This paper offers a new interpretation of Thrasymachus’ thesis in Republic I (338c–341a). Against readings that reduce his position either to sophistic cynicism or to a purely technical account of rule, I argue that Thrasymachus advances an implicit theory of legitimacy. Through a close reading of Socrates’ Polydamas parody (339a) and the technē exchange (340d–341a), I develop what I call the Principle of Appearances (PA): political power survives only when coercion presents itself as truth. Thi…
Read moreThis paper offers a new interpretation of Thrasymachus’ thesis in Republic I (338c–341a). Against readings that reduce his position either to sophistic cynicism or to a purely technical account of rule, I argue that Thrasymachus advances an implicit theory of legitimacy. Through a close reading of Socrates’ Polydamas parody (339a) and the technē exchange (340d–341a), I develop what I call the Principle of Appearances (PA): political power survives only when coercion presents itself as truth. This performative dimension clarifies why Thrasymachus demands the ruler’s infallibility and why law (nomos) appears as the advantage of the stronger. The paper situates this paradox of legitimation within the genealogy of political realism, from Plato’s dramatic text through Machiavelli’s verità effettuale della cosa to Bernard Williams’s Basic Legitimation Demand. The conclusion is that justice, for Thrasymachus, is not simply kratos or technē, but the linguistic and symbolic form by which domination sustains itself as acceptable order.
