Tal Hendel

Interactionist theories that posit qualitative or experiential fields coupled to the physical world face a fundamental challenge: if such fields genuinely influence physical processes, why are their effects not ordinarily observed? This paper proposes a possible answer. Building on a recent proposal by Hendel (forthcoming), I argue that the apparent invisibility of interactionist fields may be explained by a phase transition between disordered and ordered regimes. In the disordered regime, local interactions with physical systems cancel statistically, preventing detectable macroscopic effects. I further suggest that the phase transition is more plausibly understood as a non-equilibrium one, driven by energy flow and feedback rather than by equilibrium thermodynamic variables. Conscious brains are proposed as candidate systems capable of sustaining such ordered states. The framework predicts localized departures from causal closure and conservation laws in conscious brains and suggests a possible role for interactionist fields in phenomena currently attributed to dark matter.

The orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics lacks any notion of a particle’s trajectory. Two alternative formulations, however, make essential use of paths in three-dimensional space: Bohmian mechanics and Feynman’s path-integral formulation. Given this similarity, it is natural to ask whether these two formulations are related. This paper demonstrates that they are related in a precise sense: a particle’s Bohmian velocity can be expressed directly as the real part of an amplitude-weighted velocity defined over Feynman paths. This result provides a more transparent interpretation of Bohmian velocity than that afforded by the guiding equation. More generally, the relation between Bohmian mechanics and the path-integral formulation is argued to be structurally analogous to that between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.

Panmicropsychism is the hypothesis that the physical ultimates of our universe (i.e., its fundamental physical ingredients) are also its phenomenal ultimates (i.e., its fundamental phenomenal ingredients). In this paper, I argue that, just as the mathematical description of the physical ultimates of our universe displays simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should similarly expect the mathematical description of the phenomenal ultimates to reflect these same qualities. I exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities—color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems (qubits) in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems.

Panqualityism is a view closely related to panpsychism that attributes qualitative character to the fundamental constituents of reality without attributing experience to them. While this avoids the subject combination problem, it leaves open how conscious subjects are realized from non-experiential qualitative structure. This paper develops a trialistic version of panqualityism according to which reality comprises three irreducible ontological categories: the physical, the qualitative, and the experiential. The physical and qualitative realms are linked by a restricted psychophysical interface that enables interaction while preserving the total energy of the combined system. Through this interface, suitable physical organizations can activate determinate qualitative structure in regions of the qualitative field. When certain macroscopic conditions are satisfied, these regions undergo a transition to experiential mode. A bounded group of such activated regions forms a phenomenal field. This field, realized in a perspectival form, is identified with the conscious subject. The paper develops two models to account for these processes: a phase-transition model of qualitative instantiation and a structural model of experiential activation guided by features of black-hole physics. The resulting framework provides a unified account of subject individuation and the perspectival realization of the phenomenal field, as well as the field’s smoothness and global organization as characterized by Gestalt principles.

The equation of motion in the standard formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation, is based on the Hamiltonian. In contrast, in Feynman's path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics, the equation of motion is the propagation equation, which is based on the Lagrangian. That these two different equations of motion are equivalent was shown by Feynman, who provided a derivation of the Schrödinger equation from the propagation equation. Surprisingly, however, while in classical mechanics there exists a simple relationship between the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian, there is nothing in Feynman's derivation that gives any indication of this relationship. Here I show that the equations of motion in the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of quantum mechanics are, in fact, simply related to each other.

Panmicropsychism is the view that the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe are also its fundamental phenomenal ingredients. Since there is only a limited number of fundamental physical ingredients, panmicropsychism seems to imply that there exists only a small set (palette) of basic phenomenal qualities. How does this limited palette of basic phenomenal qualities give rise to our rich set of experiences? This is known as ‘the palette problem’. One class of solutions to this problem, large-palette solutions, simply denies that the palette is limited. These solutions assume that all types of phenomenal qualities (color, sound, odor, taste, etc., and presumably also types not experienced by humans) were created fully formed at the birth of our universe. On this view, brains evoke conscious experiences by sampling primordial, preexisting phenomenal spaces. My main claim in this paper is that, by analogy with the mathematical description of the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe, which exhibits simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should expect the mathematical description of the fundamental phenomenal ingredients of our universe to exhibit similar features. The goal of this paper is to exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities—color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems.