Tak-lap Yeung

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, infinitude, supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy.

In this essay, we discuss a perspective remote from German academics on the examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which was developed by Mou Zongsan (牟宗三). Mou focuses his interpretation of Kant on the infinite aspect of human morality and he praises Heidegger’s interpretation of the essence of human existence as “being-able-to-be”. Although, like Heidegger, he emphasizes the recognition of human finiteness as the basic premise of Kant’s philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s entire philosophy. He addresses the fact that for Kant man is “finite but can be infinite”. Furthermore, he criticises Heidegger, on the one hand, for withdrawing the dimension of independence, infinity, supersensibility and timelessness from morality, and Kant, on the other hand, for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By making use of a general insight from the schools of Chinese philosophy that positively recognise the intellectual intuition, one can, Mou believes, change the downsides of Kantian philosophy and organically connect Western and Asian philosophy.

In this essay, we discuss a perspective remote from German academics on the examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which was developed by Mou Zongsan (牟宗三). Mou focuses his interpretation of Kant on the infinite aspect of human morality and he praises Heidegger’s interpretation of the essence of human existence as “being-able-to-be”. Although, like Heidegger, he emphasizes the recognition of human finiteness as the basic premise of Kant’s philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s entire philosophy. He addresses the fact that for Kant man is “finite but can be infinite”. Furthermore, he criticises Heidegger, on the one hand, for withdrawing the dimension of independence, infinity, supersensibility and timelessness from morality, and Kant, on the other hand, for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By making use of a general insight from the schools of Chinese philosophy that positively recognise the intellectual intuition, one can, Mou believes, change the downsides of Kantian philosophy and organically connect Western and Asian philosophy.

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, infinitude, supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy.

Rolf-Peter Horstmann近作《康德之想像力》（Kant's Power of Imagination），是針對「想像力」在康德學統下備受忽視的情況而作。這部102頁的著作，仔細分析了《純粹理性批判》和《判斷力批判》中與想像力相關的內容，意圖從內部理順康德的想像力理論，並論證想像力在建構認知對象過程裡的獨特貢獻。他提出了「建構認知對象的兩階段模式」，闡明想像力在認知過程中獨一無二的功能與位置，並在此基礎上論證想像力是一種獨立、自足的認知能力。由於想像力是一種獨立認知能力，因此至少在理論哲學和知識論脈絡下，康德學者沒有忽視想像力的理由。 Rolf-Peter Horstmann's recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of ＂the power of imagination＂ in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant's theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a ＂two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects＂ in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.

Tak-Lap Yeungs Arbeit verfolgt eine innovative Deutungsperspektive mit dem Versuch, Heideggers Kant-Adaption als Weg einer Umdeutung nachzuvollziehen, um eine neue Kant-Lesart stark zu machen und zugleich darüber hinaus einen von Hannah Arendt inspirierten eigenständigen Ansatz zu entwickeln, der die Rolle der Einbildungskraft als ontologische und konstitutive Instanz der Existenzorientierung zu bestimmen ermöglicht. In Ergänzung dazu zeigt diese Arbeit im Anhang einen Vergleich zwischen Heideggers Kant-Deutung und der eines chinesischen Philosophen, Mou Zongsan, auf. Der transkulturelle Hintergrund hat Yeung, der an Universitäten in Hongkong und Berlin geforscht hat, dazu befähigt, die nicht deutschsprachigen Einsichten in den deutschen philosophischen Diskurs einzubringen. ////////// Tak-Lap Yeung's work pursues an innovative perspective of interpretation that aims to reconstruct Heidegger's adaptation of Kant as a method of reinterpretation. The goal of this research is to strengthen a new reading of Kant while simultaneously developing an independent approach, inspired by Arendt, that allows the role of the imagination as an ontological and constitutive instance of existential orientation to be determined. In addition, Yeung shows in the appendix a comparison between Heidegger’s and Mou Zongsan’s interpretations of Kant. The transcultural background gives Yeung, who did research in Hong Kong and Berlin, the ability to bring non-German-language insights into the German philosophical discourse.

In this paper, I argue that the different understandings of “harmony”, which are rooted in ancient Greek and Chinese thought, can be recapitulated in the name of “dialectic harmony” and “ambiguous harmony” regarding the representation of the beautiful. The different understandings of the concept of harmony lead to at least two kinds of aesthetic value as well as ideality – harmony in conciliation and harmony in diversity. Through an explication of the original meaning and relation between the concept of harmony and beauty, we can learn more about the cosmo-metaphysical origins in Western and Eastern aesthetics, with which we may gain insights for future aesthetics discourse.

本文旨在釐清牟宗三與海德格對康德「有限性」概念之詮釋，借此建立三者的溝通基礎。牟跟海一樣，認為康德對存有論的論述並不完備，需要補充；海德格認為康德哲學應下開「基礎存有論」，發展「此在形上學」。牟宗三則認為，應該發展「道德的形上學」；牟重視現象與物自身的區分，因其關乎認知與道德、感性與超感性領域之分際，並認為道德之超越性是人「可無限」的關鍵；海德格則意圖改變感性、知性的優次地位，強調感性、處境和時間性，否定人之無限性。基於以上異同，本文進一步申述兩者對康德哲學的改造與後續發展，設想他們之間的批評和回應，並評論兩者在何種意義下，更能承先啟後。 This paper aims at laying the foundation of a discourse between Mou and Heidegger’s philosophy through their interpretations of Kant’s concept of finitude. Mou tried wholeheartedly to internalize Kantian philosophy in the interest of establishing the new Chinese Philosophy which takes the moral subject as the foundation of the system. The key to success lies in the interpretative works of arguing the transcendental characters of man with the following premise: man is finite but can be infinite; Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, claims that the concept of finitude is the fundamental spirit and implicit premise of the whole Kantian philosophy. He upholds the priority of sensibility and concludes that the human finitude has to be delimited by the situation in terms of time, by which he rejects the infinitude of human existence. By the juxtaposition of their interpretations, we can see how they interpret the concept of finitude, and how they try to internalize and to go beyond Kantian philosophy.

The power of imagination (Die Einbildungskraft), or in short imagination, has a unique and prior position in Arendt’s theory of judgment, which has been long overlooked. This first aim of this paper is to argue for the priority and necessity of imagination in Arendt’s theory of judgment by reconstructing her descriptions and arguments mainly from her interpretation of Kantian philosophy. The second aim is to shed light on the implications of the priority of imagination in respect of judgment. In the conclusion, I will point out some problems of Arendt’s theory of judgment with the resources provided in Kant’s philosophy.

「我可希望甚麼？」希望問題（question of hope /Hoffnungsfrage）於康德學統裡常為人忽略。學者多歸諸宗教哲學範疇，甚或僅視為一附帶、中介問題，以聯繫「我能知甚麼？」與「我應做甚麼？」的論域，遂至今仍未見完整、獨立的康德希望哲學或希望理論面世。 雖然學人鮮以「希望」為研究重點，但並不代表希望概念於康德言無足輕重，反之，若以之為繩準閱讀其哲學，可看到有關希望問題 的思慮實貫穿了康德「批判」和「學說」時期。本文以「希望概念和問題」為圓心，梳理出康德哲學中一道從思考「最高善」發展到關注 「人類道德進步」的線索，圖以之開展閱讀康德哲學之新定向。 The question of hope (Hoffnungsfrage) - “What may I hope?” – has been overlooked in the mainstream Kantian scholarship. It is generally categorized into the field of philosophy of religion, or even to be treated as an appendage or solely a mediating question to connect the discourses on “what can I know?” and “what ought I to do?”, whilst the marginalization of this question leads to indifference towards the related researches. Therefore a complete and independent Kant’s theory or philosophy of hope is not yet to be seen. Albeit few scholars put high value on the concept of hope, it does not mean that the concept of hope to Kant is insignificant. If we set the concept of hope as the orientation point of reading Kant’s philosophy, we would see that the concept of hope and the related discussion appear frequently in his works, not only in the “critiques” but also in the “doctrines”. His apparently disparate views on the problem of hope in different periods of his work can actually be formulated to a theory of hope. In the paper, I tried to reveal the hidden philosophical agenda that runs through the entire development of Kant’s philosophy: from the reflection on the concept of highest good to the issues of the improvement of human morality in general. In conclusion, by reinterpreting Kant’s philosophy as a kind of philosophy of hope, we may gain a new orientation to understand his philosophy in addition to the epistemological and ethical approaches as favored in mainstream Kantian scholarship.