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Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weightPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3): 697-725. 2023.No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you are already indifferent. Betweenness has been overlooked by philosophers, and we argue that it is…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Formal Epistemology |
Decision Theory |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Bayesian Reasoning |
New Riddle of Induction |