-
4Symposium on Habitual Ethics? A replyJurisprudence 1-10. forthcoming.Every day we do all sorts of intelligent things without necessarily deliberating about it. We simply do, or cope with what the environment throws at us. Some of those things are mundane. Others are...
-
22Computing Machinery, Surprise and OriginalityPhilosophy and Technology 34 (4): 1195-1211. 2021.Lady Lovelace’s notes on Babbage’s Analytical Engine never refer to the concept of surprise. Having some pretension to ‘originate’ something—unlike the Analytical Engine—is neither necessary nor sufficient to being able to surprise someone. Turing nevertheless translates Lovelace’s ‘this machine is incapable of originating something’ in terms of a hypothetical ‘computers cannot take us by surprise’ objection to the idea that machines may be deemed capable of thinking. To understand the contempor…Read more
-
15Computer systems fit for the legal profession?Legal Ethics 21 (2): 119-135. 2018.ABSTRACTThis essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the Susskinds’ influential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers hail the specific vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer as…Read more
-
9This book offers a 'genealogical' explanation of law's normativity. The term 'genealogical' conveys a commitment to a non-metaphysical type of enquiry. While it explains how law, as a normative phenomenon, comes about, it does not seek to ground law's normativity in anything but the context of social interaction giving rise to it. Legal normativity is brought about on a daily basis. Whether in revolutionary circumstances or in the quotidian need for judges, lawmakers or citizens to balance law's…Read more
-
1268Drafting a Constitution for a "Country of words": the Palestinian caseMiddle East Law and Governance 4 (2). 2012.Can words – rather than a State – constitute a country? It may be made of land, rivers, forests or deserts – yet, without its inhabitants’ words, there would be no map to draw, no tale to sing, no country to speak of. Palestinian tales abound. They speak of departed lands, vanished homes, forfeited livelihoods. They lament internal wrangling, squeal occupational anger, seek to whisper away those quotidian checkpoint humiliations. Yet, they also speak of hope. If there ever were such a thing as “…Read more
-
38Meta-Ethical Agnosticism in Legal Theory: Mapping a Way OutJurisprudence 1 (2): 225-240. 2010.In his review of Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Hart eloquently formulated an apprehension that still haunts much of contemporary jurisprudence: if the moral 'I must' has to be 'seen as coming not from outside, but from what is most deeply inside us? the fear is that this will not be enough'. I argue that this fear is the byproduct of the dualist outlook within which Hart—and a significant part of contemporary legal theory—is confined: because of his bald naturalist premi…Read more
-
Six paths to vertigo-free legal theoryIn Michael D. A. Freeman & Ross Harrison (eds.), Law and Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2007.
-
42In his review of Williams' Ethics and the limits of philosophy, Hart eloquently formulated an apprehension that still haunts much of contemporary jurisprudence: if the moral 'I must' has to be 'seen as coming not from outside, but from what is most deeply inside us [...] the fear is that this will not be enough.' I argue that this fear is the byproduct of the dualist outlook within which Hart - and a significant part of contemporary legal theory - is confined: because of his bald naturalist prem…Read more
-
Montaigne's inquiry into the sources of normativityCanadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 16 (2). 2003.
-
17You'd Better Be Committed: Legal Norms and NormativityAmerican Journal of Jurisprudence 54 (1): 117-132. 2009.
-
38Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity ContrastedRatio Juris 17 (4): 501-520. 2004.Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappro…Read more
-
Making law bind : legal normativity as a dynamic conceptIn Maksymilian Del Mar (ed.), New waves in philosophy of law, Palgrave Macmillan. 2011.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |