Sydney Morrow

_In this first academic symposium on Hawaiʻi Philosophy, Michael David Kaulana Ing proposes using the term Philosophy as a bridge concept—one that enables culturally diverse communities to articulate their own philosophical traditions while engaging in shared dialogue. The dialogue that would ensue would allow them to discuss their shared interests in meaningful ways. Following up on his proposal, Ing develops an understanding of Hawai__ʻ__i Philosophy that includes the emic __ʻ__Ike Hawai__ʻ__i, the etic __Hawaiian Philosophy, __and K__ā__laimana__ʻ__o as a “thought-carving” middle space that enables Kānaka Hawaiʻi alongside others to search for resources far and wide to make meaning of the world we live in. __Highlighting that Hawai__ʻ__i Philosophy can only take place insofar as it is grounded in practice, Kaipulaumakaniolono Keala cautions about Kānaka __Hawaiʻi_ _demarcating the boundaries of a field when the journey has just begun, while Kamalani Johnson __argues that Hawai__ʻ__i philosophy must be rooted in a Kanaka-centered conceptualization of knowledge. Meanwhile, Bruce Ka__ʻ__imi Watson has chosen to remain visibly silent in this global forum for K__ā__naka, offering a loud but quiet withholding. __Tamara Albertini responds to Ing’s call for a distinctly Hawaiian framework of inquiry, which she describes as “philosophical wayfinding.” Writing as a non-Kanaka Maoli philosopher, she accepts this invitation in the spirit of the guest who does not arrive to consume but to tarry, perceive, and contribute with care. In so doing, she draws on her own methodology of bricolage and flânerie—approaches designed to resist the hierarchization and appropriation of philosophical traditions—in order to engage in a reflective exchange that foregrounds Indigenous knowledge systems. She particularly highlights genealogies of thought rooted in Native Hawaiian culture and embraces Ing’s notion of borrowing as a generative and creative contribution to the evolving landscape of World Philosophies. __Celia __Tagamolila_ _Bardwell-Jones argues that Hawai__ʻ__i__ Philosophy practitioners adopt an ethic of hard incommensurability. She encourages __K__ā__naka__ Hawaiʻi not to allow for integration, fusion or facile comparisons with Hawai__ʻ__i__ Philosophy. Sydney Morrow leans on Ing’s understanding of “bounded multiplicity” to develop an understanding of existential poverty afflicting post-contact __K__a__naka__ society. An alleviation of this poverty would require a different policy analysis as compared to standard economic-driven solutions, she holds. In his reply to his co-panelists, Ing reiterates that the practice of __Hawai__ʻ__i Philosophy must be guided by the principles of __positionality, epistemic humility, ho__ʻ__okama__ʻ__ā__ina, etc. and must support the __K__a__naka community for whom __Hawai__ʻ__i is their ancestral home__. _ _ _.

The philosophers discussed in this volume are exemplars of going “beyond comparison” and we think this captures a certain spirit of Ru. Incumbent upon this understanding is the notion that traditionally effective ideas are dynamic and continually evolve. Similar to Rosenlee, Sydney Morrow explores how we can philosophize about gender based on the work of Roger Ames. The work of these scholars is not only insightful, but also challenges us to break new ground on their shoulders. Morrow argues for letting the Confucian tradition speak on its own terms, including their sometimes heavily gendered vocabulary. However, we do not need to limit our understanding of it to some rigid, codified, and binary traditional interpretations. Working with Ames we can practice a more fluid, open, and contemporary Confucian engagement with gender that can be responsive and empathetic. Summarizing her view Morrow writes: “Confucian roles are best left gendered because they make space for women’s self-cultivation beyond their traditionally subservient, nei, and morally-undefined roles. Still, the way in which they are optimally gendered need not draw hard lines between masculine and feminine roles.”

This dissertation outlines comparative philosophical approaches to understanding the contemporary problem of homelessness in Hawaiʻi. It also offers a methodology for an applied comparative philosophical project. I provide examples of specific contributors to the problem of homelessness and bring in various Chinese and Western sources that contribute ways of understanding and contextualizing this issue. I build the themes successively from the necessity of constitutive interpersonal relationships, to the supportive and nurturing relationships among people and their natural surroundings, to the psychological response necessary to promote sympathy and solidarity, to a broad and inclusive awareness of the world. At each stage, I bring in my formulation of existential destitution to define and describe how these types of flourishing may fail to come about.

In her chapter “Models of knowledge in the Zhuangzi: Knowing with chisels and sticks,” Karyn L. Lai ponders Confucius’s conversation with the cicada catcher in the Zhuangzi. Lai asks, “What does the cicada catcher know that Confucius doesn’t?” The knowledge that Confucius and his disciples seek may be precisely what they can never have. I explore the epistemological rift between ways of knowing by applying Karen Amimoto Ingersoll’s distinction between “seascape epistemology” (based on Native Hawaiian, Kānaka Maoli, ways of knowing) and Western epistemology (framed as girding neocolonialist expansion on the Hawaiian Islands).

The Philosophical Challenge from China, edited by Brian Bruya, undoubtedly occupies an important place in the discourse about what practices and authorities are relevant to Philosophy as an academic discipline. Its confident reorientation of philosophical relevance in the context of Anglophone academics will hopefully speak meaningfully to any remaining skeptics of the usefulness of Chinese philosophy. The intended audience of this effort, however, is shrinking, or, more accurately, those willing to be convinced are increasingly few, and what remains is simply and haplessly the staunch traditionalists of the so-called Western paradigm. This evokes the thought that anthologies that strive to show relevance...

In this essay, I discuss a potential nexus for comparison between Hawaiian and Chinese philosophies grounded in what I call “terrestrial identity”. I bring Fei Xiaotong’s description of the formation of social identity in China, which is historically agrarian and inalienably place-based, to meet contemporary Hawaiian philosophical perspectives of personal responsibility, genealogical consciousness, and “seascape epistemology” to flesh out a new theory of relationality, one that includes the ontological, historical, and ethical relationship of humans to the land on which they orient themselves and that defines the circumstances of their lives. The concept of terrestrial identity is inclusive in terms of types of relational entities, accommodating place, space, and memory into a comprehensive social ontology. It also opens onto discussions of contemporary social problems in a way that centres place and contextuality. I will conclude this essay with such a discussion, regarding homelessness among Kānaka Maoli.

This chapter is a sustained reflection on the sorts of place-based knowledge that characterise making one’s way around in a Ruist world. As we know, Confucius and Mencius spent much of their lives travelling, and, I argue, this was essential in forming their vision of a comprehensive and cohesive world order. I suggest three motifs for place-based knowing: terrestrial geography, metaphysical geography, and moral geography. Terrestrial geography includes physical, topographical, and social geographical paradigms. These are connected by the importance of travel, by way of which one experiences the physical counterparts of such thematic analogies as lofty mountains and resolute evergreens. Finding and forging pathways through life and avoiding stagnating dead-ends reveal the second motif, metaphysical geography. In metaphysical geography, the metaphor of smooth movement along clear paths represents success, understanding, even wisdom. Blocked, unnavigable, and dead-end paths represent failure, confusion, and ignorance. In moral geography, space, time, people, events, and things are oriented and relationally connected via moral landmarks and ties. Knowing what to do on behalf of oneself and the world is the most epistemologically potent geographical knowledge one may have. It requires a depth of knowledge both of oneself and the world, as well as how one’s moral acts will have the most profound effects.

This paper aims to address when the wise person should participate in politics. The question is addressed through engagement with the Analects. Rather than provide interpretations of key terms in the Analects, we provide an account of wisdom that draws from themes in the Analects. The case is made that the wise person is committed to participating in politics primarily because of the connection between wisdom and benevolence (ren 仁 in the Analects). We address challenges to the Confucian approach from the Zhuangzi concerning the potential harms of political participation. General political disengagement is not considered exemplary on the Confucian approach to wisdom, although when political engagement may be eschewed is explored. Finally, the case is made that while ren motivates the wise to participate politically, the wise also have a sense of timeliness that provides guidance as to when to refrain or withdraw from political participation.