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21Justified Evidence ResistanceActa Analytica 1-12. forthcoming.The paper proposes a novel account of justified evidence resistance. When S inquires as to whether p is the case, S resists available counterevidence e if S either fails to countenance e or is insensitive to e’s probative force. S is justified in resisting available counterevidence e if and only if e is irrelevant.
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10Triangular ExternalismIn Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 2013.Triangular externalism is the view that a subject's thought content is determined by the communication the subject has with others about objects or events in the shared public environment. The process of triangulation is said to constitute thought content. Section 1 characterizes triangular externalism and sets it apart from other forms of content externalism. Section 2 is concerned with the tensions within Davidson's views: the tension between historical externalism and interpretationism, as we…Read more
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23Greco’s explanatory salience contextualism revisitedSynthese 201 (3): 1-11. 2023.According to Greco’s early explanatory salience contextualism, _S_ knows that _p_ if and only if _S_’s cognitive abilities are the salient factor in a causal explanation of why _S_ holds a true belief rather than a false belief or no belief at all. Greco abandoned this view because it cannot handle fake barn cases and because it proves impossible to analyze knowledge in terms of a quantitative characterization of explanatory salience. The paper argues that the core idea of explanatory salience c…Read more
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Warum das Gettierproblem kein Scheinproblem istIn Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren, Mentis. 2013.
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2An Epistemic Defense of News AbstinenceIn Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press. 2021.
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482Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first programPhilosophical Studies 181 (2): 617-625. 2023.Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the w…Read more
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48Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-ClosenessPhilosophia 50 (4): 1623-1638. 2022.The paper makes two points. First, any theory of knowledge must explain the difference between cases of knowledge from falsehood and Gettier cases where the subject relies on reasoning from falsehood. Second, the closeness-to-the-truth approach to explaining the difference between knowledge-yielding and knowledge-suppressing falsehoods does not hold up to scrutiny.
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225 A Kantian Perspective on Robot EthicsIn Hyeongjoo Kim & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence, De Gruyter. pp. 145-168. 2022.
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172The Epistemology of Fake News (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2021.This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.
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30Dieter Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy: The Return to Subjectivity (review)Philosophical Review 115 (1): 115-117. 2006.
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52Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy. The Return to SubjectivityTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (1): 188-190. 2003.
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Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-KnowledgeIn Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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573Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem istIn Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem: Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren, Mentis. pp. 29-48. 2013.Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Get…Read more
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489Reinholds linguistischer SchematismusIn Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom, De Gruyter. pp. 3369-3377. 2018.In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.
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296Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier ProblemsIn Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie – wie und wozu?, Mentis. pp. 189-214. 2015.
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98Against global method safetySynthese 197 (12): 5101-5116. 2018.The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are case…Read more
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317Memory and TruthIn Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 51-62. 2017.
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631On the Blameworthiness of ForgettingIn and Denis Perrin Dorothea Debus Kourken Michaelian (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 241-258. 2018.It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Sometimes we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three accounts of the blameworthiness of forge…Read more
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47Medical knowledge in a social world: Introduction to the special issueSynthese 196 (11): 4351-4361. 2019.Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology.While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh ques…Read more
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326The philosophy of memory today: Editors' introductionIn Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 1-3. 2017.
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172Knowledge from ForgettingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (3): 525-540. 2017.This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
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99A Causal Theory of Mnemonic ConfabulationFrontiers in Psychology 8. 2017.This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and wellgrounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulat…Read more
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1Reinhold's Road to FichteIn George di Giovanni (ed.), Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, Springer. pp. 221-240. 2010.This paper examines the revisions the Elementary-Philosophy underwent when Reinhold studied Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. The goal is to reconstruct Reinhold’s argument for the primacy of facts of moral consciousness over facts of theoretical consciousness when it comes to establishing the first principle of philosophy, and to relate this argument to his idea that moral enlightenment is a precondition of philosophical enlightenment. I argue that there is an intimate relation between Reinhold’s …Read more
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Skeptizismus, Naturalismus und QuinePhilosophisches Jahrbuch 110 (1): 46-58. 2003.This paper examines Quine's dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since skeptical doubts are scientific doubts we can neutralize the skeptical challenge empirically without begging the question. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that Quine's only argument against skepticism is his naturalism. Naturalism states that because we cannot adopt an external perspective onto our beliefs about the world the skeptic's mistake is to demand that we gain an objective understand…Read more
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Die Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung und der direkte RealismusIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Wahrnehmung und Wirklichkeit, Ontos. pp. 155-181. 2009.Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es erstens, die Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten und indirekten Realismus hinsichtlich der Wahrnehmung zu erläutern und zweitens, die weit verbreitete Ansicht, der direkte Realismus sei mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unvereinbar, zu widerlegen. Es lassen sich fünf Argumente für die Inkompatibilität des direkten Realismus mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unterscheiden. Keines dieser Argumente ist stichhaltig.
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17Reading Epistemology: Selected Texts with Interactive CommentaryWiley-Blackwell. 2006.Designed for readers who have had little or no exposure to contemporary theory of knowledge, _Reading Epistemology_ brings together twelve important and influential writings on the subject. Presents twelve influential pieces of writing representing two contrasting views on each of six core topics in epistemology. Each chapter contains an introduction to the topic, introductions to the authors, extensive commentaries on the texts, questions for debate and an annotated bibliography. Includes writi…Read more
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268Memory: A Philosophical StudyOxford University Press. 2010.Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of memory. Bernecker argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic f…Read more
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111How to Understand the Extended MindPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 1-23. 2014.Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, then we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And if we have deep understanding of the extended mind hypothesis, then the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |