Syed AbuMusab

Ethically significant consequences of artificially intelligent artifacts will stem from their effects on existing social relations. Artifacts will serve in a variety of socially important roles—as personal companions, in the service of elderly and infirm people, in commercial, educational, and other socially sensitive contexts. The inevitable disruptions that these technologies will cause to social norms, institutions, and communities warrant careful consideration. As we begin to assess these effects, reflection on degrees and kinds of social agency will be required to make properly informed decisions concerning the deployment of artificially intelligent artifacts in important settings. The social agency of these systems is unlike a human social agency, and this paper provides a methodological framework that is more suited for inquiry into artificial social agents than conventional philosophical treatments of the concept of agency. Separate aspects and dimensions of agency can be studied without assuming that agency must always look like adult human agency. This revised approach to the agency of artifacts is conducive to progress in the topics studied by AI ethics.

In chapter eleven of "On The Foundation of Computing," Primiero takes on the implementation debate in computer science. He contrasts his theory with two other views—the Semantic and the specification—artifact. In this paper, I argue that there is a way to fine-tune the implementation concept further. Firstly, contrary to Primiero, I claim it is problematic to separate the implementation relationship from the conditions which make it correct. Secondly, by taking a pluralistic approach to implementation, I claim it is a mistake to try and provide a general theory of implementation for the entire production cycle of computational systems.