Tadhg Ó Laoghaire

We argue that sustained economic development is a source of normative political legitimacy for poor states. On the foundational level, we defend restricted instrumentalism: the primary source of legitimacy in poor countries is the ability of regimes to achieve valuable outcomes. On the practical level, we argue that economic growth and enhanced state capacity are sources of legitimacy. Moreover, drawing on empirical evidence, we defend three heuristics: regimes with successful developmental records, high popular support and responsive institutions presumptively enjoy legitimacy. We illustrate the approach with reference to China.

In light of its epochal significance, academics from many disciplines have wrestled with the implications of China’s rise. Political philosophers have, however, been slow to join the fray. They have said little, in particular, about how we ought to (re)conceive of the demands of international justice in light of China’s increasing influence, or about the theoretical and practical challenges which it requires us to confront. I highlight three reasons that China’s rise generates such challenges. First, it is likely a harbinger of a broader change in the international order, as developing countries come to rival developed countries in international power. Second, China’s vast population, its unique brand of authoritarianism and economic governance, and its central role in the global economy make it a truly unique state worth analysing in detail. Finally, as China increasingly competes with the United States, its rise forces us to deal with questions about global order that will become increasingly pressing in the coming decades. After outlining these three challenges, I go on to discuss several questions concerning China’s international role which philosophers are well placed to explore, including the demands of distributive justice, the moral significance of demographic size, and the ethics of superpower competition.

While much of the business ethics literature highlights the vital role that multinational corporations (MNCs) play in generating economic opportunities and wealth on a global scale, it remains the case that this literature has nonetheless undersold the potential political significance of MNCs. Not only are MNCs amongst the key drivers of international prosperity; they are also perhaps the most durable and conspicuous examples of intensive international cooperation in the world today. Combined with the vast and systemic shortfalls of international justice we observe in the present era, I argue that MNCs’ standing as such gives rise to a series of important ethical obligations that they ought to bear. Specifically, as primary beneficiaries, organizers and instantiations of international economic cooperation, they bear obligations to ensure that the international economic order serves the interests of the world’s worst-off. In this chapter I focus on one subcategory of such obligations, obligations to help ‘inwardly internationalize’ rich, developed states, so that such states are better predisposed to fulfil their existing international obligations. Inward internationalization involves the structural transformation of domestic political and social spaces so that international voices, concerns and obligations are rendered increasingly salient therein. MNCs, I will argue, are particularly well-placed to facilitate familiarity, engagement and constructive dialogue between people across borders, and so to help inwardly internationalize domestic spaces. They have the ability, for instance, to facilitate interactions between workers in their home country and overseas; they have the ability to give overseas workers representation on corporate boards; they have the ability, through advertising and other communications, to highlight to their customers, suppliers and workers the significance of their existing international commercial and ethical ties. In this chapter I argue that they have responsibilities to engage in this sort of ‘internationalizing’ work, and I identify several non-exhaustive ways in which they may do so.

China’s rise to global power status is set to be amongst the primary shapers of politics and life more broadly in the 21st century. Yet despite its immense significance, political philosophers have been surprisingly quiet on the normative implications of China’s rise. This, I will argue, is a mistake. Not only does China’s rise generate interesting normative questions in its own right; it also upends some basic assumptions that many of us have hitherto adopted in our thinking about international distributive justice. In the philosophical literature, the international order is often characterised by two sorts of states – developed and developing – with the former owing demanding duties and the latter having expansive permissions to further their own development. China’s status as both a genuine superpower and a middle-income country facing significant development challenges calls into question the continued functionality of such simplifying assumptions. Against the backdrop of China’s rise – and, to a lesser extent, that of other large emerging economies – this paper develops a more fine-grained account of how to conceive of states’ differential levels of advantage, distinguishing between states that are incapable, precariously capable, and robustly capable of realizing a minimally decent standard of domestic justice. This account reaffirms the assignment of the most onerous international duties to developed states, but also assigns duties and claims to developing states in a scalar fashion, with the upshot that better-off developing states in particular bear positive duties of international justice, owed to least-developed countries (LDCs).

Despite being a staple of liberal-democratic politicians’ and theorists’ rhetorical arsenal, ‘openness’ as a political commitment has yet to receive sustained philosophical analysis. My aim in this paper is to provide such an analysis. I will argue that political openness involves a readiness by an agent to engage with others forthrightly and receptively, and to recognise their authoritative standing in political domains. I demonstrate the explanatory value of this account by showing that it provides an insightful explanation of what’s at stake in the emerging political cleavage between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ politics, explains the appeal of ‘the open society’ as an epithet for liberal democracies, and provides a compelling interpretation of openness’ contribution to social dynamism and progressive reform, one which diverges favourably from the emphasis others have put on social experimentation and trial and error learning.

When it comes to fulfilling our basic duties to distant others, we in the affluent world face a motivation gap; we consistently fall short of bearing even moderate costs for the sake of helping others secure basic minimums to which they are entitled. One response to the motivation gap is to cultivate in affluent populations a greater concern for distant others; cultivating such concern is the goal of ‘sentimental cosmopolitanism’. Two approaches to sentimental cosmopolitanism currently dominate the literature, a compassion-based and a complicity-based approach, respectively. In this paper, I argue for the promise of reciprocity as an alternative motivator of cosmopolitan concern. I further argue that a sense of obligation to distant others, grounded in our participation in an ongoing system of reciprocal exchange, can be cultivated within a thus-far overlooked sphere of cosmopolitan sensitization, namely the market. I make the case for the market as an appropriate site for cosmopolitan sensitization, and further argue that multinational corporations are, for several reasons, well-positioned to bear the political responsibility of sensitizing affluent populations to the significance of their participation in a cooperative economic scheme shared with distant others. This paper, then, makes a novel contribution to debates on cosmopolitan sentiment, as well as to the emerging literature on corporations’ political responsibilities. Keywords: multinational corporations; political responsibility; reciprocity; sentimental cosmopolitanism; trade.

Over 1000 companies have either curtailed or else completely ceased operations in Russia as a response to its invasion of Ukraine, a mass corporate exodus of a speed and scale which we’ve never seen. While corporate withdrawal appears to have considerable public support, it’s not obvious that it has done anything to hamper the Russian war effort, nor is it clear what the long-run effects of corporate withdrawal as a regularised response to war might be. Given this, it’s important the evaluate the ethical merits of such a response. In this paper I critique what I take to be the two most common arguments given in favour of voluntary corporate withdrawal, which I label ‘the instrumental argument’ and ‘the clean hands argument’ respectively. After illustrating their shortcomings, I reframe corporations’ predicament as a ‘spattered hands’ case—one where they may do good by remaining in a war-waging state, but where they contribute indirectly to grave wrongdoing by doing so. Drawing on ideas from the ‘Business for Peace’ and ‘Business and Human Rights’ literature, I highlight the potentially positive role of corporate presence within war-waging countries, before highlighting four considerations which corporations ought to bear in mind when determining whether to withdraw, or whether it is the lesser evil to stay and to let their hands be spattered.

In a world characterised by intense global poverty, do active corporate efforts to help the global poor constitute discretionary acts of charity, to be praised but not to be thought of as mandatory? Or, conversely, are such efforts a matter of binding moral duty? The traditional position among business ethicists – and still, perhaps, the dominant one – is that there is no such duty, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances such as rescue cases. In recent years, however, several authors have made the case that corporations have quite wide-ranging positive duties to the global poor. This entry outlines the contours of the various arguments given in favour of the latter position, before highlighting two theoretical challenges which arise if we are to embrace this position – first, the issue of determining what sorts of actions count as adequately fulfilling positive duties to the global poor, and, second, the question of what limits there are, if any, to the demandingness of corporations’ positive duties.

Duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap, particularly amongst those populations most capable of bearing the financial burdens of fulfiling them. This motivation gap is explained, at least in part, by the structure of the state system, which facilitates group identification with fellow citizens to a greater extent than with outsiders. This structural feature of the state system gives states little incentive to further the cause of global justice. Yet, given that states are the most powerful actors on the global stage today, a more just global order is likely predicated upon the development of more just states. In light of these realities, in this paper I make the case for an approach to furthering global justice which i call inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation calls for the initially modest structural transformation of domestic states, so as to make domestic governments and their constituents increasingly sensitive to their international obligations. Inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states' representatives. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. After outlining these functions, thereby showing the attraction of inward internationalisation, I argue for the strategic accessibility of inward internationalisation as a path to reform, by outlining the dynamics which might cause inward internationalisation to spread as a norm of governance amongst states.

COVID-19 knows no boundaries, but political responses to it certainly do. Much has been made about how the pandemic has revealed the Hobbesian nature of political power, but this picture of politics occludes from vision the interdependent nature of our current international order. In particular, it overlooks the fact that much of the goods, services, capital, and people that societies rely on in order to function are sourced from outside the domestic state. And, conversely, it overlooks the extent to which the policy responses taken in one state have considerable effects on the options available, and the outcomes suffered, in other jurisdictions. This paper seeks to correct this oversight, by highlighting two duties that states bear towards one another in the context of this crisis, by virtue of their participation in international trade relationships. Trade grounds duties of justice between trade partners by making them dependent upon one another in order to realize their respective duties of domestic justice. This dependence, in turn, grounds a duty of stability, and a duty of accountability. Having explained and argued for these two duties, the paper discusses the implications of taking these two duties seriously in the context of states’ policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the international trade regime within which it operates, is regularly evaluated in terms of distributive outcomes or opportunities. A less-established concern is the extent to which the institutional structure of the trade regime enables agents to exert control over the economic forces to which they’re subject. This oversight is surprising, as trade negotiations amongst states have profound impacts upon what options remain open to those states and their citizens in regulating their economies. This article contributes to filling this lacuna in the literature. Following on from recent neo-republican work on global and international justice, it argues that a major problem with the WTO is that it fails to effectively mitigate the domination of some states by others within its negotiations. Such domination prevails despite the employment of negative consensus as a decision-making procedure.

We argue that least-developed countries (LDCs) should be treated as a distinct group from developing countries within theories of global justice generally, and theories of trade justice more specifically. While authors within the trade justice literature occasionally make passing reference to LDCs’ entitlement to special favourable treatment from other states, little is said about what form this treatment should take, and how such entitlements relate to the obligations and entitlements of both developed and developing countries. This oversight is untenable in that it neglects the different character and urgency of LDCs’ needs with respect to the economic opportunities afforded to them in international markets. Moreover, by categorising trading states into binary categories of developed/developing or rich/poor, trade justice theorists have ended up obscuring and passing over unavoidable conflicts between least-developed and developing countries’ interests, the weighing of which should be central to any complete normative evaluation of the trade regime. We provide an example of such a conflict of interest and how it should be resolved by examining the structural barrier to LDC economic development presented by the current success of many developing countries in export manufacturing. We argue in favour of a trade policy intervention that would dismantle this structural barrier (by inducing export firms to move to LDCs), even though this means diverting valuable economic opportunities from developing countries.

This essay asks what it is about the practice of trade that grounds duties of justice between states as trade partners. The answer advanced is that such duties are grounded in the dependence that trade generates. The essay puts forward four conditions that a plausible account of grounding in trade must meet: it must admit of degrees, explain the distinctly international character of trade justice, ground both procedural and distributive duties, and it must be a necessary feature of all trade relationships which generate duties of justice. A dependence account of grounding meets all four conditions, and does so in an intuitively compelling way. While other accounts of what grounds duties of trade justice can meet some of the conditions, none can meet all of them. Relative to rival candidates, then, the dependence account provides a firmer foundation for the ongoing attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of trade justice.

Many corporations are large, powerful, and wealthy. There are massive shortfalls of global justice, with hundreds of millions of people in the world living below the threshold of extreme poverty, and billions more living not far above that threshold. Where injustice and needs shortfalls must be remediated, we often look towards agents’ capabilities to determine who ought to bear the costs of rectifying the situation. The combination of these three claims grounds what I call a ‘linkage-based’ account of why corporations have demanding positive duties to the global poor. In this paper, I put forward a distinctive linkage-based account of corporations’ positive duties centred on the idea of dependence and the importance of meeting agents’ core needs. In addition to outlining and defending this account, I will show that we can utilise its basic conceptual components to make headway on questions that have received insufficient attention in the business ethics literature; specifically, we can say something substantive about the weighting of needy agents’ competing claims to assistance, and about the limits to the demands that can be lodged against corporations on the basis of others' unmet needs. Having integrated considerations of duties' grounding, their comparative weight, and the limits of their demandingness into a single account of corporate positive duty, I conclude by discussing a challenge to attributing to corporations duties owed to the worst-off amongst the global poor.