefully about why we should give aid, this book has much to offer. Dr Nigel Dower Honorary Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen Author of World Ethics – the New Agenda

This paper examines the links between acting upon a duty to assist, responsibility for these actions, and how such actions link with incremental moral duties that can amass as a consequence of such action. More specifically, this paper is concerned with practices of international aid and assistance, whereby public and privately funded donations enable the actions of parties outside of the territorial and jurisdictional boundaries of a community and state to directly influence the functioning of that community, and the incremental moral duties to which such action can give rise. Using a Senian account of the basis of moral duty, it explains how agents are responsible for the outcomes of their acts of assistance, even when mediated through international institutional actors, and how such acts can give rise to accumulative duties and obligations that are not bound or constrained by territorial boundaries or pre-existing special obligations

This paper argues that it is necessary to focus on gender rather than exclusively on women in discussions on global poverty eradication. It argues firstly, that the drivers of poverty are complex and multifaceted leading to a least two different forms of deprivation – transitory and structural poverty – each requiring different forms of analysis and treatment. Transitory poverty can arise as a consequence of an event or shock that would diminish an individual’s capacity to retain or secure employment and where a State lacks an appropriate form of social protection. Structural poverty, on the other hand, arises where groups are excluded from the workforce on a more permanent basis due to a wide variety of factors of discrimination such as sex, race, ethnicity, and age. Focusing on the sex of an individual alone cannot explain why some are more likely to experience different forms of poverty than others. Policies that protect women against transitory poverty, such as care related allowances, are not sufficient to eradicate structural poverty. Secondly, structural poverty prompts an examination of gender roles and relations. Unlike the category of ‘women’, the concept of gender demands consideration of a wider range of intersecting factors that influence life chances. The structure of contemporary gender relations, where women continue to experience higher levels of violence, and carry the greatest burden of responsibility for non-market based production activities, create the social conditions where domination and dependence thrive, and where persistently high rates of poverty seem inevitable. Such circumstances are generated by human agency. Thus, thirdly, it argues that these circumstances can and should be changed through human action. Knowledge of these circumstances gives rise to moral obligations for both men and women to avoid upholding values and practices that lead to domination and dependence as a matter of basic justice.

The development of in vitro fertilisation as a treatment for human infertilty was among the most controversial medical achievements of the modern era. In Ireland, the fate and status of supranumary embryos derived from IVF brings challenges both for clinical practice and public health policy because there is no judicial or legislative framework in place to address the medical, scientific, or ethical uncertainties. Complex legal issues exist regarding informed consent and ownership of embryos, particularly the use of non-transferred embryos if a couple separates or divorces. But since case law is only beginning to emerge from outside Ireland and because legislation on IVF and human embryo status is entirely absent here, this matter is poised to raise contractual, constitutional and property law issues at the highest level. Our analysis examines this medico-legal challenge in an Irish context, and summarises key decisions on this issue rendered from other jurisdictions. The contractual issues raised by the Roche case regarding informed consent and the implications the initial judgment may have for future disputes over embryos are also discussed. Our research also considers a putative Constitutional 'right to procreate' and the implications EU law may have for an Irish case concerning the fate of frozen embryos. Since current Medical Council guidelines are insufficient to ensure appropriate regulation of the advanced reproductive technologies in Ireland, the report of the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction is most likely to influence embryo custody disputes. Public policy requires the establishment and implementation of a more comprehensive legislative framework within which assisted reproductive medical services are offered.