Susanne Lettow

In this article, I show that Hegel’s philosophical articulation of the family is inextricably bound to his engagement with political economy by focusing on three central aspects of his theory of the family. Firstly, I analyze how Hegel construes the family as a historically distinct social dispositif and constitutive element of the modern order of property. I argue that Hegel’s construction of the family and its place in the modern order of property is not only gendered but also racialized. Secondly, I focus on Hegel’s articulation of the nexus between the family and civil society and his critical diagnosis of the structural problems that result from it. Thirdly, I discuss Hegel’s concept of labor and the political-epistemic limitations of his problematization of civil society, which are bound to it. I draw attention to three aspects, namely the confinement of the concept of labor to civil society, Hegel’s rearticulation of the gendered matter/form distinction, and the relation between Hegel’s economic notion and speculative usage of “labor.” Finally, I consider briefly how a critical reading of Hegel’s articulation of the political economy of the family can provide productive insights for a multidimensional theory of the family today.

In the decades around 1800, genealogical imaginaries, or the social, political, economic and cultural meanings of descent and kinship, underwent far-reaching change. Hegel was deeply concerned with these transformations in various respects and in different parts of his philosophy. By engaging with the issues of kinship and family, with the disputes over racial diversity as well as with the scientific debates about life, reproduction and the meaning of sexual difference, Hegel contributed to a philosophical re-articulation of genealogical relations, or to the shaping of a new vocabulary through which the political, social, cultural and epistemic transformations of the period were rendered intelligible in distinctive ways. Although Hegel did not draw explicit connections between his reflections on kinship, race and reproduction, my aim is to explore the semantic interrelations among his reflections on these issues.

Strategies of naturalization have pervaded throughout the course of modernity. In order to understand both the stability and the discontinuities of modes of naturalization that refer to the knowledge of the life sciences, it is worth going back to the time when biology and related forms of naturalizing sex and race first emerged. The article explores philosophical articulations of biological knowledge at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel not only conceptualize ‘sex’ and ‘race’ in different ways but they also attribute a different status to biological knowledge. In order to understand how ‘naturalization’ works, I argue, the modes of making references to ‘biological’ knowledge and their underlying assumptions about science and philosophy must be scrutinized.

Against the backdrop of the current “geological turn,” the article sheds light on the ways in which the earth has been articulated through strategies of temporalization and territorialization in the context of modern philosophical race discourse. The author first reconstructs the constitution of a “geographic imagination” as it emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The first part focuses on the role of geography in Kant's theory of race, and Alexander von Humboldt's project of plant geography. In the second part, the author discusses Henrik Steffens's account of race. In the third part, the author turns to Heidegger, who rearticulated the “geographic imagination” in the first decades of the twentieth century. The article concludes that a critical theory of nature relations needs to overcome the semantic connections between conceptualizations of the earth and the modern race discourse that haunt contemporary ecological thinking

"Justice" has been, since Plato and Aristotle, a concept of central importance in European philosophy. It is also a concept in everyday speech and in political discourse. As an inter-discursive concept, its value is not culturally limited, so that it seems particularly apt for use in discussions about achieving "globalization with a human face" (as one might say). For such processes of communication it is, however, necessary to reflect on the different uses made of this concept, which is claimed by very different, even contrasting political-ethical projects.

Biology, established around 1800 as the “science of life,” has developed as not only a specific scientific discipline but it has also continually served as a kind of social knowledge. Biological knowledge supported the modern order of the sexes and the two-sex model that it was structured along, as well as modern racism and multiple forms of social inequality articulated by dichotomizing the normal and abnormal. However, the fledgling discipline of biology alone was not capable of developing the epistemological as well as political-ethical competence necessary for attaining this central status in the order of knowledge; it was possible only because philosophy and the emerging social sciences gave biology a specific status. The paper outlines the closely connected, but different attitudes of Kant and Schelling towards biological knowledge. While focusing on their different epistemic strategies towards the new form of nature knowledge, I also point to their different political-ethical articulations of biological knowledge. I conclude that a critical analysis of philosophies of nature around 1800 contributes not onlyto an understanding of the symbolic power of biology in the modern order of knowledge but also to rethinking philosophy’s relation to scientific knowledge today.

Until now, the body has played only a minor role in the philosophy of technology. However, more elaborate reflections on the relation between technology and the body are needed because of the advent of somatechnologies – technologies intentionally geared toward modifying bodies and that use bodily substances as technological means. The article discusses some approaches within the philosophy of technology that prove to be fruitful in this context. The article argues thatsomatechnical modifications of bodies should be understood as elements of ‘body technologies’ and body politics in a broader sense. In such a perspective, concepts of the body developed by Judith Butler and Michel Foucault should be adopted by a praxeological philosophy of technology.

In many fields within the social sciences and the humanities, the ‘material turn’ has inspired fresh debates about human-nature relationships, ecology and the meaning of the social. However, the new materialism also poses some theoretical-political problems. These problems relate to the questions of ontology, epistemology and anthropology, as I argue in the first part of this article. In the second part, I argue that some theoretical-political problems that characterize the ‘new’ materialism have also been debated within the tradition of historical materialism. By recapitulating different versions of historical materialism, I argue that an important distinction can be drawn between ontological and praxeological forms of materialism. I argue in conclusion that from the perspective of critical social theory, the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ materialism does not hold, and that for political as well as epistemological reasons a critical materialism should renounce any ontological turn to matter itself.

Since the 1960s the bio/technosciences have occupied a central place in philosophical thinking. The paper sets out three theoretical configurations embodying major challenges for today’s gender studies in philosophy, since they raise an obstacle, each in its own way, to the discussion on implications of the bio/technosciences in the political field and the area of gender theory: firstly naturalism in the field of the philosophy of science; secondly the paradigm of applied ethics; and thirdly the discourse of philosophical anthropology that has been reactivated in philosophical debates about the bio/technosciences. To conclude, some of the future tasks will be mentioned which fall to gender studies in philosophy

"Justice" has been, since Plato and Aristotle, a concept of central importance in European philosophy. It is also a concept in everyday speech and in political discourse. As an inter-discursive concept, its value is not culturally limited, so that it seems particularly apt for use in discussions about achieving "globalization with a human face" (as one might say). For such processes of communication it is, however, necessary to reflect on the different uses made of this concept, which is claimed by very different, even contrasting political-ethical projects.

Until now, the body has played only a minor role in the philosophy of technology. However, more elaborate reflections on the relation between technology and the body are needed because of the advent of somatechnologies – technologies intentionally geared toward modifying bodies and that use bodily substances as technological means. The article discusses some approaches within the philosophy of technology that prove to be fruitful in this context. The article argues thatsomatechnical modifications of bodies should be understood as elements of ‘body technologies’ and body politics in a broader sense. In such a perspective, concepts of the body developed by Judith Butler and Michel Foucault should be adopted by a praxeological philosophy of technology.