Szymon Mazurkiewicz

This paper aims to present how logic may undermine a parliamentary assault on democratic institutions based on the analysis conducted with reference to the so-called Polish constitutional crisis. I analyse whether a law can be reviewed on the basis of this law itself. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal faced such a problem while passing the verdict of 9th March, 2016, regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December, 2015. This problem, called a ‘verdict paradox’, was claimed to be a type of the Liar paradox. I argue that, contrary to the common view, the problem of the verdict paradox is not based on the Liar paradox; for this purpose, a logical analysis is applied to four variants of a reasoning with regard to the constitutionality of the said amendment. The distinction between two levels of analysis concerning emerging reasonings, namely an abstract level and a concrete level placed in the context of the legal system, is also introduced. This paper demonstrates that although only two variants of the reasoning concerning a law’s judicial review based on the law itself involve logical contradiction, the possibility of employing reasonings from other variants must be excluded, albeit due to alternative reasons. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to avoid the verdict paradox by passing over the reviewed provisions in the review process was correct and might be perceived as an example of how logic and reason can defend the institutional guarantees of political freedom.

The paper analyzes whether human nature can be the foundation of human rights. To this end, in the first part, the concept of the nature of an object is considered. The author considers three understandings of the concept “nature of X”: (1) the set of necessary (or essential) properties of all X-es, (2) ideal or pattern, which X-es can or should strive to and (3) a statistically dominant tendency (or tendencies) characterizing all X-es as a genre although not always characterizing every individual X. The J. Wroblewski’s idea of distinguishing factual, ethical and logical understanding of nature is introduced. These understandings are then analyzed, especially when it comes to the question of whether they are descriptive or normative, In the second part, each of the accounts is applied to considerations of human nature. Next, the author considers whether any of these conceptions of human nature can be recognized as the foundation of human rights. In the following part, the author examines the concept of ‘human dignity’ and its relation to human nature. Finally, the paper shows which understandings of human nature can entail human rights.

The paper analyzes whether human nature can be the foundation of human rights. To this end, in the first part, the concept of the nature of an object is considered. The author considers three understandings of the concept “nature of X”: (1) the set of necessary (or essential) properties of all X-es, (2) ideal or pattern, which X-es can or should strive to and (3) a statistically dominant tendency (or tendencies) characterizing all X-es as a genre although not always characterizing every individual X. The J. Wroblewski’s idea of distinguishing factual, ethical and logical understanding of nature is introduced. These understandings are then analyzed, especially when it comes to the question of whether they are descriptive or normative, In the second part, each of the accounts is applied to considerations of human nature. Next, the author considers whether any of these conceptions of human nature can be recognized as the foundation of human rights. In the following part, the author examines the concept of ‘human dignity’ and its relation to human nature. Finally, the paper shows which understandings of human nature can entail human rights.