Tancredo Tivane

Suppose soldiers invade your community, murder your loved ones, burn homes, and commit unspeakable atrocities without hesitation. As you still struggle to comprehend the horror, you are told that your attackers should not be blamed, for they, too, are victims—of war’s psychological toll, which has stripped them of the clarity necessary for moral agency. According to John Doris and Dominic Murphy (2007), war impairs soldiers to such an extent that their actions, though horrific, are not fully their own. Conditioned by combat stressors and rendered morally blind, such soldiers should not be blamed for the atrocities they commit. This paper challenges that conclusion. I argue that Doris and Murphy’s framework dissolves responsibility precisely when it is most appropriate—when the atrocities unfold. Their account shifts focus away from victims and onto perpetrators, treating soldiers as passive instruments of circumstance rather than as moral agents. First, I challenge their claim that war erases moral agency, demonstrating that even in combat, soldiers exhibit moral selectivity. Second, I argue that their framework erases the victim’s perspective, prioritizing the wrongdoer’s cognitive state over the reality of those they harm. Third, I point the flaws in their distinction between excusing conditions and unjustified exemptions.

Suppose Paula has given her brother consent to use her car. Just as he is about to start the engine, she abruptly stops him, saying, “An unexpected situation just came up. I need the car back right now.” He obeys. This scenario illustrates a common principle: when conflicting consent decisions arise, the most recent decision should take precedence. I call this the Principle of Contemporaneous Consent. However, this principle falters when the latest decision does not meet valid consent criteria. Through hypotheticals of John, who drunkenly demands his car keys despite previously asking a friend to prevent him from driving, and Sophie, who revokes consent mid-encounter after initially agreeing, I show the moral concerns it creates. Feinberg’s proposal, focusing on the most competent decision, avoids some concerns but sacrifices real-time autonomy. Husak’s contextual approach, by contrast, lacks the clarity necessary to guide actions. To resolve these issues, I propose a dual framework focused on the object of consent. Drawing from Thomson’s distinction between first property (one's body) and second property (external possessions), I argue that first property decisions should prioritize negative consent to protect bodily autonomy, while second property decisions should uphold earlier valid choices to maintain commitment stability.

It is widely accepted in social and political philosophy that the prevailing economic disparities and achievement gaps between Black and white communities are the direct result of historical injustices. To address these disparities, various strategies have been proposed, which can be categorized into two distinct camps: race-conscious strategies (e.g., affirmative action, DEI) and race-unconscious strategies (e.g., colorblind policies which seek to eliminate race as a factor in economic opportunity). This paper argues that both camps of strategies are incomplete because they are predicated on white perceptions of Blackness and fail to engage with Black self-perception — the internalized psychological effects of racial stigma. Drawing on Frantz Fanon’s concept of White narcissism and Black inferiority, as well as Du Bois’ notion of double-consciousness, I argue that both camps assume the solution to racial economic inequality rests solely on white agents ceasing discriminatory practices and opening doors of opportunity for blacks in their institutions. However, they ignore the burden Black folks carry as a result of internalized stigma and the effects it has on the prospects of mobility even when opportunity is given.

This master's thesis discusses two key philosophical issues: the concept of personhood and the process of becoming a morally good person. Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Strawson, and A.J. Ayer, I concur with the view that humanhood is contingent, not necessary, for personhood. Personhood, I argue, is an achievement that emerges from interactions with already-persons who assist in refining human natural and rational capacities. Cases such as feral humans highlight humans who, despite naturally possessing relevant qualities for personhood, failed to achieve it due to a lack of interpersonal interactions. Moreover, just as personhood can be achieved, it can also be lost if certain traits are no longer present. In exploring good moral personhood, I challenge the notion that moral virtue stems from natural tendencies. Instead, I contend that a person becomes morally good by adhering to moral norms insofar as they promote an ideal interactive environment—one in which individuals are safe from threats to their well-being. This viewpoint emphasizes the significance of normative engagement over innate predispositions in the development of moral character.