Svetlana Bardina

This article intends to re-examine Rousseau’s educational theory in the context of the nature/culture opposition. In contemporary discussions on the nature/culture dualism, it has been often stated that his educational theory is based on the assumption that a child is a natural being. However, the author demonstrates that Rousseau was instead committed to a duality of human nature; this influences his educational theory. In his model, human nature consists of a natural and a social side; these two parts are in conflict which seems unsolvable due to the present state of society. A child is regarded as a figure which is open to the future reconciliation of nature and culture. Thus, Rousseau’s model of education is presented not from the standpoint of the present state of society, but from the standpoint of an ideal state which might be built in the future. In addition, the examination of human duality allows one to show that Rousseau’s ideas on civil and private education are closely interrelated.

ABSTRACTThis article intends to reconsider the epistemological status of delusional beliefs on the basis of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty. Several works over the last two decades have compared delusional beliefs with so-called hinge propositions, which – according to Wittgenstein – function as expressions of objective certainty. This gives rise to a paradox. On the one hand, delusions are compatible to Wittgensteinian certainties in some respects; on the other hand, they contradict beliefs shared by other members of the community, which makes them different from ‘normal’ certainties. In order to address this issue, I use Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy of hinge propositions. This taxonomy allows one to distinguish between different types of hinge propositions; all types share the same features, but these features are manifested in a variety of ways. Thus, delusional beliefs might also be regarded as constituting a specific type of hinge propositions. This move makes it possible to resolve the paradox and to identify the special epistemic features of delusional beliefs.