Tanuj Raut

Researchers in neuroscience and biomedicine tend to exclude female animal subjects from preclinical studies. As a result, they fail to consider sex as a biological variable (SABV) while testing some drug or treatment, and this in turn hinders the development of safer and more efficacious treatments for women patients (section 1.1). In section 2, I consider the proposal that this exclusion is an epistemic injustice to women patients and argue that it fails. More strongly, I show that if we accept Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic subjectivity, we cannot account for the exclusion even as an epistemic wrong against women patients. To account for the intuition that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong, I briefly outline a broader notion of what it means to be an epistemic subject. In section 3, I argue that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong because it violates the epistemic claim-rights of women patients. For this I use Lani Watson’s work on epistemic claim-rights. In 3.1, I defend the claim that women patients have an epistemic claim-right against researchers’ exclusion of female animal subjects from preclinical studies. Finally, in 3.2, I consider some important upshots of my thesis.

Researchers in neuroscience and biomedicine tend to exclude female animal subjects from preclinical studies. As a result, they fail to consider sex as a biological variable (SABV) while testing some drug or treatment, and this in turn hinders the development of safer and more efficacious treatments for women patients (section 1.1). In section 2, I consider the proposal that this exclusion is an epistemic injustice to women patients and argue that it fails. More strongly, I show that if we accept Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic subjectivity, we cannot account for the exclusion even as an epistemic wrong against women patients. To account for the intuition that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong, I briefly outline a broader notion of what it means to be an epistemic subject. In section 3, I argue that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong because it violates the epistemic claim-rights of women patients. For thisI use Lani Watson’s work on epistemic claim-rights. In 3.1, I defend the claim that women patients have an epistemic claim-right against researchers’ exclusion of female animal subjects from preclinical studies. Finally, in 3.2, I consider some important upshots of my thesis.