Szilvia Szanyi

In this article I discuss two early but highly influential sources in the long history of Buddhist-Hindu debates on theism and creation: the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The paper is structured around the Yogācārabhūmi’s argumentation, often overlooked in scholarship, which attacks the existence of a supreme being who creates and rules the universe on four fronts. It argues that 1) God does not have the capacity to create the universe; 2) God cannot be either immanent or non-immanent in the created world; 3) God cannot create with or without a purpose; 4) nor can God create with or without instrumental causes. Besides examining the Yogācārabhūmi's arguments, I consider how the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya complements them, for instance, by emphasising that the causal power of ordinary beings and objects, or the successive unfolding of events in the world, cannot be explained if we accept that God is the sole cause of the universe.

The classification of sense objects, especially visible objects, is a controversial issue in Abhidharma philosophy, with a significant part of the debate revolving around the nature and reality of shape ( saṃsthāna ). The purpose of this article is to expose the dynamics of the Abhidharmic debates over shape and unpack the laconic arguments we find in various works attributed to Vasubandhu and his commentators Yaśomitra and Sthiramati. Studying these arguments is essential not only to gain a better understanding of Abhidharma metaphysics. They also illuminate important aspects of the Abhidharmic theories of perception, such as their views on common sensibles or the relationship between perception and inference. Furthermore, as I point out at the end of the essay, appreciating the Abhidharmic debate over the reality of shape also sheds more light on the cryptic arguments Vasubandhu puts forward in verse 15 of the Viṃśikā.

The term āśraya is used in manifold ways in the Abhidharmakośa and its bhāṣya. This comes from the fact that its basic meaning, indicating anything on which something else depends or rests, is quite generic. Despite the plasticity of its usage, we can find some recurring and distinct technical applications of the term in the AK, which I explore in my paper. First, I look at its usage of characterising a member of various asymmetric dependence relationships on which the arising and sometimes also the persistence of the other relatum depends. Through examining the nature of various āśraya-āśrita dependence relations the AK discusses, I show that āśraya stands for an entity that determines the fundamental nature of the thing it supports. In the second half of the paper, I move on to those occurrences of the term where āśraya has a specific referent. While āśraya can refer to the six sense faculties individually, it can also stand for them collectively pointing towards its widespread meaning as ‘psychophysical basis’. In this context, the focus often shifts either to the material or the mental elements that make up a sentient being. I will dedicate special attention to the discussion of the transformation of the basis, where, on my reading, it is more natural to interpret āśraya as referring primarily to the mind, with its bodily connotations being marginal.