Tamas Demeter

In Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon interprets folk psychological discourse metaphorically. Based on Kendall Walton’s theory of metaphor, he argues that folk psychology ought to be understood in terms of prop-oriented make-believe that relies on representationally essential metaphors. Toon insists that this fictionalist view of everyday mental talk preserves what we commonly think folk psychology can achieve: it does not only rationalize but explains behavior causally. In this paper, first we raise concerns about Toon’s characterization of folk psychology as metaphorical. Then we proceed to show that representationally essential metaphors are incompatible with genuine causal explanation. And finally, we argue that no construal of mental fictionalism can preserve the epistemic virtues we commonly ascribe to folk psychological discourse.

We asked our readers to answer the question, in 250 words or fewer, "Of all the articles that have been published in Hume Studies over the past 50 years, which one is most noteworthy to you? Why so?" We realized that what is noteworthy to individual scholars will vary by their research interests and many other factors. Here are the responses we received, ordered by the date of the Hume Studies articles chosen, from earliest to most recent.Saul Traiger, "Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions," Hume Studies 13, no. 2 (1987): 381–99Hume argues that various mental states are "fictions" of the imagination. The ancient philosopher's commitment to material substance is a fiction, as are our ascriptions of diachronic identity... Read More.

This paper offers a new interpretation of Hume’s Treatise as a work written by a methodological solipsist. It argues that Hume anticipates later developments by launching a Fodorian project that is to be realised by Carnapian means. Hume develops an explanatory theory of mental operations based on an analysis conducted by way of similarity recollections in the stream of experience. The paper first presents the case for Hume’s commitment to methodological solipsism and then offers a reconstruction of the methodology with which his project is to be executed. Hume proceeds by analysing perceptions and the connections between them to account for their “nature” and the “principles” underlying their interaction. His analyses reveal the solipsistic methodological credo that Hume did not make explicit.