Tad Brennan

This chapter distinguishes two Platonic interests in self-knowledge: the ‘thin’ self-knowledge that a human being is a rational soul using its body as a tool (the Delphic self-knowledge made prominent in the _Phaedrus_, _First Alcibiades_, and elsewhere), and the ‘thick’ self-knowledge of the particular accidental psychological profile of an individual. The two are contrasted in four ways: the thin applies to the entire species, makes no reference to irrational parts, offers no etiology of contingencies, and makes no special use of first-personal knowledge; the thick applies to individuals, incorporates details about the irrational soul, explains the individual through a narrative of the events that shaped them, and is first-personal in making the object of self-knowledge identical with the subject of that self-knowledge. This richer, thicker form of self-knowledge is illustrated with extensive examples from the _Republic_ and _Seventh Letter_.

Greek Philosophers of the Hellenistic Age examines an important but frequently neglected group of philosophers writing after Aristotle between the third and first centuries B.C. The work of a distinguished intellectual historian, this book is based on an erudite reading of a vast number of primary sources: the Greek and Latin writings of the philosophers, and the fragments, paraphrases, and testimonies from their lost works. Kristeller explores the thought of Epicurus; Zenon and Cleanthes, the founder of the Stoic school and his successor; Pyrrhon and Arcesilaus, the founder of Skepticism and the philosopher who introduced it into the Platonic Academy; and Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school and its most important representative. Other figures include Carneades and Philo of Larissa, the second and third representatives of Skepticism in the Platonic Academy, respectively; Panaetius, the first leader of Middle Stoicism; and Antiochus of Ascalon, the head of the Academy, who led it back from Skepticism and prepared Middle Platonism, which paved the way for Neoplatonism. Originally presented as a series of lectures before the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, Italy, Greek Philosophers of the Hellenistic Age assesses a group of philosophers who exerted an enormous influence upon pagan and Christian writers of late antiquity - including Cicero and St. Augustine - and on many medieval and early modern philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers.

The Mode of Relativity in Agrippa’s Five Modes does not fit with the other four modes, and disrupts an otherwise elegant system. We argue that it is not the familiar argument from epistemic relativism, but a formal condition on the structure of justifications: the principle that epistemic grounding relations cannot be reflexive. This understanding of Agrippan Relativity leads to a better understanding of the Modes of Hypothesis and Reciprocity, a clearer outline of the structure of Agrippa’s system as a whole, and a new insight into the Two Modes that follow the Five.