Building on work by Bradley and Stefánsson (British J Philosophy Sci 68(2): 485–533, 2017), we consider counterfactually-dependent preferences in a dynamic setting. In particular, we consider the interaction between such preferences and rational intention. We point out a hitherto unrecognised role for intentions: they can fix what would have been and thus influence the rationality of choosing certain actually available options. We furthermore argue that orthodox sophisticated choice can be under…
Read moreBuilding on work by Bradley and Stefánsson (British J Philosophy Sci 68(2): 485–533, 2017), we consider counterfactually-dependent preferences in a dynamic setting. In particular, we consider the interaction between such preferences and rational intention. We point out a hitherto unrecognised role for intentions: they can fix what would have been and thus influence the rationality of choosing certain actually available options. We furthermore argue that orthodox sophisticated choice can be understood in two ways in this setting. Actualist sophistication faces the problem of being overly restrictive and of potential probabilistic incoherence. Possibilist sophistication avoids these problems but faces the problem of being overly permissive and of violating the spirit of forward-looking consequentialism. Indeed, we show that possibilist sophistication can rationalise behaviour otherwise associated with resolute choice.
